We, the Gods - Theodorus the Atheist as Inspiration

Theodorus the Atheist (c. 340 - c. 250 B.C.) was an ancient Cyrenaic philosopher who studied under Aristippus the Younger, and later learned from Anniceris, branching off from the orthodox strain and creating a new school of Theodoreans with a somewhat eclectic doctrine. There is much to gain by studying Theodorus’ innovations and applying his teaching to our own lives, due to the admirable qualities he cultivated on the basis of Cyrenaic philosophy. Although the following principles signal something of a departure from his predecessors, we ought increase the scope of our interest to cautiously adopt attenuated Theodorean values, without abandoning the fundamentals of Aristippus the Elder, in our quest towards defining a New Cyrenaicism of individual self-sufficiency, best equipped for navigating the real world. 

Theodorean Modifications:

The New Telos: 

Theodorus reinterpreted the ethical ends of Cyrenaic philosophy, and in the place of pleasure (hedonē) and pain (ponos), substituted instead the emotional states of joy (kharis/charis) and grief (lupē) as the supreme good and evil. This development signifies an attempt to identify a more robust telos, likely in response to the growing popularity of Epicureanism, transferring the focus from predominantly physical sensations towards a more abiding state of positive mental enjoyment. Epicurus also, when speaking of the kinetic emotion of pleasure, referred to this condition as charā, or joy, although his usual wont is to define the goal in terms of its limits in the removal of mental disturbance, referring to ataraxia, a more static state of tranquility. This option is of course foreign to the Cyrenaics, who can only admit to feelings which result from some level of physical activity causing perception. Nevertheless, Theodorus considers pleasure and pain, presumably intending those that are bodily, as intermediate to these states of joy and grief.

As avowed hedonists, we cannot follow Theodorus this far if his reclassification is taken at face value, which usually means interpretating the intermediates Stoically as “indifferent” — however, I suggest that we instead understand this differentiation between particular pleasures or pains, and the ethical telos of joy, as indicating roughly the same observation the Hellenic contemporary Epicurus (341- 270 B.C.) makes in his letter to Menoeceus:  

And since pleasure is the first good and natural to us, for this very reason we do not choose every pleasure, but sometimes we pass over many pleasures, when greater discomfort accrues to us as the result of them: and similarly we think many pains better than pleasures, since a greater pleasure comes to us when we have endured pains for a long time. Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided. Yet by a scale of comparison and by the consideration of advantages and disadvantages we must form our judgment on all these matters. For the good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and conversely the bad as good.

Here, we might also make sense of a relevant passage in Laërtius’ doxography on the Cyrenaics: “Hence, although pleasure is in itself desirable, yet they hold that the things which are productive of certain pleasures are often of a painful nature, the very opposite of pleasure; so that to accumulate the pleasures which are productive of happiness appears to them a most irksome business.” By distinguishing between pleasures themselves, and the pleasant state of mind called “joy”, Theodorus can more easily excerise discretion amongst particular sources of pleasure, some of which are to be pursued while some are to be avoided, having reference not primarily to the character of the pleasure itself, but assessing its value according to the influence on his cheerful eudaimonia.

Diogenes Laërtius tells us that Epicurus was influenced by Theodorus, and although he makes this connection primarily in regards to his doctrine on the gods, it is eminently plausible that his influence went further than that. Epicurus borrowed more than is commonly recognised from the Cyrenaics, including the much-lauded Cradle Argument, and based on multiple similarities it is clear that the ideas of Anniceris provide something of a bridge between Cyrenaic and Epicurean hedonism. It would not be surprising to discover further points of influence from Theodorus than have hitherto been granted, especially considering both men attended the court of Lysimachus while Theodorus was the ambassador for Ptolemy I, who later also became interested in the philosophy of the Garden. Permitting this speculation, we may note a further connection in this regard when it comes to the Theodorean virtues. 

The New Virtues:

Theodorus identifies the virtues of practical wisdom (phronesis) and justice (dikaiosunē) as goods which bring about our joy, while their opposites, foolishness and injustice, are evils which lead to grief. While the exhortation of phronesis, often translated as “prudence”, is easy enough to understand, the emphasis placed on justice presents more difficulties for interpretation, especially in regards to Theodorus’ insistence that, upon occasion, acts such as theft and adultery are permissible. In order to offer a possible solution, I’ll introduce another plausible connection to Epicurean philosophy, taken from the same letter:

Of all this the beginning and the greatest good is prudence. Wherefore prudence is a more precious thing even than philosophy: for from prudence are sprung all the other virtues, and it teaches us that it is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently and honorably and justly, nor, again, to live a life of prudence, honor, and justice without living pleasantly. For the virtues are by nature bound up with the pleasant life, and the pleasant life is inseparable from them. For indeed who, think you, is a better man than he who holds reverent opinions concerning the gods, and is at all times free from fear of death, and has reasoned out the end ordained by nature? (Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus).

Prudence and justice, so highly praised by Epicurus as inseparable from the pleasant life, are precisely those virtues identified by Theodorus. We may also note the remaining criteria, for as regards the opinions concerning the gods, we have good reason to suspect Epicurus learned these from Theodorus, according to Diogenes Laërtius. Furthermore, if anyone can be said to display full confidence in the belief that “death is nothing to us”, it is the very same man. Preserved from antiquity are numerous anecdotes illustrating Theodorus’ courage in the face of deadly threats from powerful figures, and one taken from Cicero’s account will suffice: “when Lysimachus threatened to crucify him, [Theodorus] bade him keep those menaces for his courtiers: ‘To Theodorus it makes no difference whether he rot in the air or underground.’” Of course, this analysis is certainly speculative, but I would argue it is both plausible and illuminating to consider that Theodorus intends his use and understanding of these terms in much the same way as Epicurus does, given their temporal, geographical, and ideological proximity. 

If this much is admitted, we can deal fairly easily with Theodorus’ conception of justice, following the same understanding that Epicurus offers. Principle Doctrine 31 tells us that, “The justice which arises from nature is a pledge of mutual advantage to restrain men from harming one another and save them from being harmed.” This contextual social-contract notion is much easier to reconcile with Theodorus’ attitude towards theft and adultery, given the right circumstances, since not only can we easily imagine contexts within which prudent judgment would recommend ignoring certain laws or norms, we are also dealing with a concretised understanding of what justice really consists of, rather than strictly adhering to some Platonic absolute. This interpretation also intersects neatly with other feature of Theodorean philosophy, which we will turn to now.

The New Self-Sufficiency:

Theodorus’ philosophy proceeds from precious few elementary principles, and his confident polemical approach also indicates a skeptical attitude towards casuistry — yet the wise person must make prudential and righteous judgements upon some grounds, in order to achieve his sought-after joyous end. Here we come to the true expression of Theodorus’ self-sufficiency, wherein philosophical wisdom comes together with the realities of a specific situation, and the individual must make their own judgement. This further explains the following account from the doxography, which we have already touched upon: “He allowed that a wise man might steal, and commit adultery and sacrilege, at proper seasons: for that none of these actions were disgraceful by nature, if one only put out of sight the common opinion about them, which owes its existence to the consent of fools. And he said that the wise man would indulge his passions openly, without any regard to circumstances.” Against the interpretation that Theodorus was “indifferent” to passions and pleasures, the doxography suggests instead that prudence advises the wise how best to indulge these desires, according to the occasion that presents itself, even against standard social conventions ordering the relations of the common population. Hence, although this latter Cyrenaic places more emphasis on the virtues than his predecessors, and they are not strictly instrumental, they have much the same relationship to the good life as they do for Epicurus, as inseparable partial-constituents of a wise and joyous character. 

Theodorus also expands upon the illusive civic position of Aristippus and proclaims that the whole World is his country. We also see him argue in favour of pursuing relations with courtesans, and explain that the proper use of beauty is to be enjoyed, in every sense of that term. On this account Theodorus claims that the foolish multitude cause their own grief — they are ignorant regarding how, when, and even if to indulge their desires. Instead, ordinary people base their beliefs on general consensus, lacking trust in their own judgement, missing the virtues of prudence and justice, and thus failing to achieve any lasting happiness. The Theodorean pupil, on the other hand, is perceptive and sensitive to all relevant factors, skilled in handling diverse situations, adaptable to circumstances, and able to indulge his will freely as a result. 

Theodorus’ autarchy also resulted in controversial views toward friendship, which he asserts does not exist among the wise themselves, the foolish themselves, or between these groups. The wise are self-sufficient (autarkis), and thus do not require friends. The so-called “friendship” of the foolish, on the other hand, is based on need or use, and when this departs, so too does the friendship — such an empty relationship is not even truly deserving of the name. This attitude signifies a radical departure, not only from orthodox Cyrenaicism, but particularly from the doctrines of Anniceris. This self-aggrandising attitude finds even greater expression in the behaviour which earned Theodorus his iconic appellation. 

