We, the Gods - Theodorus the Atheist as Inspiration

Theodorus the Atheist (c. 340 - c. 250 B.C.) was an ancient Cyrenaic philosopher who studied under Aristippus the Younger, and later learned from Anniceris, branching off from the orthodox strain and creating a new school of Theodoreans with a somewhat eclectic doctrine. There is much to gain by studying Theodorus’ innovations and applying his teaching to our own lives, due to the admirable qualities he cultivated on the basis of Cyrenaic philosophy. Although the following principles signal something of a departure from his predecessors, we ought increase the scope of our interest to cautiously adopt attenuated Theodorean values, without abandoning the fundamentals of Aristippus the Elder, in our quest towards defining a New Cyrenaicism of individual self-sufficiency, best equipped for navigating the real world. 

Theodorean Modifications:

The New Telos: 

Theodorus reinterpreted the ethical ends of Cyrenaic philosophy, and in the place of pleasure (hedonē) and pain (ponos), substituted instead the emotional states of joy (kharis/charis) and grief (lupē) as the supreme good and evil. This development signifies an attempt to identify a more robust telos, likely in response to the growing popularity of Epicureanism, transferring the focus from predominantly physical sensations towards a more abiding state of positive mental enjoyment. Epicurus also, when speaking of the kinetic emotion of pleasure, referred to this condition as charā, or joy, although his usual wont is to define the goal in terms of its limits in the removal of mental disturbance, referring to ataraxia, a more static state of tranquility. This option is of course foreign to the Cyrenaics, who can only admit to feelings which result from some level of physical activity causing perception. Nevertheless, Theodorus considers pleasure and pain, presumably intending those that are bodily, as intermediate to these states of joy and grief.

As avowed hedonists, we cannot follow Theodorus this far if his reclassification is taken at face value, which usually means interpretating the intermediates Stoically as “indifferent” — however, I suggest that we instead understand this differentiation between particular pleasures or pains, and the ethical telos of joy, as indicating roughly the same observation the Hellenic contemporary Epicurus (341- 270 B.C.) makes in his letter to Menoeceus:  

And since pleasure is the first good and natural to us, for this very reason we do not choose every pleasure, but sometimes we pass over many pleasures, when greater discomfort accrues to us as the result of them: and similarly we think many pains better than pleasures, since a greater pleasure comes to us when we have endured pains for a long time. Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided. Yet by a scale of comparison and by the consideration of advantages and disadvantages we must form our judgment on all these matters. For the good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and conversely the bad as good.

Here, we might also make sense of a relevant passage in Laërtius’ doxography on the Cyrenaics: “Hence, although pleasure is in itself desirable, yet they hold that the things which are productive of certain pleasures are often of a painful nature, the very opposite of pleasure; so that to accumulate the pleasures which are productive of happiness appears to them a most irksome business.” By distinguishing between pleasures themselves, and the pleasant state of mind called “joy”, Theodorus can more easily excerise discretion amongst particular sources of pleasure, some of which are to be pursued while some are to be avoided, having reference not primarily to the character of the pleasure itself, but assessing its value according to the influence on his cheerful eudaimonia.

Diogenes Laërtius tells us that Epicurus was influenced by Theodorus, and although he makes this connection primarily in regards to his doctrine on the gods, it is eminently plausible that his influence went further than that. Epicurus borrowed more than is commonly recognised from the Cyrenaics, including the much-lauded Cradle Argument, and based on multiple similarities it is clear that the ideas of Anniceris provide something of a bridge between Cyrenaic and Epicurean hedonism. It would not be surprising to discover further points of influence from Theodorus than have hitherto been granted, especially considering both men attended the court of Lysimachus while Theodorus was the ambassador for Ptolemy I, who later also became interested in the philosophy of the Garden. Permitting this speculation, we may note a further connection in this regard when it comes to the Theodorean virtues. 

