Philodemus of Gadara references Aristippus of Cyrene
Credit Where It Is Due: Tracing the Cyrenaic Origin of Key Ideas
When asked what advantage he had ever gained for himself from philosophy, Aristotle said, “That I do, without being subject to compulsion, what some do through fear of the laws”.
With,
Being once asked what advantage philosophers have, he [Aristippus] replied, “Should all laws be repealed, we shall go on living as we do now.”
Now, there’s nothing particularly unusual about this apparent repetition, and although Aristippus was Aristotle’s older contemporary, which may indicate a certain direction of influence, it is possible that both statements are original, or apocryphal, and such retellings with different characters abound in the doxography. Nevertheless, this incident had me contemplating just how many interesting strains of thought seem to originate with, or significantly evolve from, the Cyrenaic philosophers, and how dreadfully uncredited their influences remains to this day. To take just one example, every casual Greek philosophy enthusiast knows of Diogenes the Cynic, and among many other tidbits, he is generally considered a pioneer of cosmopolitanism. And yet, Aristippus of Cyrene is famously depicted by Xenophanes rebutting the false dichotomy of Socrates thusly (underlining for emphasis is my own),
[Soc]: you are yourself a Hellene—which among Hellenes enjoy the happier existence, think you, the dominant or the subject states? [Ar.] Nay, I would have you to understand that I am just as far from placing myself in the ranks of slavery; there is, I take it, a middle path between the two which it is my ambition to tread, avoiding rule and slavery alike; it lies through freedom—the high road which leads to happiness. [Soc.] True, if only your path could avoid human beings, as it avoids rule and slavery, there would be something in what you say. But being placed as you are amidst human beings, if you purpose neither to rule nor to be ruled, and do not mean to dance attendance, if you can help it, on those who rule, you must surely see that the stronger have an art to seat the weaker on the stool of repentance both in public and in private, and to treat them as slaves. I daresay you have not failed to note this common case: a set of people has sown and planted, whereupon in comes another set and cuts their corn and fells their fruit-trees, and in every way lays siege to them because, though weaker, they refuse to pay them proper court, till at length they are persuaded to accept slavery rather than war against their betters. And in private life also, you will bear me out, the brave and powerful are known to reduce the helpless and cowardly to bondage, and to make no small profit out of their victims. [Ar.] Yes, but I must tell you I have a simple remedy against all such misadventures. I do not confine myself to any single civil community. I roam the wide world a foreigner.
What Aristippus is describing, again as the elder contemporary, is that selfsame cosmopolitanism, the consideration of the whole world as one’s country, that Diogenes of Sinope more famously advocates — and yet who knows of this?
When we move to better-known territory, Epicurus’ debt to Aristippus and the Cyrenaics is generally admitted, but even here the scope is severely overlooked. The general impression given is that Epicurus and Aristippus share only the superficial similarity of regarding the ethical end to be pleasure, by which terminology they really mean very different things, and that is where the comparison dries up, though generosity dictates acknowledging the first Greek hedonists for completeness’ sake before promptly moving on.
I have already written a seperate post comparing key Epicurean ideas with close (or at least, closer than one would imagine) parallels found among Aristippus and the orthodox Cyrenaics. One major idea that the Cyrenaics supply the Epicureans is commonly referred to as The Cradle Argument, wherein the instinctive, natural, uncorrupted desires of infants and animals is taken as good evidence for the proper values of man, and an arch example of Nature supplying the norm. If you research this topic, you will find sources citing Epicureans, Stoics, perhaps even mention of Eudoxus, but in fact, according to Diognes Laërtius, the Cyrenaics actually pioneered this argument, claiming that “a proof that pleasure is the end is that we are favorably inclined to it without deliberate choice from childhood”, and as further evidence, “pleasure is satisfying to all animals, and pain is repellent”. Laërtius also claims that Epicurus’ infamous understanding of the Gods, that is, his denial of the common myths, was largely inspired by the book On the Gods by the later Cyrenaic philosopher Theodorus the Atheist. This is not to mention the tempering, pro-social influence of Anniceris, whose exaltation of friendship, more than any other predecessor, resemble the mature ethics of Epicurus.
Much more could be said on this topic, but I plan instead to create a follow-up post in the future simply highlighting some key ideas introduced by the Cyrenaics in an effort to ground a foundation for practice and belief, without taking too much effort to chase down the influential flow-on effects.
Happy Heroism
One of the striking features of most Greek philosophy is its aspiration to rebuild its practitioners from the “bare self ” up—to determine what is universally good and desirable, and to reorganize life and society based on this determination. But modern philosophers have rightly argued that the bare self is a fantasy; selfhood is largely constituted by libidinal, evaluative, and narrative orientations, which can only be altered gradually and piecemeal. (2017).
…one complex of values that will prove illuminating in this study revolves around masculine competition and honor. This complex finds its most influential expression in Homer, whose epics The Iliad and The Odyssey precede Cyrenaicism by several hundred years. Homer’s enormous influence on subsequent Greek culture is well indicated by the claim in Plato’s Republic that “this poet educated Greece” (606e). The capacity of so-called “heroic values” to shed light on classical Greek culture has recently been demonstrated in studies of both Socratic philosophy and Athenian legal procedure. Closely related to this are other features of Homeric ethics and its descendants in lyric and tragic poetry, which will help to fill in the background behind otherwise puzzling Cyrenaic beliefs or behavior. (Lampe, 2017).
Once when [Aristippus] was sailing to Corinth and was caught in a storm it happened that he became upset. Someone said, “We common people weren’t afraid, but you philosophers acted like cowards!” “Well,” he answered, “we aren’t contending for the same kind of soul!” (D.L. 2.71).
“…he replied that of course the other hadn’t been terribly worried about the soul of a totally worthless loser [nequissimi nebulonis], but he was afraid for the soul of Aristippus!” (Aulus Gellius, Noct. Att. 19.1.1 = SSR 4a.49).
According to Aelian, Aristippus’s response to his fellow sailor is, “Naturally [I was afraid]! After all, your concern and risk just now involved an unhappy life, but mine involved a happy one” (VH 9.20).
In his book The Birth of Hedonism, Kurt Lampe suggests that the adaptability and sociability of Aristuppus is reminiscent of the “hero’s cunning” familiar from Homeric epics.