The New God:

Contrary to Theodorus’ title as “ho atheos”, it’s unlikely, based on the testimony remaining, that Theodorus positively denied the existence of the Gods in the modern sense of the term, though no doubt he severely undermined the popular opinion, and was likely sufficiently skeptical to earn the epithet. Due to the comments of Diogenes relating the content of Epicurus’ theology to that of Theodorus, and the observation from Plutarch that Theodorus “the godless” only seems to imply that, whatever the gods may be, they are not imperishable, we may suspect a more nuanced position. We also have another humorous anecdote related by Diogenes Laërtius which could indicate some level of belief:

Mithras, the king's minister, standing by [said], “It seems that you can ignore not only gods but kings as well,” Theodorus replied, “How can you say that I ignore the gods when I regard you as hateful to the gods?”

More relevant to our purposes here, however, and what inspired the title of this post, is the interesting symmetry regarding the two titles which designate Theodorus in our sources. Although he is commonly referred to as “the Atheist”, or “the Godless”, he is also known by another name, allegedly resulting from this exchange with Stilpo of Megara: 

He appears to have been called θεός (god) in consequence of the following argument addressed to him by Stilpo. “Are you, Theodorus, what you declare yourself to be?” To this he assented, and Stilpo continued, “And do you say you are god?” To this he agreed. “Then it follows that you are god.” Theodorus accepted this, and Stilpo said with a smile, “But, you rascal, at this rate you would allow yourself to be a jackdaw and ten thousand other things.”

In a case of apparent auto-proclamation, Theodorus declared himself to actually be a god, though this clearly should not be taken literally. In an earlier post I have collected the anecdotes which relate Theodorus’ comparison of himself to Greek heroes, and this seems to be a further instance of self-aggrandisement from the unusually pugnacious Cyrenaic, perhaps a further expression of autarchy and joyful self-assurance, no doubt with an overflowing sense of superiority not unlike the classic Grecian virtue of Pride.

Conclusion:

When it comes to what we should make of the foregoing, I’d recommend exercising caution in approaching the innovations of Theodorus. For all his boisterousness and intrigue as a provocative character, I find it incredibly unlikely that this man of Cyrene actually found the kind of joy most of us would wish to possess. With that said, there are elements of Theodorus’ confident expression, self-assurance, and intellectual modifications which can serve as an inspiration for the modern Cyrenaic, particularly in regards to increasing the emphasis on achieving abiding happiness while pursuing particular pleasurable experiences. Overall, I certainly would not recommend adopting Theodorus’ egotistical, aggressive, and frankly insolent approach, not to mention his outright rejection of friendship — in all this we find an excess of dialectical sophisms which undermine the achievement and appreciation of pleasurable experiences — but, as always, we may pick the flowers while not eating of the fruit, and for this purpose, Theodorus offers an engaging viewing experience. 

Credit Where It Is Due: Tracing the Cyrenaic Origin of Key Ideas

Recently, I read Roderick T. Long’s excellent monograph Reason and Value: Aristotle Versus Rand, which offers a comparative analysis of Ayn Rand’s foundationalist theory of truth to the coherentism of the Peripatetics, and explores how this understanding relates to her ethical standard. Perhaps I shall have more to say about this text in the future, but something entirely orthogonal came to my attention in the process of reading, because Long quotes a phrase attributed to Aristotle by Diogenes Laërtius which possesses remarkable similarity to another pronounced by Aristippus. Compare, 

When asked what advantage he had ever gained for himself from philosophy, Aristotle said, “That I do, without being subject to compulsion, what some do through fear of the laws”. 

With, 

Being once asked what advantage philosophers have, he [Aristippus] replied, “Should all laws be repealed, we shall go on living as we do now.”

Now, there’s nothing particularly unusual about this apparent repetition, and although Aristippus was Aristotle’s older contemporary, which may indicate a certain direction of influence, it is possible that both statements are original, or apocryphal, and such retellings with different characters abound in the doxography. Nevertheless, this incident had me contemplating just how many interesting strains of thought seem to originate with, or significantly evolve from, the Cyrenaic philosophers, and how dreadfully uncredited their influences remains to this day. To take just one example, every casual Greek philosophy enthusiast knows of Diogenes the Cynic, and among many other tidbits, he is generally considered a pioneer of cosmopolitanism. And yet, Aristippus of Cyrene is famously depicted by Xenophanes rebutting the false dichotomy of Socrates thusly (underlining for emphasis is my own), 

[Soc]: you are yourself a Hellene—which among Hellenes enjoy the happier existence, think you, the dominant or the subject states? [Ar.] Nay, I would have you to understand that I am just as far from placing myself in the ranks of slavery; there is, I take it, a middle path between the two which it is my ambition to tread, avoiding rule and slavery alike; it lies through freedom—the high road which leads to happiness. [Soc.] True, if only your path could avoid human beings, as it avoids rule and slavery, there would be something in what you say. But being placed as you are amidst human beings, if you purpose neither to rule nor to be ruled, and do not mean to dance attendance, if you can help it, on those who rule, you must surely see that the stronger have an art to seat the weaker on the stool of repentance both in public and in private, and to treat them as slaves. I daresay you have not failed to note this common case: a set of people has sown and planted, whereupon in comes another set and cuts their corn and fells their fruit-trees, and in every way lays siege to them because, though weaker, they refuse to pay them proper court, till at length they are persuaded to accept slavery rather than war against their betters. And in private life also, you will bear me out, the brave and powerful are known to reduce the helpless and cowardly to bondage, and to make no small profit out of their victims. [Ar.] Yes, but I must tell you I have a simple remedy against all such misadventures. I do not confine myself to any single civil community. I roam the wide world a foreigner.

What Aristippus is describing, again as the elder contemporary, is that selfsame cosmopolitanism, the consideration of the whole world as one’s country, that Diogenes of Sinope more famously advocates — and yet who knows of this? 

When we move to better-known territory, Epicurus’ debt to Aristippus and the Cyrenaics is generally admitted, but even here the scope is severely overlooked. The general impression given is that Epicurus and Aristippus share only the superficial similarity of regarding the ethical end to be pleasure, by which terminology they really mean very different things, and that is where the comparison dries up, though generosity dictates acknowledging the first Greek hedonists for completeness’ sake before promptly moving on. 

I have already written a seperate post comparing key Epicurean ideas with close (or at least, closer than one would imagine) parallels found among Aristippus and the orthodox Cyrenaics. One major idea that the Cyrenaics supply the Epicureans is commonly referred to as The Cradle Argument, wherein the instinctive, natural, uncorrupted desires of infants and animals is taken as good evidence for the proper values of man, and an arch example of Nature supplying the norm. If you research this topic, you will find sources citing Epicureans, Stoics, perhaps even mention of Eudoxus, but in fact, according to Diognes Laërtius, the Cyrenaics actually pioneered this argument, claiming that “a proof that pleasure is the end is that we are favorably inclined to it without deliberate choice from childhood”, and as further evidence, “pleasure is satisfying to all animals, and pain is repellent”. Laërtius also claims that Epicurus’ infamous understanding of the Gods, that is, his denial of the common myths, was largely inspired by the book On the Gods by the later Cyrenaic philosopher Theodorus the Atheist. This is not to mention the tempering, pro-social influence of Anniceris, whose exaltation of friendship, more than any other predecessor, resemble the mature ethics of Epicurus. 

Much more could be said on this topic, but I plan instead to create a follow-up post in the future simply highlighting some key ideas introduced by the Cyrenaics in an effort to ground a foundation for practice and belief, without taking too much effort to chase down the influential flow-on effects. 

Pillars of Pleasure

Aristippus of Cyrene is famously quoted as stating the following: “The kind of possessions and traveling provisions free men ought to acquire are those which can swim away from a ship-wreck with them.” (Vitruvius, De Arch. 6.1.1). These possessions and provisions are, of course, the values and virtues endowed by proper philosophical education — those characteristics and excellencies of ability which the wise man ought cultivate in order to flourish. Based on my study and understanding of Cyrenaic philosophy, I’d like to offer the following Pillars of Pleasure as best representing the foundational elements which enable, express, and constitute the pleasant life.