The New Virtues:

Theodorus identifies the virtues of practical wisdom (phronesis) and justice (dikaiosunē) as goods which bring about our joy, while their opposites, foolishness and injustice, are evils which lead to grief. While the exhortation of phronesis, often translated as “prudence”, is easy enough to understand, the emphasis placed on justice presents more difficulties for interpretation, especially in regards to Theodorus’ insistence that, upon occasion, acts such as theft and adultery are permissible. In order to offer a possible solution, I’ll introduce another plausible connection to Epicurean philosophy, taken from the same letter:

Of all this the beginning and the greatest good is prudence. Wherefore prudence is a more precious thing even than philosophy: for from prudence are sprung all the other virtues, and it teaches us that it is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently and honorably and justly, nor, again, to live a life of prudence, honor, and justice without living pleasantly. For the virtues are by nature bound up with the pleasant life, and the pleasant life is inseparable from them. For indeed who, think you, is a better man than he who holds reverent opinions concerning the gods, and is at all times free from fear of death, and has reasoned out the end ordained by nature? (Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus).

Prudence and justice, so highly praised by Epicurus as inseparable from the pleasant life, are precisely those virtues identified by Theodorus. We may also note the remaining criteria, for as regards the opinions concerning the gods, we have good reason to suspect Epicurus learned these from Theodorus, according to Diogenes Laërtius. Furthermore, if anyone can be said to display full confidence in the belief that “death is nothing to us”, it is the very same man. Preserved from antiquity are numerous anecdotes illustrating Theodorus’ courage in the face of deadly threats from powerful figures, and one taken from Cicero’s account will suffice: “when Lysimachus threatened to crucify him, [Theodorus] bade him keep those menaces for his courtiers: ‘To Theodorus it makes no difference whether he rot in the air or underground.’” Of course, this analysis is certainly speculative, but I would argue it is both plausible and illuminating to consider that Theodorus intends his use and understanding of these terms in much the same way as Epicurus does, given their temporal, geographical, and ideological proximity. 

If this much is admitted, we can deal fairly easily with Theodorus’ conception of justice, following the same understanding that Epicurus offers. Principle Doctrine 31 tells us that, “The justice which arises from nature is a pledge of mutual advantage to restrain men from harming one another and save them from being harmed.” This contextual social-contract notion is much easier to reconcile with Theodorus’ attitude towards theft and adultery, given the right circumstances, since not only can we easily imagine contexts within which prudent judgment would recommend ignoring certain laws or norms, we are also dealing with a concretised understanding of what justice really consists of, rather than strictly adhering to some Platonic absolute. This interpretation also intersects neatly with other feature of Theodorean philosophy, which we will turn to now.

The New Self-Sufficiency:

Theodorus’ philosophy proceeds from precious few elementary principles, and his confident polemical approach also indicates a skeptical attitude towards casuistry — yet the wise person must make prudential and righteous judgements upon some grounds, in order to achieve his sought-after joyous end. Here we come to the true expression of Theodorus’ self-sufficiency, wherein philosophical wisdom comes together with the realities of a specific situation, and the individual must make their own judgement. This further explains the following account from the doxography, which we have already touched upon: “He allowed that a wise man might steal, and commit adultery and sacrilege, at proper seasons: for that none of these actions were disgraceful by nature, if one only put out of sight the common opinion about them, which owes its existence to the consent of fools. And he said that the wise man would indulge his passions openly, without any regard to circumstances.” Against the interpretation that Theodorus was “indifferent” to passions and pleasures, the doxography suggests instead that prudence advises the wise how best to indulge these desires, according to the occasion that presents itself, even against standard social conventions ordering the relations of the common population. Hence, although this latter Cyrenaic places more emphasis on the virtues than his predecessors, and they are not strictly instrumental, they have much the same relationship to the good life as they do for Epicurus, as inseparable partial-constituents of a wise and joyous character. 

Theodorus also expands upon the illusive civic position of Aristippus and proclaims that the whole World is his country. We also see him argue in favour of pursuing relations with courtesans, and explain that the proper use of beauty is to be enjoyed, in every sense of that term. On this account Theodorus claims that the foolish multitude cause their own grief — they are ignorant regarding how, when, and even if to indulge their desires. Instead, ordinary people base their beliefs on general consensus, lacking trust in their own judgement, missing the virtues of prudence and justice, and thus failing to achieve any lasting happiness. The Theodorean pupil, on the other hand, is perceptive and sensitive to all relevant factors, skilled in handling diverse situations, adaptable to circumstances, and able to indulge his will freely as a result. 