This social cunning blends into temperance as Diogenes’ testimony proceeds, beginning with the statement that Aristippus “always dealt successfully with whatever happened.” The phrase “deal successfully” (eu diatithemenos) implies active manipulation of the situation, which might require charm, quick-wittedness, and courage. But we are also drifting into the domain of temperance, the function of which is to keep before the mind’s eye what really matters and what does not. One reason Aristippus makes such good use of available opportunities, this passage hints, is because he knows that most situations offer some pleasures. This hint is corroborated by the very next clause, which says that Aristippus enjoys what is present and does not worry about what is absent…It is only by understanding emotionally and intellectually what matters and knowing that one has the capacity to secure these goods that anyone can really focus on the present. (Lampe, 2017).
As mentioned in the introductory paragraph, it may appear that the lifestyle advocated by Cyrenaics would be difficult to romanticize as explicitly heroic, however, such comparisons are not unusual for iconoclastic philosophical thinkers of this period:
It may seem audacious to compare Aristippus with Odysseus, but we will see below that this comparison occurs more than once in our ancient evidence ([Plut.] Vit. Hom. 2.150 = SSR 4a.55, D.L. 2.79–80 [twice]). Moreover, the shipwreck anecdote we have just encountered recalls Odysseus’s shipwreck on Phaeacia, just as the overwhelming impression Aristippus makes on the Rhodians recalls Odysseus’s impression on the Phaeacians (whose young men he defeats in athletic competition, and whose king offers him the princess’s hand in marriage [Od. 7–8]). More generally, heroic posturing is a common element in Greek philosophizing. As [Angela] Hobbs has convincingly shown, Plato’s dialogues contain an extended rumination on the allure and psychology of Homeric heroes and an attempt to represent philosophers like Socrates as alternative role models. Heroic motifs are also scattered throughout many Stoic and Epicurean texts…(2017).
Hegesias the Death Persuader:
While Hegesias is a pessimist and diverges sharply from the eudaemonic telos of orthodox Cyrenaicism, his allusions to heroism are instructive, particularly for understanding the later comments and actions of someone like Theodorus. Hegesias believes that,
The wise person will do everything for his own sake, because he considers no one equal to himself in worth. For even if he seems to receive the greatest profit from someone, it isn’t equivalent to what he himself provides. (D.L. 2.95)
The Hegesiac sage also displays powerful levels of magnanimity, due to their ethical superiority:
errors receive forgiveness. For a person does not err voluntarily, but because he is coerced by some passion. And ‹they› won’t hate, but will rather share ‹their› teaching” (D.L. 2.95).
Theodorus the Atheist:
Theodorus famously displays his courage and superiority in a collection of oft-repeated anecdotes, not to mention his disregard for the danger inherent in impious suggestions, which won him the designation of ho atheos. Cicero’s renditions of Theodorus’ strength in the face of powerful figures will suffice to illustrate his attitude:
[VERSION 1] When Lysimachus was threatening Theodorus with death, he said, “It’s really a mighty thing you’ve accomplished, if you’ve acquired the power of the cantharis beetle! (Cic. Tusc. 5.117 = SSR 4h.7)
[VERSION 2] Shouldn’t we admire Theodorus of Cyrene? When king Lysimachus threatened him with torture, he replied, “Direct your threats to these luxuriously dressed friends of yours; it makes no difference to Theodorus whether he rots under ground or above it!” (Cic. Tusc. 1.102 = SSR 4h.8)
Philo also describes occasions where Theodorus personally compared himself to Homeric heroes in order to explain the true cause of his prior expulsions from Cyrene and Athens:
The story goes that when Theodorus, nicknamed the Atheist, had been exiled from Athens and came to Lysimachus, an official mocked him for his flight and listed its causes: that he had been exiled on account of con- demnation for atheism and corruption of the youth. “I wasn’t exiled,” he replied. “The same thing happened to me as to Zeus’ son Heracles. He too was offloaded by the Argonauts, not because he did anything wrong, but because all by himself he was a full load and ballast and weighed them down. So he made his fellow sailors afraid the boat would fill with water. I changed residence for the same reason. The citizens of Athens couldn’t keep up with the profundity and magnitude of my thought, and they also envied me.” Then Lysimachus asked, “And were you also exiled from your own country because of envy?” And he answered, “Not because of envy, but because of the excesses of my nature, which my country couldn’t accommodate. Just like when Semele was pregnant with Dionysus, she couldn’t carry him for the defined time until his birth; but Zeus, struck with fear, extracted the fruit of her womb before its time, and made him equal in honor to the gods. In the same way some deity or god raised me up and decided to send me as a colonist to a better place, Athens, because my own country was too narrow to receive such a mass of philosophical wisdom.” (Quod omn. bon. lib. 127–30 = SSR 4h.9)
Diogenes Laertius also relates a dialogue between Theordorus and Stilpo, illustrating Theodorus’ sly wit and an apparent proclamation of self-deification:
“Are you, Theodorus, what you declare yourself to be?” To this he assented, and Stilpo continued, “And do you say you are god?” To this he agreed. “Then it follows that you are god.” Theodorus accepted this, and Stilpo said with a smile, “But, you rascal, at this rate you would allow yourself to be a jackdaw and ten thousand other things.”
Epicurus of Samos:
There are multiple quotes from Epicurus comparing himself and other members of his school to the Gods and immortals, in order to praise the scope and importance of his teachings. We see an echo of Theodorean influence perhaps, which is all the more plausible considering Diogenes Laertius’ claim that Epicurus’ view on the gods was taken from Thedorus’ book. Some examples of comparisons include:
Vatican Saying 78: "The truly noble man busies himself chiefly with wisdom and friendship, of which the one is an understandable good but the other is immortal."
Go on thy way as immortal, and think of us as immortal too. (Epicurea fragment translated by Bailey).
Meditate then, on all these things, and on those things which are related to them, both day and night, and both alone and with like-minded companions. For if you will do this, you will never be disturbed while asleep or awake by imagined fears, but you will live like a god among men. For a man who lives among immortal blessings is in no respect like a mortal being. (Letter to Menoeceus).
Norman DeWitt explains that, “Paradoxical as it must seem, Epicurus knows no higher praise than to call a thing immortal; being opposed in this text to understandable, it must mean "passing understanding."” (DeWitt, 1973). Epicurus famously denied the immortality of the soul, and also denied that the Gods interfered with the lives of men. Nevertheless, Epicurus was also somewhat “deified” in his sect, enjoying an immortality of reputation persisting long after his death.