Pillar I - Satisfaction (εὐδοκέω/eudokeo): 

The Cyrenaic ethical project is centered around achieving and maintaining satisfaction through the pursuit and enjoyment of pleasures, so emphasis is placed on active appreciation and savouring of pleasant experiences. Peace of mind is essential to maximal enjoyment, and alongside the possession of confidence, involves exercising present-focus in order to make the most of what is at hand. Success according to our hedonistic eudaemonism requires taking satisfaction as both the criteria of action and the purpose of living, rendering this the cardinal value of our school. 

Pillar II - Self-Mastery (ἐνκράτεια/enkráteia): 

Self-mastery or self-control, within Cyrenaic ethics, refers to the ability to maintain purposeful awareness and direction over one’s actions. This value forms the bedrock for wisely exercising choice and avoidance (prudence), informed by the fundamental virtue of temperance (disdaining excess), while also underpinning the importance placed on securing internal and external freedom (autonomy), so that we are able to act according to our own sober judgement. The successful Cyrenaic engages in philosophical education and study in order to properly understand the nature of pleasure, self, and world — cutting through attachment and insatiability, thereby transforming actions and outlook in accordance with the true philosophy.

Pillar III - Confidence (θάρσος/thársos): 

Confidence is a Cyrenaic watchword, appearing multiple times in the doxography, and describes the foundational attitude formed from the reasonable expectation of success, due to an assurance of personal ability and versatility, underpinning the active pursuit of simple pleasures. Confidence is concomitant with the development of the Cyrenaic virtues of adaptability and sociability, dovetailing with the simple accomodation of oneself to the available pleasures most situations easily offer, these being all that is necessary for enjoyment, and the sage masterfully capitalises on any circumstance.

Maximization is Misleading

It’s common to discuss the evaluative metric of hedonic calculus in terms of “maximizing” pleasure and “minimizing” pain, aiming for a situation where, on balance, the agent experiences a greater return in happiness than their investment in effort. While this simplistic picture has its merits, the imprecise language involved could support two erroneous interpretations which, if left unchecked, lead either towards insatiable extravagance, or else, towards reserved timidity, each for the very same reason depending on where the emphasis is placed. 

To tackle the easier error first, the exhortation to “minimize” pain could be, and historically has been, misconstrued as recommending a path of habitual caution and repression, where anything that might cause a measure of discomfort or hurt is routinely avoided, until, at the minimum extreme, it becomes impossible even to survive without enduring some small measure of exertion. This bare minimum, then, is taken to represent absolutely necessary human values, these and these alone are considered sufficient, the resulting state of numb subsistence is slapped with a shiny new name like eudaimonia or tranquility, and anything extra is avoided as deadly poison. “Surely that’s absurd!” you may say, but it is not difficult to find moderate ascetics of widely different stripes who have learned essentially the same clumsy lesson. These men and women rally against striving to achieve any “unnecessary” desires, arguing that, since they cannot mourn the absence, removal, or failure to achieve that which was never prized to begin with, they are also spared the great distress of want, loss, and disappointment. As such, those shrewd individuals systematically trim down their requirements to the bare minimum until what remains is so easily met as to be virtually assured of satisfaction. We may find our examples among the Cynics, Stoics, various mendicant monks, Buddhists, Jainists, Daoists, even some confused Epicureans — history is full of their kind, take your pick. 

Of course, such a program in self-denial is ridiculous and, if anything is unnecessary, certainly we have found it here. In the words of Aristippus, “it is not abstinence from pleasures that is best, but mastery over them without ever being worsted.” These ascetics have simply lost their nerve — they are afraid of the possibility of disappointment; they shy away from comfort, out of fear that it will someday pass and disappoint them with its absence: they abstain from pursuing pleasure, not due to strength of character, but from weakness of spirit. By contrast, Epicurus maintains that just because all pleasures are good in themselves, this does not mean that all pleasures are choice-worthy, and conversely, just because all pains are bad in themselves, this does not mean that all pains are avoidance-worthy. Often, we should choose the painful, difficult, uncomfortable course of action, because it will lead to greater pleasure! But doesn’t this present a problem for an ostensibly hedonistic philosophy? On what basis are we to make our determination in any instance, if the pleasure or pain that it will cause is no longer enough? In fact, hedonic calculus remains the criteria, but as rational beings, we are able to make principled judgements about the expected outcomes of our activity beyond the sliver of a moment, such that we may judge something initially painful as tending to cause more pleasure in the future, and vice-versa for something initially pleasurable. This is the true import of the economy of pleasure, and like good economists, we do not use a single immediate variable as our sole determining factor, we must use general knowledge and principles to predict where the trends are heading in the future, though we can only enjoy them in the present.  

This same argument can be applied to correcting the opposite error, which is to take “maximization” as some cosmic proclamation that only the highest peak-experiences ultimately count, and we should toil to procure greater and greater degrees of excitation. Sure, you may be content relaxing by the beach-side, but could you be doing cocaine instead? Well, consistent hedonism suggests you should! Oh, you are happily married, but wouldn’t a one-night stand or an affair offer extra pleasure? Hey, hedonism says it would! Similar examples are readily deployed as lazy reductio ad absurdum arguments against hedonistic philosophies. On the surface, they have the appearance of compulsion, or at least, they’re often compelling enough for most people to reject hedonism out-of-hand — to laugh it away, or to condemn it as dangerous degeneracy. 

There are two main reasons why these arguments fail to hold up to the least scrutiny. The first is the inverse of the pain-avoidance argument: just because something is pleasurable, or even “more pleasurable”, in the immediate context, does not mean that it ought to be chosen if it will lead to greater pain in the long-run. This is the obvious flaw of the more absurd “maximization” arguments, and even those who proffer them will soon admit the illusion of legitimacy hinges on making an arbitrary insistence of short-sightedness, since the would-be hedonist will clearly be ruined sooner or later if they were to take this code of conduct seriously. How can any so-called “consistent hedonism” recommend a principle of action that will, even at a glance, cause the agent far greater pains than any pleasures gained? Obviously it cannot. The other argument runs in the opposite direction, and involves a misunderstanding regarding what it means to “maximize” one’s pleasure. It is not at all obvious that the cocaine-induced party-lover is actually experiencing “more” pleasure, in the relevant sense, than the leisurely beach-goer, or the studious chemistry student, even setting aside future consequences. What does “in the relevant sense” mean here? It means that the only course rational hedonism actually recommends is the one where, on balance, we experience a greater extent of joy than sorrow over a lifetime. The greater the extent of pleasure experienced, you see —not primarily the “degree” or “amount” — the better. Hence Epicurus summons us to continuous pleasure, not intense pleasure. Any modest level of pleasantness we actively enjoy, and can confidently expect to sustain, while maintaining peace of mind and avoiding bodily stress, is meeting the criteria of our hedonistic program, as guided by the faculties of nature. Within reason, we must add variety and spice, because monotony yields diminishing returns and stagnant habituation, and, as we covered earlier, one ought to take calculated risks or expend their efforts where these will generally add to our enjoyment. But where on earth does this additional duty to endlessly pursue “increase” for its own sake come from? God only knows. 

The surest course for extending pleasurable experience over a lifetime actually recommends exercising temperance, and instructs us to greedily defend certain necessary preconditions for happiness, such as maintaining our self-control, confidence, and satisfaction. By contrast, far from achieving the pleasure he so desires, the insatiable “hedonist” who endlessly seeks after higher thrills, or who feeds a bottomless appetite, is suffering a mental illness which will assure he is never content no matter what he obtains. We can only enjoy pleasantness in the moment, it is not the kind of good that can be stored up, accumulated, saved for later — miss what is present, and it is gone forever. Our avaricious seeker will never stop to enjoy what he so desperately chases. Quite the counter-productive course. Hence, Aristippus teaches us to disdain excess, to dispense with the tiresome business of chasing after empty figments, and instead, to focus our energy on adapting and enjoying present circumstances in the most advantageous manner. 

We Cyrenaics wish only to live as easily and pleasantly as possible, not to ceaselessly crank the dopamine dial to 11 in slavish service to Dionysius, nor again to shrink from any possibility that events may temporarily turn against us, committed to diminishing ourselves first lest the universe do it for us. We deserve better, and can readily achieve it.

Hedonic Eudaemonism - Achieving The Pleasant Life

In this post, I’d like to thread the needle on a topic of importance for promoting and following Cyrenaicism as a way of life: what, properly considered, is our purpose, end, or telos? I’ll offer the label “hedonic eudaemonism” as best encapsulating the telos of our New Cyrenaicism, because it emphasises the long-range, totalising focus on the happiness of our life as a whole, while also describing the pleasurable quality and content in present-experiential terms. By describing our goal in these terms, we leave no room for Stoicising interpretations of apathetic calm as commanding the character of “eudaimonia”, for example, and we also head-off any lingering misunderstanding that the tantalising fancy of the moment ought enslave our attention. We are concerned with achieving happiness in a robust and lasting manner, and the nature of that happiness is found in living “as easily and pleasantly as possible”. 