Theodorus’ autarchy also resulted in controversial views toward friendship, which he asserts does not exist among the wise themselves, the foolish themselves, or between these groups. The wise are self-sufficient (autarkis), and thus do not require friends. The so-called “friendship” of the foolish, on the other hand, is based on need or use, and when this departs, so too does the friendship — such an empty relationship is not even truly deserving of the name. This attitude signifies a radical departure, not only from orthodox Cyrenaicism, but particularly from the doctrines of Anniceris. This self-aggrandising attitude finds even greater expression in the behaviour which earned Theodorus his iconic appellation. 

The New God:

Contrary to Theodorus’ title as “ho atheos”, it’s unlikely, based on the testimony remaining, that Theodorus positively denied the existence of the Gods in the modern sense of the term, though no doubt he severely undermined the popular opinion, and was likely sufficiently skeptical to earn the epithet. Due to the comments of Diogenes relating the content of Epicurus’ theology to that of Theodorus, and the observation from Plutarch that Theodorus “the godless” only seems to imply that, whatever the gods may be, they are not imperishable, we may suspect a more nuanced position. We also have another humorous anecdote related by Diogenes Laërtius which could indicate some level of belief:

Mithras, the king's minister, standing by [said], “It seems that you can ignore not only gods but kings as well,” Theodorus replied, “How can you say that I ignore the gods when I regard you as hateful to the gods?”

More relevant to our purposes here, however, and what inspired the title of this post, is the interesting symmetry regarding the two titles which designate Theodorus in our sources. Although he is commonly referred to as “the Atheist”, or “the Godless”, he is also known by another name, allegedly resulting from this exchange with Stilpo of Megara: 

He appears to have been called θεός (god) in consequence of the following argument addressed to him by Stilpo. “Are you, Theodorus, what you declare yourself to be?” To this he assented, and Stilpo continued, “And do you say you are god?” To this he agreed. “Then it follows that you are god.” Theodorus accepted this, and Stilpo said with a smile, “But, you rascal, at this rate you would allow yourself to be a jackdaw and ten thousand other things.”

In a case of apparent auto-proclamation, Theodorus declared himself to actually be a god, though this clearly should not be taken literally. In an earlier post I have collected the anecdotes which relate Theodorus’ comparison of himself to Greek heroes, and this seems to be a further instance of self-aggrandisement from the unusually pugnacious Cyrenaic, perhaps a further expression of autarchy and joyful self-assurance, no doubt with an overflowing sense of superiority not unlike the classic Grecian virtue of Pride.

Conclusion:

When it comes to what we should make of the foregoing, I’d recommend exercising caution in approaching the innovations of Theodorus. For all his boisterousness and intrigue as a provocative character, I find it incredibly unlikely that this man of Cyrene actually found the kind of joy most of us would wish to possess. With that said, there are elements of Theodorus’ confident expression, self-assurance, and intellectual modifications which can serve as an inspiration for the modern Cyrenaic, particularly in regards to increasing the emphasis on achieving abiding happiness while pursuing particular pleasurable experiences. Overall, I certainly would not recommend adopting Theodorus’ egotistical, aggressive, and frankly insolent approach, not to mention his outright rejection of friendship — in all this we find an excess of dialectical sophisms which undermine the achievement and appreciation of pleasurable experiences — but, as always, we may pick the flowers while not eating of the fruit, and for this purpose, Theodorus offers an engaging viewing experience. 

Pillars of Pleasure

Aristippus of Cyrene is famously quoted as stating the following: “The kind of possessions and traveling provisions free men ought to acquire are those which can swim away from a ship-wreck with them.” (Vitruvius, De Arch. 6.1.1). These possessions and provisions are, of course, the values and virtues endowed by proper philosophical education — those characteristics and excellencies of ability which the wise man ought cultivate in order to flourish. Based on my study and understanding of Cyrenaic philosophy, I’d like to offer the following Pillars of Pleasure as best representing the foundational elements which enable, express, and constitute the pleasant life.