Sources:
Pillars of Pleasure
Self-mastery or self-control, within Cyrenaic ethics, refers to the ability to maintain purposeful awareness and direction over one’s actions. This value forms the bedrock for wisely exercising choice and avoidance (prudence), informed by the fundamental virtue of temperance (disdaining excess), while also underpinning the importance placed on securing internal and external freedom (autonomy), so that we are able to act according to our own sober judgement. The successful Cyrenaic engages in philosophical education and study in order to properly understand the nature of pleasure, self, and world — cutting through attachment and insatiability, thereby transforming actions and outlook in accordance with the true philosophy.
Confidence is a Cyrenaic watchword, appearing multiple times in the doxography, and describes the foundational attitude formed from the reasonable expectation of success, due to an assurance of personal ability and versatility, underpinning the active pursuit of simple pleasures. Confidence is concomitant with the development of the Cyrenaic virtues of adaptability and sociability, dovetailing with the simple accomodation of oneself to the available pleasures most situations easily offer, these being all that is necessary for enjoyment, and the sage masterfully capitalises on any circumstance.
Horace on Aristippus
nullius addictus iurare in uerba magistri,
quo me cumque rapit tempestas, deferor hospes.
Nunc agilis fio et mersor ciuilibus undis,
uirtutis uerae custos rigidusque satelles;
nunc in Aristippi furtim praecepta relabor
et mihi res, non me rebus subiungere conor.
si laedit caupona, Ferentinum ire iubebo;
nam neque divitibus contingunt gaudia solis
nec vixit male, qui natus moriensque fefellit:
si prodesse tuis pauloque benignius ipsum
te tractare voles, accedes siccus ad unctum.
‘si pranderet holus patienter, regibus uti
nollet Aristippus.’ ‘si sciret regibus uti,
fastidiret holus, qui me notat.’ utrius horum
verba probes et facta, doce, vel iunior audi,
cur sit Aristippi potior sententia. namque
mordacem Cynicum sic eludebat, ut aiunt:
‘scurror ego ipse mihi, populo tu: rectius hoc et
splendidius multo est. equus ut me portet, alat rex,
officium facio: tu poscis vilia—verum
dante minor, quamvis fers te nullius egentem.’
omnis Aristippum decuit color et status et res,
temptantem maiora, fere praesentibus aequum.
contra, quem duplici panno patientia velat,
mirabor, vitae via si conversa decebit.
alter purpureum non exspectabit amictum,
quidlibet indutus celeberrima per loca vadet
personamque feret non inconcinnus utramque;
alter Mileti textam cane peius et angui
vitabit chlanidem, morietur frigore, si non
rettuleris pannum. refer et sine vivat ineptus.
If pleasant rest, and sleep till seven o'clock, delight you; if dust and the rumbling of wheels, if the tavern offend you, I shall order you off for Ferentinum. For joys are not the property of the rich alone: nor has he lived ill, who at his birth and at his death has passed unnoticed. If you are disposed to be of service to your friends, and to treat yourself with somewhat more indulgence, you, being poor, must pay your respects to the great. Aristippus, if he could dine to his satisfaction on herbs, would never frequent [the tables] of the great. If he who blames me, [replies Aristippus,] knew how to live with the great, he would scorn his vegetables. Tell me, which maxim and conduct of the two you approve; or, since you are my junior, hear the reason why Aristippus' opinion is preferable; for thus, as they report, he baffled the snarling cynic: "I play the buffoon for my own advantage, you [to please] the populace. This [conduct of mine] is better and far more honorable; that a horse may carry and a great man feed me, pay court to the great: you beg for refuse, an inferior to the [poor] giver; though you pretend you are in want of nothing." As for Aristippus, every complexion of life, every station and circumstance sat gracefully upon him, aspiring in general to greater things, yet equal to the present: on the other hand, I shall be much surprised, if a contrary way of life should become [this cynic], whom obstinacy clothes with a double rag. The one will not wait for his purple robe; but dressed in any thing, will go through the most frequented places, and without awkwardness support either character: the other will shun the cloak wrought at Miletus with greater aversion than [the bite of] dog or viper; he will die with cold, unless you restore him his ragged garment; restore it, and let him live like a fool as he is.
Original Latin:
danda est ellebori multo pars maxima avaris:
nescio an Anticyram ratio illis destinet omnem.
heredes Staberi summam incidere sepulcro,
ni sic fecissent, gladiatorum dare centum
damnati populo paria atque epulum arbitrio Arri,
frumenti quantum metit Africa. 'sive ego prave
seu recte hoc volui, ne sis patruus mihi': credo,
hoc Staberi prudentem animum vidisse. quid ergo
sensit, cum summam patrimoni insculpere saxo
heredes voluit? quoad vixit, credidit ingens
pauperiem vitium et cavit nihil acrius, ut, si
forte minus locuples uno quadrante perisset,
ipse videretur sibi nequior. 'omnis enim res,
virtus, fama, decus, divina humanaque pulchris
divitiis parent; quas qui construxerit, ille
clarus erit, fortis, iustus.' 'sapiensne?' 'etiam, et rex
et quidquid volet.' hoc veluti virtute paratum
speravit magnae laudi fore. quid simile isti
Graecus Aristippus? qui servos proicere aurum
in media iussit Libya, quia tardius irent
propter onus segnes. uter est insanior horum?
nil agit exemplum, litem quod lite resolvit.
siquis emat citharas, emptas conportet in unum,
nec studio citharae nec Musae deditus ulli,
si scalpra et formas non sutor, nautica vela
aversus mercaturis: delirus et amens
undique dicatur merito. qui discrepat istis,
qui nummos aurumque recondit, nescius uti
conpositis metuensque velut contingere sacrum?