Other questions follow: what is our ultimate good? What is the status of other goods in relation to our end and our ultimate good? How do we go about achieving our end?

I propose the following: 

1. Our ultimate good, or summum bonum, is this life itself. The purpose or end of this life is to live pleasantly/pleasurably.

2. Other goods are either instrumental to, or essential components of, the pleasant life.

3. Achieving and enjoying the pleasant life requires exercising practical reason in the realm of choice and avoidance, in order to secure and maintain those aforementioned goods. It is the role of philosophical education to identify, enumerate, and categorise those goods, while also providing us the tools and techniques required to achieve them.

I believe this presentation of Aristippean Cyrenaicism is historically defensible, philosophically preferable, and practically beneficial. The doxographical material we have regarding Aristippus himself suggests a figure who is undeniably concerned with the quality of his life as a whole — it shows us someone who engages in training and study with clear future-concern, someone who values personal character and virtues not merely as means to the end of gaining particular pleasures, but as inseparable elements of The Good Life itself. 

Such an understanding not only brings early Cyrenaicism into clearer alignment with the Greek ethical tradition in which Aristippus was embedded at Athens, it also better accounts for the Socratic flavour of his associations, and more easily accommodates the extant anecdotes, as against any awkward attempts to read later Cyrenaic developments back onto the founder of the school. With this in mind, we come to understand Aristippus as a radical innovator more so in terms of his attitude towards pleasure, his manner of achieving it, and his confident expression — though these are erected upon familiar intellectual soil — rather than as someone promoting a rather complex foundationalist theory, completely divergent from any of his contemporaries, in a manner starkly at odds with the anti-dogmatic, moderate-skepticism he expressed elsewhere. 

The next step is of course to proceed with a breakdown of those component qualities which one ought to cultivate in order to achieve and enjoy the pleasant life. That subject will be covered in a future post, where I will enumerate the “Pillars of Pleasure” which support successful, happy living. 

Aristippus As A Socratic

Voula Tsouna McKirahan - The Socratic Origins of the Cynics and Cyrenaics

- There are two categories of testimony on Aristippean ethics, one that attributes to him a straightforward hedonism and one that does not consider him a hedonist at all. According to the former, Aristippus was the first Cyrenaic to define the moral end as a smooth movement that results in a pleasure of the body, is confined strictly to the present, and is very short-lived. Pleasure must be distinguished from happiness (eudaemonia), which is the sum of particular pleasures, present as well as past and future ones, extended over one’s lifetime. It is pleasure and not happiness that is pursued for its own sake. 

- On the other hand, Aristocles denies that Aristippus defined pleasure as the only thing that is intrinsically good, and there is further information that he never lectured defending a particular moral end, whether pleasure of anything else — a piece of evidence that fits perfectly with Aristippus’ distaste for a didactic tone in teaching or speaking (Arist. Rh. 2.23). 

- Instead, Aristippus believes that pleasure is to be sought and enjoyed not unconditionally but only if it does not endanger our self-control. The latter is the result of philosophical education, together with the acquisition of internal freedom, self-awareness, and the promotion of the well-being of the soul by means of study and endurance. These goods are not instrumental to the enjoyment of pleasure but valuable in themselves. If one obtains them, one may securely savour bodily pleasures; if one does not obtain them, one presumably should not pursue bodily pleasures, for they would hinder promotion of virtue in the soul. 

- It is undoubtedly true that the Cyrenaics who came after Aristippus developed a hedonistic theory in which the moral end was the momentary present pleasure. Their ethics was backed by their epistemology that claims that the only knowledge accessible to us is the knowledge of our undergoings (pathē). The ethical claim that momentary pleasure is the good has an irrefutable character precisely in virtue of the fact that pleasure is an undergoing and therefore self-evident. 

- In the non-hedonistic tradition Aristippus’ ethical theory is firmly based on the beliefs common to the members of the Socratic circle, is coherent and intuitively persuasive. 

- …we infer that Aristippus and Socrates differ on the subject of pleasure with respect to its practical implications, not in their respective definitions of the moral end. For Socrates, control over bodily pleasure dictates a life of moderation, while for Aristippus it does not. 

- …regarding the passage from Xenophon. First, it provides direct evidence for the claim that Aristippus was a eudaemonist and not a hedonist. Second, Socrates’ argument leaves unscathed Aristippus’ belief that it is morally right for one to enjoy various pleasures. 

- …part of Aristippus’ answer [to Socrates] is that he aims at the easiest and pleasantest life and that he wishes to live a life of freeedom that leads to happiness. But this indicates that Aristippus does not seek pleasure for their own sake but presumably views them as a means to or a component of happiness. Also, he does not look at momentary pleasures of the present but at his life as a whole. 

- Independent evidence tells us that Aristippus indulged in pleasure but at the same time made sure that he was in control of his experiences and that pleasure did not master him instead. 

- We are left to wonder whether Aristippus is right: although pleasure is not the moral end, it is an important constituent of happiness. And one can be self-disciplined without abstaining from pleasure either partially or totally. 

- His [Aristippus’] primary interest was in ethical questions. It may be that he mostly dealt with practical ethics, but we are also allowed to glimpse a theoretical argument to the effect that every object is associated with a moral end, and therefore objects that are morally neutral do not exist. On account of this argument he dismissed the study of mathematics and perhaps also of natural science. On the other hand, some titles of his books indicate an interest in rhetoric. History and perhaps literature complete the list of his interests. 

- Nor can his knowledge… of[familiar topics of Greek intellectual tradition] have been complete superficial, for he taught in the competitive environment of Athenian culture for a substantial fee and fairly successfully. 

- Aristippus’ apolitical stance, “that leads neither through ruling nor through slavery but through freedom” to happiness. Aristippus’ disavowal of civic bonds appears like a means to the end of enjoying an easy and pleasant life. 

Source: 

Tsouna-McKirahan, Voula. (1994). “The Socratic Origins of the Cynics and Cyrenaics”, in Paul A Vander Waerdt (ed.), The Socratic Movement. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 367-91.

New Cyrenaic Virtues

Pleasure (ἡδονή/hedonē): The pursuit of pleasure is the foundational virtue of Cyrenaic philosophy, as pleasant living is our telos. The Cyrenaic ethical project is a life organized around the life-guiding truth of pleasure and pain. Perception of the world is made in terms of opportunities for enjoyment, and risks of suffering distress. This is hedonic calculus in the economy of pleasure. We must investigate the causes and conditions that secure happiness and well-being, which means understanding physiology, psychology, and relevant externalities. We ought pursue sensual pleasures, intellectual excitement, and aesthetic delights. 

Education (παιδεία/paideia): The goals of philosophical education are tranquility, social mastery, and connoisseurship. Transforming “slavish” characters into free ones involves cultivating self-mastery (see: temperance), the capacity to speak with sophistication (see: sociability), and proper philosophical understanding. Education thereby removes impediments to the purest and most immediate reception of pleasurable experiences (see: presentism), including anxiety, regret, and unjustified (merely conventional) compunctions. Training also includes cultivation of appetite and the refinement of its satisfaction, increasing capacity for appreciation (see: sensitivity).

Presentism (monokhronos hēdonē): The pleasures we actively experience in the present moment are the true sensations of value. We telescope our concerns to the present moment as a spiritual exercise, prudential rule of thumb, and emotional attitude — not as an ontological straight-jacket. We thereby diminish discomfort and become more receptive to present pleasures. Due to the greater ability to affect the present moment, we put less faith in painstaking long-term planning than in our ability to adapt to circumstances. We must still plan and reflect, but we do so mindfully, always with an eye upon current conditions. 

Adaptability: Ability to harmonize with place, time, and role, and perform harmoniously in any circumstance. Confidence means feeling comfortable rather than anxious or fearful in unknown or threatening situations. Paradoxically, it is only a person of firm character and profound insight who can be so malleable, adapting comfortably to every situation. This requires gaining a range of basic competencies so that we can respond well in any situations, making us self-sufficient.

Temperance (σωφροσύνη/sōphrosūnē): Temperance involves keeping in mind what really matters and what does not. What really matters is simply to avoid pain and distress, and to experience some modicum of pleasure. We achieve the former by disdaining excess, which does not entail embracing austerity. Excess is relative to what is actually good — pleasure. This does not exclude luxury, but we avoid becoming attached to specific sources of pleasure and reduce our desires accordingly. Simple pleasure is enjoyable and sufficient, we ought never covet more than we currently possesses, nor be overcome by sensual enjoyment and lose our contentment.

Sociability (φιλία/philia): Capable of getting along with any sort of person whatsoever, and to do so without anxiety. This social confidence is based on the understanding both cognitively and emotionally that; 1. all one needs is to avoid pain and discover some modicum of pleasure, therefore, one feels more relaxed around other people. He or she does not need to impress anyone, since we are not after anything another can provide which we could not procure ourselves. 2. Just about every situation presents opportunities for enjoyment, which encourages simple accommodation of oneself to one’s company at any given moment. Training responsiveness, versatility, and adroitness. The wise man is comfortable in any situation, and adroit enough to turn it to his advantage. He speaks well, with knowledge and sophistication, possessing charm, humor, and quick-wittedness.

Sensitivity: Explore diverse and evocative sources of pleasure which require increased capacities for appreciation, such as aesthetic discernment, cultural enrichment, physical ability, dexterous skills, and intellectual stimulation. Training sensitivity to aesthetic delights, judged based on the virtuous merits regarding their degree, type, and unique sensory impressions with which they affect the individual’s “imaginative reason”. We refine all instruments of inward and outward intuition and impression, developing our capacities, in order to best receive and interact with the “beatific vision” of our experience in the world. This training involves, not the conveyance of doctrine or principles, but rather, the teaching of an art. Education increases one’s capacity for enjoyment.

Sympathy:  We have an empathetic distaste for causing or witnessing pain and discomfort due to our immediate grasp of the inherently evil nature of pain and suffering. We appeal to the aesthetic revulsion caused by the ugliness of suffering, prompting an amelioration of its causes if reasonable, and an avoidance of behavior which would bring it about. “How tenderly—more tenderly than many stricter souls—we might yield to kindly instinct, what fineness of charity in passing judgment on others, what an exquisite conscience of other men’s susceptibilities. We go beyond most people in our care for all weakly creatures.”

Earthen Character: Development generally of the more human and earthly elements of character. Virile consciousness of the realities of life, poetic apprehension, united with something of personal ambition and self-assertion. The earthly end comes like a final revelation of nothing less than the soul’s extinction. To the sentiment of the body, and the affections it defines — the flesh — one must cling; a materialist with the temper of a devotee. Amid abstract metaphysical doubts, as to what might lie one step only beyond that experience, we reinforce the deep original materialism or eathliness of human nature itself, bound so intimately to the sensuous world — let us at least make the most of what is “here and now”. 

The New Cyrenaic System

With this entry I present a condensed vision of the entire New Cyrenaic system. All credit for philosophical originality properly belongs to the individual figures named and tagged - these are, in chronological order, Heraclitus of Ephesus, Aristippus of Cyrene, Epicurus of Samos, and Walter Pater. Additional credit is due to Charles Sanders Peirce, who, though I do not reproduce his doctrine in depth, broadly influenced the interpretation and perspective provided. My contribution is entirely dependent on underlying primary material provided by the aforementioned persons, and consists solely of trans-historical creative reinterpretation, aiming at a functional pastiche of cohesive elements. The unitive principle which informs this ethical project is total commitment to our immediate affectations as the sole criteria of truth and value. It is for the reader to test the following for themselves. 

Metaphysics and Epistemology: 

Empirical Idealism: Complete fidelity to immediate experience, consisting of sensory affections, as the sole source and criteria of knowledge. These subjective impressions vouch for themselves, and they do so inwardly, unmistakably, truly, and incorrigibly. Affections are elements of sensational awareness generated by movements of our physical being due to relational contact with external stimuli, and they fall into three categories: pleasurable, painful, or neutral. These latter, intermediate states provide representational information, of which there are innumerable varieties, and may also be accompanied by/provoke pleasurable or painful sensations. 

Hedonic Motivation: Among the affections we have the feelings called pleasure and pain. Pleasure is self-evidently choice-worthy, pain is self-evidently avoidance-worthy, and no other sensations possess these monadic qualities as a matter of brute experience. Consequently, these feelings alone are directly capable of motivating or guiding choice and avoidance. Emotions are the positive and negative responses respectively resulting from cognitive judgements, evaluative or prospective, according to the criteria of these two states. As further evidence of nature supplying the norm, we have the Cradle Argument, according to which we judge the evidence provided by uncorrupted beings, such as animals and young children, who, from birth, automatically pursue pleasure and shun pain without moralistic confusion.

Purgative Skepticism: Withdrawal of interest from all other alleged sources of knowledge beyond what can be accessed and verified through direct sense-perception, or can be inferred therefrom, eliminating concerns with speculative metaphysics and intrinsic axiological dogma, narrowing the field of legitimate concern and circumscribing the scope of epistemic ability. 

Impressionistic Flux: The impressions of experience are constantly undergoing changes, at different rates and in varying respects, with underlying continuity and fixed relationships among them. We observe that change is oppositional and bi-polar, operating according to an interplay of centrifugal and centripetal tendencies. Human beings, like all phenomena, are a developmental result of this self-same process, and within the nexus of experience, the mode of organic sense-perception operates along multiple qualitative continuums, the extremes of which we declare opposites. The mind is sensitive to patterns of behavior resulting from the interactivity of balanced forces because it is of the same nature, these habitual relationships being deemed “lawful” when applied to the predictable motions of external objects, and “logical” when considered cognitively. The universe is therefore comprehensible, directly as a matter of immediate experience, and inferentially as the approximate value of statistical ratios. 

Pragmatic Theory of Objects: Our conception of an object’s identity consists entirely in that confluence of present and expected relational effects, on other objects and on oneself directly, according to which we group and categorize entities in terms of their general characteristics and principles of action, within ranges of practical significance. 

Presentism: The present moment alone is truly ours, a bubble wherein experience unfolds and phenomena are open to purposeful interactivity. We yield to the improvement of the present, excluding all embarrassment alike of regret for the past and calculation for the future, as far as possible, in order to maximize attentive receptivity. (See “Present Focus” below for the practical application of this insight).

Ethics:

Individual Sensual Hedonism: The highest good (summum bonum) is one’s own pleasurable existence as a living organism. The end (to telos) is to live pleasantly/pleasurably, which is called happiness. All other goods are instrumental to securing and adorning one’s own pleasant living. Human happiness is psychosomatic, requiring physical health and mental well-being as both foundational states for seeking greater pleasure, and for maintaining the sensitivity of our apparatus for enjoyment.

Peace of Mind and Homeostasis of Body: The active pursuit of pleasures is balanced with the value of freedom from mental distress (or, possessing peace of mind), and freedom from bodily pain (or, preserving physical well-being). It is by pursuing, attaining, and maintaining this dual-aspect of healthiness, we may say biological hygiene, which provides pleasure in itself, and establishes the necessary pre-conditions for pursuing and appreciating higher pleasures.

Unitemporal Pleasure: The pleasures of the present experience are to be enjoyed fully as our highest goal, without undue concern for what has passed or what is to come, which is self-defeating. Pleasant living is to be accomplished within each individual unit of time, enjoying what is at hand, without excessive toil or yearning for what is not currently available.

Hierarchy of Desires: In order to prioritise our desires, we categorize them according to their level of necessity for the pleasant life, and their origin in natural or unnatural conditions, creating three distinct categories. Of the desires that are both natural and necessary, there are those which are required for our survival, those required for removing bodily pain, and those required for achieving happiness. Unnecessary desires ought to be pursued as augmenting necessary desires and contributing to happiness, but should not be chased at the expense of more basic requirements. 

Aesthetic Exemplarism: Projecting a vision of the successful life, informed by other persons and artistic representations, as tangible exemplars for our own aspirations. Additionally, 

“We may well adorn and beautify, in scrupulous self-respect, our souls, and whatever our souls touch upon — these wonderful bodies, these material dwelling-places through which the shadows pass together for a while, the very raiments we wear, our very pastimes and the inter course of society.” - Walter Pater. 

True aesthetic culture is realizable as a new form of the contemplative life, founded on the vision of perfect men, objects, and environments. Whatever form of human life which may be heroic, impassioned, ideal: these are the criterion of inspirational values.

Character and Attitude:

Education: The goals of philosophical education are tranquility, social mastery, and connoisseurship. Transforming “slavish” characters into free ones involves cultivating self-possession/-mastery, the capacity to speak with sophistication, and proper philosophical understanding. Education thereby removes impediments to the purest and most immediate reception of pleasurable experiences, including anxiety, regret, and unjustified (that is, merely conventional) compunctions. Training also includes cultivation of appetite and the refinement of its satisfaction, increasing capacity for appreciation.