siquis ad ingentem frumenti semper acervum
porrectus vigilet cum longo fuste neque illinc
audeat esuriens dominus contingere granum
ac potius foliis parcus vescatur amaris;
si positis intus Chii veterisque Falerni
mille cadis—nihil est: tercentum milibus, acre
potet acetum; age si et stramentis incubet unde-
octoginta annos natus, cui stragula vestis,
blattarum ac tinearum epulae, putrescat in arca:
nimirum insanus paucis videatur, eo quod
maxima pars hominum morbo iactatur eodem
Translation into English by C. Smart:
By far the largest portion of hellebore is to be administered to the covetous: I know not, whether reason does not consign all Anticyra to their use. The heirs of Staberius engraved the sum [which he left them] upon his tomb: unless they had acted in this manner, they were under an obligation to exhibit a hundred pair of gladiators to the people, beside an entertainment according to the direction of Arrius; and as much corn as is cut in Africa. Whether I have willed this rightly or wrongly, it was my will; be not severe against me, [cries the testator]. I imagine the provident mind of Staberius foresaw this. What then did he moan, when he appointed by will that his heirs should engrave the sum of their patrimony upon his tomb-stone? As long as he lived, he deemed poverty a great vice, and nothing did he more industriously avoid: insomuch that, had he died less rich by one farthing, the more Iniquitous would he have appeared to himself. For every thing, virtue, fame, glory, divine and human affairs, are subservient to the attraction of riches; which whoever shall have accumulated, shall be illustrious, brave, just—What, wise too? Ay, and a king, and whatever else he pleases. This he was in hopes would greatly redound to his praise, as if it had been an acquisition of his virtue. In what respect did the Grecian Aristippus act like this; who ordered his slaves to throw away his gold in the midst of Libya; because, encumbered with the burden, they traveled too slowly? Which is the greater madman of these two? An example is nothing to the purpose, that decides one controversy by creating another. If any person were to buy lyres, and [when he had bought them] to stow them in one place; though neither addicted to the lyre nor to any one muse whatsoever: if a man were [to buy] paring-knives and lasts, and were no shoemaker; sails fit for navigation, and were averse to merchandizing; he every where deservedly be styled delirious, and out of his senses. How does he differ from these, who boards up cash and gold [and] knows not how to use them when accumulated, and is afraid to touch them as if they were consecrated? If any person before a great heap of corn should keep perpetual watch with a long club, and, though the owner of it, and hungry, should not dare to take a single grain from it; and should rather feed upon bitter leaves: if while a thousand hogsheads of Chian, or old Falernian, is stored up within (nay, that is nothing—three hundred thousand), he drink nothing, but what is mere sharp vinegars again—if, wanting but one year of eighty, he should lie upon straw, who has bed-clothes rotting in his chest, the food of worms and moths; he would seem mad, belike, but to few persons: because the greatest part of mankind labors, under the same malady.
Hedonic Eudaemonism - Achieving The Pleasant Life
In this post, I’d like to thread the needle on a topic of importance for promoting and following Cyrenaicism as a way of life: what, properly considered, is our purpose, end, or telos? I’ll offer the label “hedonic eudaemonism” as best encapsulating the telos of our New Cyrenaicism, because it emphasises the long-range, totalising focus on the happiness of our life as a whole, while also describing the pleasurable quality and content in present-experiential terms. By describing our goal in these terms, we leave no room for Stoicising interpretations of apathetic calm as commanding the character of “eudaimonia”, for example, and we also head-off any lingering misunderstanding that the tantalising fancy of the moment ought enslave our attention. We are concerned with achieving happiness in a robust and lasting manner, and the nature of that happiness is found in living “as easily and pleasantly as possible”.
Other questions follow: what is our ultimate good? What is the status of other goods in relation to our end and our ultimate good? How do we go about achieving our end?
I propose the following:
1. Our ultimate good, or summum bonum, is this life itself. The purpose or end of this life is to live pleasantly/pleasurably.
2. Other goods are either instrumental to, or essential components of, the pleasant life.
3. Achieving and enjoying the pleasant life requires exercising practical reason in the realm of choice and avoidance, in order to secure and maintain those aforementioned goods. It is the role of philosophical education to identify, enumerate, and categorise those goods, while also providing us the tools and techniques required to achieve them.
I believe this presentation of Aristippean Cyrenaicism is historically defensible, philosophically preferable, and practically beneficial. The doxographical material we have regarding Aristippus himself suggests a figure who is undeniably concerned with the quality of his life as a whole — it shows us someone who engages in training and study with clear future-concern, someone who values personal character and virtues not merely as means to the end of gaining particular pleasures, but as inseparable elements of The Good Life itself.
Such an understanding not only brings early Cyrenaicism into clearer alignment with the Greek ethical tradition in which Aristippus was embedded at Athens, it also better accounts for the Socratic flavour of his associations, and more easily accommodates the extant anecdotes, as against any awkward attempts to read later Cyrenaic developments back onto the founder of the school. With this in mind, we come to understand Aristippus as a radical innovator more so in terms of his attitude towards pleasure, his manner of achieving it, and his confident expression — though these are erected upon familiar intellectual soil — rather than as someone promoting a rather complex foundationalist theory, completely divergent from any of his contemporaries, in a manner starkly at odds with the anti-dogmatic, moderate-skepticism he expressed elsewhere.
The next step is of course to proceed with a breakdown of those component qualities which one ought to cultivate in order to achieve and enjoy the pleasant life. That subject will be covered in a future post, where I will enumerate the “Pillars of Pleasure” which support successful, happy living.
Aristippus As A Socratic
Diogenes Läertius - The Lives of Eminent Philosophers - Chapter 8: Aristippus (R.D. Hicks Edition)
Chapter 8. ARISTIPPUS (c. 435-350 B.C.)
Aristippus was by birth a citizen of Cyrene and, as Aeschines informs us, was drawn to Athens by the fame of Socrates. Having come forward as a lecturer or sophist, as Phanias of Eresus, the Peripatetic, informs us, he was the first of the followers of Socrates to charge fees and to send money to his master. And on one occasion the sum of twenty minae which he had sent was returned to him, Socrates declaring that the supernatural sign would not let him take it; the very offer, in fact, annoyed him. Xenophon was no friend to Aristippus; and for this reason he has made Socrates direct against Aristippus the discourse in which he denounces pleasure. Not but what Theodorus in his work On Sects abuses him, and so does Plato in the dialogue On the Soul, as has been shown elsewhere.
He was capable of adapting himself to place, time and person, and of playing his part appropriately under whatever circumstances. Hence he found more favour than anybody else with Dionysius, because he could always turn the situation to good account. He derived pleasure from what was present, and did not toil to procure the enjoyment of something not present Hence Diogenes called him the king's poodle Timon, too, sneered at him for luxury in these words:
Such was the delicate nature of Aristippus, who groped after error by touch.