Temperance: We strive to keep in mind what really matters and what does not. What really matters is simply to avoid pain and distress, and to experience some sort of pleasure. We achieve the former by disdaining excess, which does not entail embracing austerity, and not becoming attached/dependent to any particular source of pleasure. Excess is relative to what is actually good, which is pleasure, and this does not exclude luxury, but we avoid upsetting the hierarchy by chasing corrosive desires which cannot be satisfied. Those who are always dissatisfied, no matter what they acquire, have an illness. New Cyrenaic philosophy cures practitioners of their attachment to superfluities, freeing them from stress, insomnia, and the stranglehold of their preoccupations. Temperance also enables enjoyment: those with a sound mind can indulge in luxurious pleasures without becoming corrupted — that is, beginning to feel these are necessities.

Present Focus: Telescoping of concerns to the present moment as a spiritual exercise, prudential rule of thumb, and emotional attitude - not an ontological straight-jacket. We thereby diminish discomfort and become more receptive to present pleasures. Due to the greater ability to affect the present moment, we put less faith in painstaking long-term planning than in our ability to adapt to circumstances.

Adaptability and Confidence: Able to harmonize with place, time, and role, and perform harmoniously in any circumstance. Confidence means feeling comfortable rather than anxious or fearful in unknown or threatening situations. Paradoxically, it is only a person of firm character and profound insight who can be so malleable, adapting comfortably to every situation.

Sociability: Capable of getting along with any sort of person whatsoever, and do so without anxiety. This confidence is based on the understanding both cognitively and emotionally that; 1. all one needs is to avoid pain and discover some modicum of pleasure, therefore, the sage feels more relaxed around people. He or she does not need to impress anyone, since we are not after anything another can provide which we could not procure ourselves. 2. Just about every situation presents opportunities for enjoyment, which encourages simple accommodation of oneself to one’s company at any given moment.

Suavity: Training responsiveness, versatility, and adroitness. The wise man is comfortable in any situation, and adroit enough to turn it to his advantage. He speaks well, with knowledge and sophistication, possessing charm, humor, and quick-wittedness.

Aristippus as Exemplar

We, the New Cyrenaics, ought take our founding inspiration from Aristippus seriously — not primarily as regards an implicit abstract doctrine, later systematized and explicated by his grandson, but as an idealized man amongst men. What recommends itself to the receptive temperament is both more and less than a doctrine — we meet with arresting attitude, disposition, conduct: in a word, bold and blithe character. Through the intriguing series of anecdotes related us by Laërtius, from the antinomian portrayals in choice Socratic dialogues, for the very fact that he so irritated Plato that our man of easy living is scarcely eluded to (and then, with thinly-veiled derision) by the prolific and contemporaneous courter of Dionysius, or his choice pupil — we receive an impression of concentrated Socratic sunniness, amplified by the open elevation of pleasure to the level of a daring ideal, skillfully pursued. Humanity finds, at long last, the modest possibility of quiet repose and easy enjoyment, modeled by one who considers that life needn’t consist of slithering in the mud or floating through the clouds — one who prefers to stride along the earth with dignified bearing, capable of more than the pained fate rejected even by beasts, finding no solace in sacrificing self-interest for honeyed fabrications of the over-active intellect. This purgative skepticism — the dismissal in a single sweep of all seductive idealisms and useless sciences — is the true function of reductive Cyrenaic impressionism. Error arises in supposing epistemological theory to constitute an independent branch of interest. To reveal the correct status of all such proposals, we need but recognize that, for our hedonic ancestor, all philosophical inquiry finds itself occupying a sub-set of ethical investigation — naught but further support for the central thesis that all is vanity. 

The selfsame concretizing tendency justifies specifying the content of happiness, not in reference to some grand abstraction, but as consisting of living pleasurably, that is, exercising choice and avoidance according to the life-guiding truth of pleasant and painful sensations. Not by boring into other men’s minds, not by rationalistic contemplation, nor even by surveying culturally elevated nobility, but by paying attention to what is present in our own immediate experience do we find some natural referent for The Good. Though nothing intrinsically limits this pursuit of pleasure, neither convention nor prejudice, its realizable achievement and selection, in terms of quality and degree, as well as the limitation of its painful opposite, requires wise regulation. The action which yields greater unpleasantness than its currency in pleasant feelings is reprehensible. Consequently, Aristippus, man of the world, exemplified and exhorted lordship over his desires. It is not he who avoids and renounces pleasures, but he who wisely indulges, with full self-control, that commands true mastery over his passions. In this we find the perfect expression of Socratic temperance, its moderating influence in the economy of pleasure, combined with the prudent use of men, surroundings, objects — unified to exact personal enjoyment, as far as possible. Aristuppus thrives in company, a master of socialization, ever adapting to circumstances with the confident assurance bestowed upon one with heroic self-respect and joyful sense. He understands well that what is required for happiness is little: some modicum of pleasure serenely enjoyed, disturbance skillfully avoided, and the capacity to appreciate it. Let us learn from his philosophy, share in a life of pleasant living, and make the most of our time here!

A Charitable Portrayal of Aristippus

When Cyrenaicism is mentioned in historical accounts, it is often referenced in order to provide an unfavorable contrast with the more sophisticated philosophical developments of the Epicureans. Whilst I have immense respect for Epicurus and his philosophy, these two schools actually have far more in common than the conveniently exaggerated juxtapositions would lead us to believe. It is no secret that Epicurus borrowed from his predecessors, which is easily conceded in regards to Democritus and Leucippus, but what is less commonly recognized is that Epicureanism is similarly situated in regards to Cyrenaicism, representing an innovative evolution rather than a sharp departure. In order to dramatize Epicurus’ unique elements, Aristippus and the Cyrenaics are often caricatured as empty-headed goldfish flitting from one source or momentary pleasure to another, while the level-headed Epicureans plan for the future, exercise moderation, and make calculated decisions. Let us interrogate this simplified picture, explore the Cyrenaic theory in greater depth, and analyze the clear parallels with much-needed charity. 

Physics:

Epicurus famously defended an atomistic materialism in the vein of Democritus, albeit with idiosyncratic updates (and we may say, improvements), such as breaking from the latter’s strict determinism by introducing the “swerve” to account for human volition, or treating phenomenal qualities as faithfully representing an underlying structural reality rather asserting that they exist by mere “convention”. 

Aristippus and the Cyrenaics are also essentially common-sense physicalists (though not properly materialists), arguing that all sensation consists of varieties of motions in our bodies caused by relational interactions with external objects, producing either gentle, violent, or calm vibrations, corresponding to pleasurable, painful, or indifferent sensational feelings in our awareness. This theory was clearly borrowed from Protagoras, and is not greatly elaborated upon in the extant remains of the Cyrenaics, who did not much care for natural investigation, but note there is no fundamental disagreement between the two hedonistic schools on this point. 

It is ultimately unclear that the sensory impressionism of Cyrenaics epistemology could support a more robust theory of matter, particularly dubious would be an atomistic theory, but something like Mill’s phenomenalism seems compatible. Nevertheless, Epicurus’ developments are far superior in specification, explanation, and argumentation, but he is not essentially at odds with his hedonistic predecessors. 

Epistemology:

Epicurus is, for all intents and purposes, a straightforward empiricist who additionally acknowledges that human beings have innate predispositions and pattern-recognition abilities. The Canon is a triadic account of the faculties for gaining knowledge, and includes the Senses (our six classical organs of awareness), the Feelings (pleasure and pain), and the Anticipations (variously interpreted as pre-conceptual patterning, socio-political navigation, conceptual categorization based on repetitive experiences, etc.). 

The Cyrenaics begin from a somewhat skeptical framework, wherein we can only be completely sure of our directly experienced affections, rather than the intrinsic nature of that which causes them. Another clear outgrowth of Protagorean relativism, we are nevertheless in a similar epistemic situation to the Epicureans, in which empirical evidence is incorrigible and certain, while all other alleged sources of information are considered dubious or non-existent, unless they can be established to originate from what is immediately sensible. 

The Epicureans reason from what is evident to what is not, in the case of both their atomic theory and their various accounts of remote meteorological phenomena, using analogy. The Cyrenaics refrain from engaging in abstract ontology and focus their attention on what is practical, based on that which we do know for sure. They sweep aside with indifference the unfounded supernatural speculations of the masses — those concerns which motivate Epicurean efforts to debunk cosmic sources of mortal fears — because, according to their epistemic theory, there is no corresponding experience which makes this a plausible area for concern to begin with. While there are important differences in these approaches, note again the essential agreements.