He is said to have ordered a partridge to be bought at a cost of fifty drachmae, and, when someone censured him, he inquired, "Would not you have given an obol for it?" and, being answered in the affirmative, rejoined, "Fifty drachmae are no more to me." And when Dionysius gave him his choice of three courtesans, he carried off all three, saying, "Paris paid dearly for giving the preference to one out of three." And when he had brought them as far as the porch, he let them go. To such lengths did he go both in choosing and in disdaining. Hence the remark of Strato, or by some accounts of Plato, "You alone are endowed with the gift to flaunt in robes or go in rags." He bore with Dionysius when he spat on him, and to one who took him to task he replied, "If the fishermen let themselves be drenched with sea-water in order to catch a gudgeon, ought I not to endure to be wetted with negus in order to take a blenny?"
Diogenes, washing the dirt from his vegetables, saw him passing and jeered at him in these terms, "If you had learnt to make these your diet, you would not have paid court to kings," to which his rejoinder was, "And if you knew how to associate with men, you would not be washing vegetables." Being asked what he had gained from philosophy, he replied, "The ability to feel at ease in any society." Being reproached for his extravagance, he said, "If it were wrong to be extravagant, it would not be in vogue at the festivals of the gods."
Being once asked what advantage philosophers have, he replied, "Should all laws be repealed, we shall go on living as we do now." When Dionysius inquired what was the reason that philosophers go to rich men's houses, while rich men no longer visit philosophers, his reply was that "the one know what they need while the other do not." When he was reproached by Plato for his extravagance, he inquired, "Do you think Dionysius a good man?" and the reply being in the affirmative, "And yet," said he, "he lives more extravagantly than I do. So that there is nothing to hinder a man living extravagantly and well." To the question how the educated differ from the uneducated, he replied, "Exactly as horses that have been trained differ from untrained horses." One day, as he entered the house of a courtesan, one of the lads with him blushed, whereupon he remarked, "It is not going in that is dangerous, but being unable to go out."
Some one brought him a knotty problem with the request that he would untie the knot. "Why, you simpleton," said he, "do you want it untied, seeing that it causes trouble enough as it is?" "It is better," he said, "to be a beggar than to be uneducated; the one needs money, the others need to be humanized." One day that he was reviled, he tried to slip away; the other pursued him, asking, "Why do you run away?" "Because," said he, "as it is your privilege to use foul language, so it is my privilege not to listen." In answer to one who remarked that he always saw philosophers at rich men's doors, he said, "So, too, physicians are in attendance on those who are sick, but no one for that reason would prefer being sick to being a physician."
It happened once that he set sail for Corinth and, being overtaken by a storm, he was in great consternation. Some one said, "We plain men are not alarmed, and are you philosophers turned cowards?" To this he replied, "The lives at stake in the two cases are not comparable." When some one gave himself airs for his wide learning, this is what he said: "As those who eat most and take the most exercise are not better in health than those who restrict themselves to what they require, so too it is not wide reading but useful reading that tends to excellence." An advocate, having pleaded for him and won the case, thereupon put the question, "What good did Socrates do you?" "Thus much," was the reply, "that what you said of me in your speech was true."
He gave his daughter Arete the very best advice, training her up to despise excess. He was asked by some one in what way his son would be the better for being educated. He replied, "If nothing more than this, at all events, when in the theatre he will not sit down like a stone upon stone." When some one brought his son as a pupil, he asked a fee of 500 drachmae. The father objected, "For that sum I can buy a slave." "Then do so," was the reply, "and you will have two." He said that he did not take money from his friends for his own use, but to teach them upon what objects their money should be spent. When he was reproached for employing a rhetorician to conduct his case, he made reply, "Well, if I give a dinner, I hire a cook."
Being once compelled by Dionysius to enunciate some doctrine of philosophy, "It would be ludicrous," he said, "that you should learn from me what to say, and yet instruct me when to say it." At this, they say, Dionysius was offended and made him recline at the end of the table. And Aristippus said, "You must have wished to confer distinction on the last place." To some one who boasted of his diving, "Are you not ashamed," said he, "to brag of that which a dolphin can do?" Being asked on one occasion what is the difference between the wise man and the unwise, "Strip them both," said he, "and send them among strangers and you will know." To one who boasted that he could drink a great deal without getting drunk, his rejoinder was, "And so can a mule."
To one who accused him of living with a courtesan, he put the question, "Why, is there any difference between taking a house in which many people have lived before and taking one in which nobody has ever lived?" The answer being "No," he continued, "Or again, between sailing in a ship in which ten thousand persons have sailed before and in one in which nobody has ever sailed?" "There is no difference." "Then it makes no difference," said he, "whether the woman you live with has lived with many or with nobody." To the accusation that, although he was a pupil of Socrates, he took fees, his rejoinder was, "Most certainly I do, for Socrates, too, when certain people sent him corn and wine, used to take a little and return all the rest; and he had the foremost men in Athens for his stewards, whereas mine is my slave Eutychides." He enjoyed the favours of Laïs, as Sotion states in the second book of his Successions of Philosophers. To those who censured him his defence was, "I have Lais, not she me; and it is not abstinence from pleasures that is best, but mastery over them without ever being worsted." to one who reproached him with extravagance in catering, he replied, "Wouldn't you have bought this if you could have got it for three obols?" The answer being in the affirmative, "Very well, then," said Aristippus, "I am no longer a lover of pleasure, it is you who are a lover of money." One day Simus, the steward of Dionysius, a Phrygian by birth and a rascally fellow, was showing him costly houses with tesselated pavements, when Aristippus coughed up phlegm and spat in his face. And on his resenting this he replied, "I could not find any place more suitable."
When Charondas (or, as others say, Phaedo) inquired, "Who is this who reeks with unguents?" he replied, "It is I, unlucky wight, and the still more unlucky Persian king. But, as none of the other animals are at any disadvantage on that account, consider whether it be not the same with man. Confound the effeminates who spoil for us the use of good perfume." Being asked how Socrates died, he answered, "As I would wish to die myself." Polyxenus the sophist once paid him a visit and, after having seen ladies present and expensive entertainment, reproached him with it later. After an interval Aristippus asked him, "Can you join us today?" On the other accepting the invitation, Aristippus inquired, "Why, then, did you find fault? For you appear to blame the cost and not the entertainment." When his servant was carrying money and found the load too heavy--the story is told by Bion in his Lectures--Aristippus cried, "Pour away the greater part, and carry no more than you can manage." Being once on a voyage, as soon as he discovered the vessel to be manned by pirates, he took out his money and began to count it, and then, as if by inadvertence, he let the money fall into the sea, and naturally broke out into lamentation. Another version of the story attributes to him the further remark that it was better for the money to perish on account of Aristippus than for Aristippus to perish on account of the money. Dionysius once asked him what he was come for, and he said it was to impart what he had and obtain what he had not. But some make his answer to have been, "When I needed wisdom, I went to Socrates; now that I am in need of money, I come to you." He used to complain of mankind that in purchasing earthenware they made trial whether it rang true, but had no regular standard by which to judge life. Others attribute this remark to Diogenes. One day Dionysius over the wine commanded everybody to put on purple and dance. Plato declined, quoting the line:
Aristippus, however, put on the dress and, as he was about to dance, was ready with the repartee:
Even amid the Bacchic revelry
True modesty will not be put to shame.
He made a request to Dionysius on behalf of a friend and, failing to obtain it, fell down at his feet. And when some one jeered at him, he made reply, "It is not I who am to blame, but Dionysius who has his ears in his feet." He was once staying in Asia and was taken prisoner by Artaphernes, the satrap. "Can you be cheerful under these circumstances?" some one asked. "Yes, you simpleton," was the reply, "for when should I be more cheerful than now that I am about to converse with Artaphernes?" Those who went through the ordinary curriculum, but in their studies stopped short at philosophy, he used to compare to the suitors of Penelope. For the suitors won Melantho, Polydora and the rest of the handmaidens, but were anything but successful in their wooing of the mistress. A similar remark is ascribed to Ariston. For, he said, when Odysseus went down into the under-world, he saw nearly all the dead and made their acquaintance, but he never set eyes upon their queen herself.
Again, when Aristippus was asked what are the subjects which handsome boys ought to learn, his reply was, "Those which will be useful to them when they are grown up." To the critic who censured him for leaving Socrates to go to Dionysius, his rejoinder was, "Yes, but I came to Socrates for education and to Dionysius for recreation." When he had made some money by teaching, Socrates asked him, "Where did you get so much?" to which he replied, "Where you got so little."
A courtesan having told him that she was with child by him, he replied, "You are no more sure of this than if, after running through coarse rushes, you were to say you had been pricked by one in particular." Someone accused him of exposing his son as if it was not his offspring Whereupon he replied, "Phlegm, too, and vermin we know to be of our own begetting, but for all that, because they are useless, we cast them as far from us as possible." He received a sum of money from Dionysius at the same time that Plato carried off a book and, when he was twitted with this, his reply was,, "Well, I want money, Plato wants books." Some one asked him why he let himself be refuted by Dionysius. "For the same reason," said he, "as the others refute him."
Dionysius met a request of his for money with the words, "Nay, but you told me that the wise man would never be in want." To which he retorted, "Pay! Pay! and then let us discuss the question;" and when he was paid, "Now you see, do you not," said he, "that I was not found wanting?" Dionysius having repeated to him the lines:
Whoso betakes him to a prince's court
Becomes his slave, albeit of free birth,
he retorted:
This is stated by Diocles in his work On the Lives of Philosophers; other writers refer the anecdotes to Plato. After getting in a rage with Aeschines, he presently addressed him thus: "Are we not to make it up and desist from vapouring, or will you wait for some one to reconcile us over the wine-bowl?" To which he replied, "Agreed." "Then remember," Aristippus went on, "that, though I am your senior, I made the first approaches." Thereupon Aeschines said, "Well done, by Hera, you are quite right; you are a much better man than I am. For the quarrel was of my beginning, you make the first move to friendship." Such are the repartees which are attributed to him.
[…]
He laid down as the end the smooth motion resulting in sensation.
Having written his life, let me now proceed to pass in review the philosophers of the Cyrenaic school which sprang from him, although some call themselves followers of Hegesias, others followers of Anniceris, others again of Theodorus. Not but what we shall notice further the pupils of Phaedo, the chief of whom were called the school of Eretria. [86] The case stands thus. The disciples of Aristippus were his daughter Arete, Aethiops of Ptolemais, and Antipater of Cyrene. The pupil of Arete was Aristippus, who went by the name of mother-taught, and his pupil was Theodorus, known as the atheist, subsequently as "god." Antipater's pupil was Epitimides of Cyrene, his was Paraebates, and he had as pupils Hegesias, the advocate of suicide, and Anniceris, who ransomed Plato.
Those then who adhered to the teaching of Aristippus and were known as Cyrenaics held the following opinions. They laid down that there are two states, pleasure and pain, the former a smooth, the latter a rough motion, and that pleasure does not differ from pleasure nor is one pleasure more pleasant than another. The one state is agreeable and the other repellent to all living things. However, the bodily pleasure which is the end is, according to Panaetius in his work On the Sects, not the settled pleasure following the removal of pains, or the sort of freedom from discomfort which Epicurus accepts and maintains to be the end. They also hold that there is a difference between "end" and "happiness." Our end is particular pleasure, whereas happiness is the sum total of all particular pleasures, in which are included both past and future pleasures.
Particular pleasure is desirable for its own sake, whereas happiness is desirable not for its own sake but for the sake of particular pleasures. That pleasure is the end is proved by the fact that from our youth up we are instinctively attracted to it, and, when we obtain it, seek for nothing more, and shun nothing so much as its opposite, pain. Pleasure is good even if it proceed from the most unseemly conduct, as Hippobotus says in his work On the Sects. For even if the action be irregular, still, at any rate, the resultant pleasure is desirable for its own sake and is good. The removal of pain, however, which is put forward in Epicurus, seems to them not to be pleasure at all, any more than the absence of pleasure is pain. For both pleasure and pain they hold to consist in motion, whereas absence of pleasure like absence of pain is not motion, since painlessness is the condition of one who is, as it were, asleep. They assert that some people may fail to choose pleasure because their minds are perverted; not all mental pleasures and pains, however, are derived from bodily counterparts. For instance, we take disinterested delight in the prosperity of our country which is as real as our delight in our own prosperity. Nor again do they admit that pleasure is derived from the memory or expectation of good, which was a doctrine of Epicurus. For they assert that the movement affecting the mind is exhausted in course of time. Again they hold that pleasure is not derived from sight or from hearing alone. At all events, we listen with pleasure to imitation of mourning, while the reality causes pain. They gave the names of absence of pleasure and absence of pain to the intermediate conditions. However, they insist that bodily pleasures are far better than mental pleasures, and bodily pains far worse than mental pains, and that this is the reason why offenders are punished with the former. For they assumed pain to be more repellent, pleasure more congenial. For these reasons they paid more attention to the body than to the mind. Hence, although pleasure is in itself desirable, yet they hold that the things which are productive of certain pleasures are often of a painful nature, the very opposite of pleasure; so that to accumulate the pleasures which are productive of happiness appears to them a most irksome business.