Pleasure:

For Epicurus, it is the faculty of the Feelings wherein our natural end is to be understood, since we are supplied by nature with a built-in mechanism for automatic evaluation, judging what phenomena are for or against us according to how they please or disturb us. Epicureans find the limit of pleasure in the elimination of pain in the body and disturbances in the mind, and accordingly they urge us to satisfy our natural and necessary desires through fulfillment, while eliminating corrosive desires, and prudently moderating our merely unnecessary desires. What evidence is brought to support this identification of human nature supplying the norm? The Epicureans place great weight on the example of uncorrupted and unconfused beings, such as young infants or animals, and they ask us to consult our own internal experiences. 

It is with the Cyrenaics that both of these naturalistic arguments originate. Similar to the empiricist Epicureans, the Cyrenaics who admit only direct knowledge of our sensations can find no possible competing criteria by which to judge the good or the bad, except for these selfsame sensations, all of which are either pleasant, painful, or neutral. We naturally gravitate towards the former, shrink away from the next, and are neither compelled nor repelled by the latter. Nevertheless, through corruption we can become confused and work against these innate feelings. The Cyrenaics also greatly value peace of mind, but there is no question of this tranquility supplanting the pleasurable end we seek, it is merely the healthy foundation from which we work to maximize positive experiences. By carefully managing the economy of pleasures and pains, we maintain our constitution while making calculated risks for greater rewards, forgoing superfluous excesses, and making the most of every situation. 

Presentism: 

The Epicureans no doubt have a far-ranging theory of pleasure, taking great delight in reminiscence on pleasurable experiences gone by, and finding solace in the well-founded expectation of future pleasures to come. Due to this temporal extension, Epicureans place greater emphasis on mental pleasures and pains, because while titillations and afflictions of the body only occur during the moment of physical excitement, those of the mind stretch across time, as yesterday’s regrets become today’s anguish, while tomorrow’s rewards induce present excitement.

The Cyrenaics, on the other hand, are unfairly portrayed as radical ontological presentists, occupying a minuscule sliver of time, paying no heed to future consequences, lacking reflection on the past, and busying themselves with any potential source of elation their eyes may fix upon. In reality, Aristippus and his followers are really more concerned with pointing out a pair of fairly intuitive observations: that present pleasures and pains are of higher degree, intensity, and reality than their copies in recollection or anticipation, and; that people often spend too much time brooding over the past or worrying about the future, while losing focus on the present situation and missing their chance to act here and now, to enjoy what is at hand. 

A cursory reading of Cyrenaic material reveals an emphasis on education, the development of skills and character, a knack for controlling our desires and forgoing those which promise greater troubles than they are worth. None of these concerns make any sense for a movement which is confined to the ever-vanishing moment. Cyrenaic presentism is nothing more than the reasonable exercise of attending to the real world right in front of us, rather than wandering around in one’s imagination — not exclusively, not at the expense of planning and executing long-range goals, but as a prudential rule-of-thumb. 

Friendship and Society:

Epicurus placed great emphasis on the value of living among a community of close friends, a situation which provides greater assurance of security, continuous opportunities for socializing, and a network of mutual support. Epicurus also cautions against risky political engagement, not necessarily advocating complete withdrawal of the kind usually attributed to him, but nevertheless acknowledging the danger to health and serenity that accompanies such public forays, and certainly suspiciously interrogating the corrosive motivations that tend to spur such activity in the first place.

Aristippus tended to pursue pleasures that involved cheerful association with others, adapting to new circumstances and making the most of available opportunities. If the anecdotes recorded by Diogenes Laërtius show us anything, it’s that Aristippus was incredibly quick-witted, jovial, and humorous. Politically, the Socratic dialogue of Xenophon reveals a character prizing personal freedom, rejecting the roles of ruler or ruled, and preferring instead to travel as a stranger everywhere in order to maintain his independence. Though there is apparently greater self-sufficiency and individualism present here than in the Epicurean communities, it is clear nevertheless that Aristippus highly values social relationships, and the genealogy of his school, as well as a collection of spurious letters, suggests that he cared deeply for his daughter Arete, teaching her in his ways and advising her not to worry about inessential losses.

Virtue:

It is impossible, says Epicurus, to live pleasantly without living honorably, wisely, and justly. The virtues are instrumental means to securing the good life, and are inseparable necessities for navigating the world successfully. One must abide by the niceties regulating social conduct, one must exercise prudent judgement in practical matters, and one must abide by the laws and regulations designed to maintain cohesion and protect men from one another. Conversely, nobody who does so fails to live happily, either. Epicurean prudence generally consists of rationally pursuing the necessary and natural desires, taking care to moderate unnecessary desires so as to guard against inviting additional pains in their wake, or in the effort to obtain them, lest we counterproductively disturb our tranquility. 

Breaking from the usual portrayal, and though the Cyrenaics are rather more indulgent, Aristippus  actually emphasizes a perfected version of Socratic temperance, urging the disdain for excess, understanding that all we require is to experience some level of comfortable pleasure while avoiding disturbances, and arguing that those who are dissatisfied no matter what are undergoing a mental illness. We find in Aristuppus the embryonic form of Epicurus’ threefold division of desires, though in a simplified form which highlights the Cyrenaic belief that it is he who wisely indulges in a controlled fashion, not he who cautiously abstains, that exhibits the greatest self-mastery. 

Conclusion:

My hope with this rough overview is merely to provide the beginning of a counter narrative against the popular view that the Cyrenaics were a mere infantile anomaly, whose only continuing interest, if any, is as a historical curiosity portraying misguided Socratics stretching the limits of sophistic excesses. In reality, there is much greater insight available here, later expanded by orthodox and heterodox Cyrenaics over time, and of course, extended by the Epicurean school, albeit with new foundations and greater coherence. 

George Henry Lewes - Aristippus the Imperfect Socratic

Among the imperfect Socratics we must rank Aristippus, the founder of the Cyrenaic School, which borrowed its name from the birthplace of its founder — Cyrene, in Africa. 

Aristippus was descended from wealthy and distinguished parents, and was thrown into the vortex of luxurious debauchery which then characterized the colony of Cyrene. He came over to Greece to attend the Olympic games; there he heard so much of the wisdom of Socrates that he determined on listening to his enchanting discourse. He made Socrates an offer of a large sum of money, which, as usual, was declined. The great Talker did not accept money; but he willingly admitted Aristippus among the number of his disciples. It is commonly asserted that the pupil did not agree well with his master, and that his fondness for pleasure was offensive to Socrates. There is no good authority for such an assertion. He remained with Socrates until the death of the latter; and there was no bond on either side to have prevented their separation as soon as they disagreed. The impression seems to have originated in the discussion reported by Xenophon, wherein Aristippus expresses his political indifference, and Socrates, by an exaggerated extension of logic, endeavors to prove his views to be absurd. But this is simply a divergence of opinion, such as must have existed between Socrates and many of his followers. It merely shows that Aristippus thought for himself. Socrates with such men as Aristippus and Alcibiades reminds one of Dr. Johnson with the 'young bloods': he was wise enough and tolerant enough not to allow his virtue to be scandalized by their love of pleasure. 

From Athens Aristippus went to Aegina, where he met with Lais, the world-renowned courtesan, whom he accompanied to Corinth. On his way from Corinth to Asia he was shipwrecked on the island of Rhodes. On the sea-coast he discovered a geometrical diagram, and exclaimed, 'Take courage; I see here the footsteps of men.' On arriving at the principal town, he managed to procure for himself and friends a hospitable reception. He used to say, 'Send two men amongst strangers, and you will see the advantage of the philosopher.' 

Aristippus was one of those but to strong sensual passions he united a calm regulative intellect. Prone to luxury, he avoided excess. Easy and careless in ordinary affairs, he had great dominion over his desires. Pleasure was his grand object in life; but he knew how to temper enjoyment with moderation. In disposition he was easy and yielding, a 'fellow of infinite mirth,' a philosopher whose brow was never 'sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought.' He had none of that dignity which mistakes a stiff neck for healthy virtue. He had no sternness. Gay, brilliant, careless, and enjoying, he became the ornament and delight of the Court of Dionysius; — that Court already illustrious by the splendid genius of Plato and the rigid abstinence of Diogenes. The grave deportment of Plato and the savage virtue of Diogenes had less charm for the Tyrant than the easy gaiety of Aristippus, whose very vices were elegant. His ready wit was often put to the test. On one occasion three courtesans were presented for him to make a choice : he took them all three, observing that it had been fatal even to Paris to make a choice. On another occasion, in a dispute with Aeschines, who was becoming violent, he said, 'Let us give over. We have quarreled, it is true, but I, as your senior, have a right to deem the precedence in the reconciliation'. In his old age he appears to have returned to Cyrene, and there opened his school. 