They do not accept the doctrine that every wise man lives pleasantly and every fool painfully, but regard it as true for the most part only. It is sufficient even if we enjoy but each single pleasure as it comes. They say that prudence is a good, though desirable not in itself but on account of its consequences; that we make friends from interested motives, just as we cherish any part of the body so long as we have it; that some of the virtues are found even in the foolish; that bodily training contributes to the acquisition of virtue; that the sage will not give way to envy or love or superstition, since these weaknesses are due to mere empty opinion; he will, however, feel pain and fear, these being natural affections; and that wealth too is productive of pleasure, though not desirable for its own sake.
They affirm that mental affections can be known, but not the objects from which they come; and they abandoned the study of nature because of its apparent uncertainty, but fastened on logical inquiries because of their utility. But Meleager in his second book On Philosophical Opinions, and Clitomachus in his first book On the Sects, affirm that they maintain Dialectic as well as Physics to be useless, since, when one has learnt the theory of good and evil, it is possible to speak with propriety, to be free from superstition, and to escape the fear of death. They also held that nothing is just or honourable or base by nature, but only by convention and custom. Nevertheless the good man will be deterred from wrong-doing by the penalties imposed and the prejudices that it would arouse. Further that the wise man really exists. They allow progress to be attainable in philosophy as well as in other matters. They maintain that the pain of one man exceeds that of another, and that the senses are not always true and trustworthy.
The school of Hegesias, as it is called, adopted the same ends, namely pleasure and pain. In their view there is no such thing as gratitude or friendship or beneficence, because it is not for themselves that we choose to do these things but simply from motives of interest, apart from which such conduct is nowhere found. They denied the possibility of happiness, for the body is infected with much suffering, while the soul shares in the sufferings of the body and is a prey to disturbance, and fortune often disappoints. From all this it follows that happiness cannot be realized. Moreover, life and death are each desirable in turn. But that there is anything naturally pleasant or unpleasant they deny; when some men are pleased and others pained by the same objects, this is owing to the lack or rarity or surfeit of such objects. Poverty and riches have no relevance to pleasure; for neither the rich nor the poor as such have any special share in pleasure. Slavery and freedom, nobility and low birth, honour and dishonour, are alike indifferent in a calculation of pleasure. To the fool life is advantageous, while to the wise it is a matter of indifference. The wise man will be guided in all he does by his own interests, for there is none other whom he regards as equally deserving. For supposing him to reap the greatest advantages from another, they would not be equal to what he contributes himself. They also disallow the claims of the senses, because they do not lead to accurate knowledge. Whatever appears rational should be done. They affirmed that allowance should be made for errors, for no man errs voluntarily, but under constraint of some suffering; that we should not hate men, but rather teach them better. The wise man will not have so much advantage over others in the choice of goods as in the avoidance of evils, making it his end to live without pain of body or mind. [96] This then, they say, is the advantage accruing to those who make no distinction between any of the objects which produce pleasure.
The school of Anniceris in other respects agreed with them, but admitted that friendship and gratitude and respect for parents do exist in real life, and that a good man will sometimes act out of patriotic motives. Hence, if the wise man receive annoyance, he will be none the less happy even if few pleasures accrue to him. The happiness of a friend is not in itself desirable, for it is not felt by his neighbour. Instruction is not sufficient in itself to inspire us with confidence and to make us rise superior to the opinion of the multitude. Habits must be formed because of the bad disposition which has grown up in us from the first. A friend should be cherished not merely for his utility--for, if that fails, we should then no longer associate with him--but for the good feeling for the sake of which we shall even endure hardships. Nay, though we make pleasure the end and are annoyed when deprived of it, we shall nevertheless cheerfully endure this because of our love to our friend.
The Theodoreans derived their name from Theodorus, who has already been mentioned, and adopted his doctrines. Theodorus was a man who utterly rejected the current belief in the gods. And I have come across a book of his entitled Of the Gods which is not contemptible. From that book, they say, Epicurus borrowed most of what he wrote on the subject.
Theodorus was also a pupil of Anniceris and of Dionysius the dialectician, as Antisthenes mentions in his Successions of Philosophers. He considered joy and grief to be the supreme good and evil, the one brought about by wisdom, the other by folly. Wisdom and justice he called goods, and their opposites evils, pleasure and pain being intermediate to good and evil. Friendship he rejected because it did not exist between the unwise nor between the wise; with the former, when the want is removed, the friendship disappears, whereas the wise are selfsufficient and have no need of friends. It was reasonable, as he thought, for the good man not to risk his life in the defence of his country, for he would never throw wisdom away to benefit the unwise.
He said the world was his country. Theft, adultery, and sacrilege would be allowable upon occasion, since none of these acts is by nature base, if once you have removed the prejudice against them, which is kept up in order to hold the foolish multitude together. The wise man would indulge his passions openly without the least regard to circumstances. Hence he would use such arguments as this. "Is a woman who is skilled in grammar useful in so far as she is skilled in grammar?" "Yes." "And is a boy or a youth skilled in grammar useful in so far as he is skilled in grammar?" "Yes." "Again, is a woman who is beautiful useful in so far as she is beautiful? And the use of beauty is to be enjoyed?" "Yes." When this was admitted, he would press the argument to the conclusion, namely, that he who uses anything for the purpose for which it is useful does no wrong. And by some such interrogatories he would carry his point.
He appears to have been called theos (god) in consequence of the following argument addressed to him by Stilpo. "Are you, Theodorus, what you declare yourself to be?" To this he assented, and Stilpo continued, "And do you say you are god?" To this he agreed. "Then it follows that you are god." Theodorus accepted this, and Stilpo said with a smile, "But, you rascal, at this rate you would allow yourself to be a jackdaw and ten thousand other things."
[However, Theodorus, sitting on one occasion beside Euryclides, the hierophant, began, "Tell me, Euryclides, who they are who violate the mysteries?" Euryclides replied, "Those who disclose them to the uninitiated." "Then you violate them," said Theodorus, "when you explain them to the uninitiated." Yet he would hardly have escaped from being brought before the Areopagus if Demetrius of Phalerum had not rescued him. And Amphicrates in his bookUpon Illustrious Men says he was condemned to drink the hemlock.
For a while he stayed at the court of Ptolemy the son of Lagus, and was once sent by him as ambassador to Lysimachus. And on this occasion his language was so bold that Lysimachus said, "Tell me, are you not the Theodorus who was banished from Athens?" To which he replied, "Your in- formation is correct, for, when Athens could not bear me any more than Semele could Dionysus, she cast me out." And upon Lysimachus adding, "Take care you do not come here again," "I never will," said he, "unless Ptolemy sends me." Mithras, the king's minister, standing by and saying, "It seems that you can ignore not only gods but kings as well," Theodorus replied, "How can you say that I ignore the gods when I regard you as hateful to the gods?" He is said on one occasion in Corinth to have walked abroad with a numerous train of pupils, and Metrocles the Cynic, who was washing chervil, remarked, "You, sophist that you are, would not have wanted all these pupils if you had washed vegetables." Thereupon Theodorus retorted, "And you, if you had known how to associate with men, would have had no use for these vegetables." A similar anecdote is told of Diogenes and Aristippus, as mentioned above.
Such was the character of Theodorus and his surroundings. At last he retired to Cyrene, where he lived with Magas and continued to be held in high honour. The first time that he was expelled from Cyrene he is credited with a witty remark: "Many thanks, men of Cyrene," said he, "for driving me from Libya into Greece."
New Cyrenaic Virtues
Encyclopedia Britannica, “Cyrenaics”, by Hugh Chrisholm
CYRENAICS, a Greek school of philosophy, so called from Cyrene, the birthplace of the founder, Aristippus (q.v.). It was one of the two earliest Socratic schools, and emphasized one side only of the Socratic teaching (cf. Cynic). Socrates, although he held that virtue was the only human good, admitted to a certain extent the importance of its utilitarian side, making happiness at least a subsidiary end of moral action. Aristippus and his followers seized upon this, and made it the prime factor in existence, denying to virtue any intrinsic value. Logic and physical science they held to be useless, for all knowledge is immediate sensation (see Protagoras). These sensations are motions (κινήσεις) which (1) are purely subjective, and (2) are painful, indifferent or pleasant, according as they are violent, tranquil or gentle. Further they are entirely individual, and can in no way be described as constituting absolute objective knowledge. Feeling, therefore, is the only possible criterion alike of knowledge and of conduct. “Our modes of being affected (πάθη) alone are knowable.” Thus Cyrenaicism goes beyond the critical scepticism of the Sophists and deduces a single, universal aim for all men, namely pleasure. Furthermore, all feeling is momentary and homogeneous. It follows (1) that past and future pleasure have no real existence for us, and (2) that among present pleasures there is no distinction of kind, but only of intensity. Socrates had spoken of the higher pleasures of the intellect; the Cyrenaics denied the validity of this distinction and said that bodily pleasures as being more simple and more intense are to be preferred. Momentary pleasure (μονόχρονος ἡδόνη), preferably of a carnal kind, is the only good for man. Yet Aristippus was compelled to admit that some actions which give immediate pleasure entail more than their equivalent of pain. This fact was to him the basis of the conventional distinction of right and wrong, and in this sense he held that regard should be paid to law and custom. It is of the utmost importance that this development of Cyrenaic hedonism should be fully realized. To overlook the Cyrenaic recognition of social obligation and the hedonistic value of altruistic emotion is a very common expedient of those who are opposed to all hedonistic theories of life. Like many of the leading modern utilitarians, they combined with their psychological distrust of popular judgments of right and wrong, and their firm conviction that all such distinctions are based solely on law and convention, the equally unwavering principle that the wise man who would pursue pleasure logically must abstain from that which is usually denominated “wrong” or “unjust.” This idea, which occupies a prominent position in systems like those of Bentham, Volney, and even Paley, was evidently of prime importance at all events to the later Cyrenaics.
Developing from this is a new point of practical importance to the hedonism of the Cyrenaics. Aristippus, both in theory and in practice, insisted that true pleasure belongs only to him who is self-controlled and master of himself. The truly happy man must have φρόνησις (prudence), which alone can save him from falling a prey to mere passion. Thus, in the end, Aristippus, the founder of the purest hedonism in the history of thought, comes very near not only to the Cynics, but to the more cultured hedonism of Epicurus and modern thinkers. Theodorus, held even more strongly that passing pleasure may be a delusion, and that permanent tranquillity is a truer end of conduct. Hegesias denied the possibility of real pleasure and advocated suicide as ensuring at least the absence of pain. Anniceris, in whose thought the school reached its highest perfection, declared that true pleasure consists sometimes in self-sacrifice and that sympathy in enjoyment is a real source of happiness. Other members of the school were Arete, wife of Aristippus, Aristippus the younger (her son), Bio and Euhemerus.
The Cyrenaic ideal was, of course, utterly alien to Christianity, and, in general, subsequent thinkers found it an ideal of hopeless pessimism. Yet in modern times it has found expression in many ethical and literary works, and it is common also in other ancient non-Hellenic literature. There are quatrains in the Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyám and pessimistic verses in Ecclesiastes which might have been uttered by Aristippus. (“Then I commended mirth, because a man hath no better thing than to eat and to drink and to be merry; for that shall abide with him of his labour the days of his life which God giveth him under the sun”). So in Byron and Heine, and, in a sense, in Walter Pater (Marius the Epicurean), there is the same tendency to seek relief from the intellectual cul-de-sac in frankly aesthetic satisfaction. Thus Cyrenaicism did not entirely vanish with its absorption in Epicureanism.
Philodemus of Gadara references Aristippus of Cyrene
The Epicurean philosopher Philodemus of Gadara offers a rare explicit reference to Aristippus of Cyrene in a fragmentary segment from his wo...
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Theodorus the Atheist (c. 340 - c. 250 B.C.) was an ancient Cyrenaic philosopher who studied under Aristippus the Younger, and later learned...
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Aristippus of Cyrene is famously quoted as stating the following: “ The kind of possessions and traveling provisions free men ought to acqui...