His philosophy, as Hegel remarks, takes its color from his personality. So individual is it, that we should have passed it over entirely, had it not been a precursor of Epicureanism. Its relation to Socrates is also important. 

In the only passage in which, as far as we know, Aristotle mentions Aristippus, he speaks of him as a Sophist. What does this mean? was he one of the professed Sophists? No. It means, we believe, that he shared the opinion of the Sophists respecting the uncertainty of Science. That he did share this opinion is evident from Sextus Empiricus, who details his reasons; such as, that external objects make different impressions on different senses; the names which we impose on these objects express our sensations, but do not express the things; there is no criterion of truth; each judges according to his impressions; none judge correctly. 

In so far he was a Sophist; but, as the disciple of Socrates, he learned that the criterion of truth must be sought within. He dismissed with contempt all physical speculations, as subjects beyond human comprehension, and concentrated his researches upon the moral constitution of man. 

Several of his repartees are recorded by Laertius. We add the best of them: Scinus, the treasurer of Dionysius, a man of low character but immense wealth, once showed Aristippus over his house. While he was expatiating on the splendour of every part, even to the floors, the philosopher spat in his face. Scinus was furious. 'Pardon me,' exclaimed Aristippus, 'there was no other place where I could have spat with decency'. One day, in interceding with the Tyrant for a friend, he threw himself on his knees. Being reproached for such want of dignity, he answered, 'Is it my fault if Dionysius has his ears in his feet?' One day he asked the Tyrant for some money. Dionysius made him own that a philosopher had no need of money. 'Give, give,' replied Aristippus, 'and we will settle the question at once.' Dionysius gave. 'Now' said the philosopher, 'I have no need of money.'

In so far he was a Socratic. But, although he took his main direction from Socrates, yet his own individuality quickly turned him into by-paths which his master would have shunned. His was not a scientific intellect. Logical deduction, which was the rigorous process of his master, suited neither his views nor his disposition. He was averse from abstract speculations. His tendency was directly towards the concrete. Hence, while Socrates was preaching about The Good, Aristippus wished to specify what it was; and resolved it into Pleasure. It was the pith and kernel of Socrates' Ethical system, that Happiness was the aim and desire of all men — the motor of all action; men only erred because of erroneous notions of what constituted Happiness. Thus the wise man alone knew that to endure an injury was better than to inflict it; he alone knew that immoderate gratification of the senses, being followed by misery, did not constitute Happiness, but the contrary. Aristippus thought this too vague. He not only reduced this general idea to a more specific one, namely. Pleasure; he endeavored to show how truth had its only criterion in the sensation of pleasure or of pain. Of that which is without us we can know nothing truly; we only know through our senses, and our senses deceive us with respect to objects. But our senses do not deceive us with respect to our sensations. We may not perceive things truly ; but it is true that we perceive. We may doubt respecting external objects ; we cannot doubt respecting our sensations. Amongst those sensations we naturally seek the repetition of such as are pleasurable, and shun those that are painful. 

Pleasure, then, as the only positive good, and as the only positive test of what was good, he declared to be the end of life; but, inasmuch as for constant pleasure the soul must preserve its dominion over desires, this pleasure was only another form of the Socratic temperance. It is distinguished from the Socratic conception of Pleasure, however, in being positive, and not merely the gratification of a want. In the Phaedo, Socrates, on being released from his chains, reflects upon the intimate connection of pleasure and pain; and calls the absence of pain pleasure. Aristippus, on the contrary, taught that pleasure is not the mere removal of pain: they are both positive emotions; non-pleasure and non-pain are not emotions, but as it were the sleep of the soul. 

In the application of this doctrine to ethics, Aristippus betrays both his Sophistic and Socratic education. With the Sophists he regarded pleasure and pain as the proper criteria of actions; no action being in itself either good or bad, but only such according to convention. With Socrates, however, he regarded the advantages acquired by injustice to be trifling; whereas the evils and apprehensions of punishment are considerable; and pleasure was the result, not of individual prosperity alone, but of the welfare of the whole State. 

In reviewing the philosophy, such as it was, of Aristippus, we cannot fail to be struck with the manifest influence of Socrates; although his method was not followed, we see the ethical tendency predominating. In the Megaric School the abstract idea of The Good of Socrates, was grounded on the Eleatic conception of The One. In the Cyrenaic, the abstract conception was reduced to the concrete, Pleasure; and this became the only ground of certitude, and morals the only science. In the Cynic School we shall see a still further development in this direction.

Source:

Lewis, G.H. (1867). The Story of Philosophy from Thales to Comte. Longmans, Green and Co.

Bare Essentials

This post is merely a skeletal companion piece to the more fleshed-out summary of Cyrenaic practice found here. It consists only of the essential points to keep in mind as we navigate the world, without excess information.

Bare Essentials:

Our immediate, subjective, sensory affections vouch for themselves, not whatever they appear to represent, and they do so inwardly, unmistakably, truly and incorrigibly. They are our only source of knowledge. The passage and dissolution of fleeting sensations and images is where analysis leaves off.  

Pleasure is self-evidently choice-worthy, pain is self-evidently avoidance-worthy, and no other experiences possess these monadic axiological characteristics. Our ethical project is a life organized around the life-guiding truth of pleasure and pain — the only natural, native, and concrete referents for our understanding of good and evil. 

The highest good is one’s own pleasure, and the end is to live pleasantly, which is happiness. All other goods are instrumental to securing one’s own pleasure. The pursuit of pleasures is balanced with the value of maintaining freedom from mental distress and from bodily pain. Perception of the world is made in terms of opportunities for enjoyment and risks of suffering, informing our hedonic calculus in the economy of pleasure.

The pleasures of the present experience are to be enjoyed fully as our highest goal, without undue concern for what has passed or what is to come, which is self-defeating. Pleasant living is to be accomplished within each individual unit of time, enjoying what is at hand, without excessive toil or yearning for what is not currently available. 

We skilfully cultivate an earthen character, with virile consciousness of the natural and instinctive sentiments of the body and the affections our flesh defines — a poetic apprehension of experience united with something of personal ambition and self-assertion. This opens an aesthetic dimension of pleasure-seeking. We regard all objects — works of art, the fairer forms of nature and human life, engaging personalities — as powers or forces producing pleasurable sensations, each of a more or less peculiar, unique kind. 

We adorn and beautify, in scrupulous self-respect, our souls, and whatever our souls touch upon — these bodies, the raiments we wear, our pastimes, and the intercourse of society. We build ourselves in accordance with a beatific vision of successful living — exemplified by heroic, impassioned, and joyful modes of being and behaving, taken from living or artistically depicted examples. To burn always with this hard, gem-like flame, to maintain this ecstasy, is success in life. 

To strong sensual passions we must unite a calm regulative intellect, in order to indulge various pleasures without being worsted. We temper our enjoyment with moderation, holding dominion over desires by keeping in mind what really matters and what does not. What really matters is simply to avoid pain and distress, and to experience some sort of pleasure. We achieve the former by disdaining excess. This does not entail embracing austerity, because excess is relative to what is actually good — pleasure. We do not exclude luxury, if available, but avoid becoming attached or dependent on specific sources of pleasure, and reduce our desires accordingly. Temperance also enables enjoyment: those with a sound mind can indulge freely in luxurious pleasures without becoming corrupted — that is, beginning to feel these are necessities.

We keep an easy and yielding disposition, with infinite mirth, adapting ourselves to place, time, and role, performing harmoniously in any circumstance. With confidence, healthy virtue, and elegant vice, we feel comfortable rather than anxious or fearful in unknown or threatening situations. Paradoxically, it is only a person of firm character and profound insight who can be so malleable, adapting comfortably to every situation.

Our easy gaiety and careless enjoyment aids sociability, and we are capable of getting along with any sort of person whatsoever, and can do so without anxiety. This social confidence is based on the understanding both cognitively and emotionally that all we need is to avoid pain and discover some modicum of pleasure, so we feel more relaxed around other people. We do not need to impress anyone, since we are not after anything another can provide which we could not procure for ourselves. Just about every situation presents opportunities for enjoyment, which encourages simple accommodation of ourselves to our company at any given moment.

Suavity involves training responsiveness, versatility, and adroitness. The wise man is comfortable in any situation, and adroit enough to turn it to his advantage. He speaks well, with knowledge and sophistication, possessing charm, humor, and quick-wittedness.