Pillar I - Satisfaction (εὐδοκέω/eudokeo): 

The Cyrenaic ethical project is centered around achieving and maintaining satisfaction through the pursuit and enjoyment of pleasures, so emphasis is placed on active appreciation and savouring of pleasant experiences. Peace of mind is essential to maximal enjoyment, and alongside the possession of confidence, involves exercising present-focus in order to make the most of what is at hand. Success according to our hedonistic eudaemonism requires taking satisfaction as both the criteria of action and the purpose of living, rendering this the cardinal value of our school. 

Pillar II - Self-Mastery (ἐνκράτεια/enkráteia): 

Self-mastery or self-control, within Cyrenaic ethics, refers to the ability to maintain purposeful awareness and direction over one’s actions. This value forms the bedrock for wisely exercising choice and avoidance (prudence), informed by the fundamental virtue of temperance (disdaining excess), while also underpinning the importance placed on securing internal and external freedom (autonomy), so that we are able to act according to our own sober judgement. The successful Cyrenaic engages in philosophical education and study in order to properly understand the nature of pleasure, self, and world — cutting through attachment and insatiability, thereby transforming actions and outlook in accordance with the true philosophy.

Pillar III - Confidence (θάρσος/thársos): 

Confidence is a Cyrenaic watchword, appearing multiple times in the doxography, and describes the foundational attitude formed from the reasonable expectation of success, due to an assurance of personal ability and versatility, underpinning the active pursuit of simple pleasures. Confidence is concomitant with the development of the Cyrenaic virtues of adaptability and sociability, dovetailing with the simple accomodation of oneself to the available pleasures most situations easily offer, these being all that is necessary for enjoyment, and the sage masterfully capitalises on any circumstance.

Hedonic Eudaemonism - Achieving The Pleasant Life

In this post, I’d like to thread the needle on a topic of importance for promoting and following Cyrenaicism as a way of life: what, properly considered, is our purpose, end, or telos? I’ll offer the label “hedonic eudaemonism” as best encapsulating the telos of our New Cyrenaicism, because it emphasises the long-range, totalising focus on the happiness of our life as a whole, while also describing the pleasurable quality and content in present-experiential terms. By describing our goal in these terms, we leave no room for Stoicising interpretations of apathetic calm as commanding the character of “eudaimonia”, for example, and we also head-off any lingering misunderstanding that the tantalising fancy of the moment ought enslave our attention. We are concerned with achieving happiness in a robust and lasting manner, and the nature of that happiness is found in living “as easily and pleasantly as possible”. 

Other questions follow: what is our ultimate good? What is the status of other goods in relation to our end and our ultimate good? How do we go about achieving our end?

I propose the following: 

1. Our ultimate good, or summum bonum, is this life itself. The purpose or end of this life is to live pleasantly/pleasurably.

2. Other goods are either instrumental to, or essential components of, the pleasant life.

3. Achieving and enjoying the pleasant life requires exercising practical reason in the realm of choice and avoidance, in order to secure and maintain those aforementioned goods. It is the role of philosophical education to identify, enumerate, and categorise those goods, while also providing us the tools and techniques required to achieve them.

I believe this presentation of Aristippean Cyrenaicism is historically defensible, philosophically preferable, and practically beneficial. The doxographical material we have regarding Aristippus himself suggests a figure who is undeniably concerned with the quality of his life as a whole — it shows us someone who engages in training and study with clear future-concern, someone who values personal character and virtues not merely as means to the end of gaining particular pleasures, but as inseparable elements of The Good Life itself. 

Such an understanding not only brings early Cyrenaicism into clearer alignment with the Greek ethical tradition in which Aristippus was embedded at Athens, it also better accounts for the Socratic flavour of his associations, and more easily accommodates the extant anecdotes, as against any awkward attempts to read later Cyrenaic developments back onto the founder of the school. With this in mind, we come to understand Aristippus as a radical innovator more so in terms of his attitude towards pleasure, his manner of achieving it, and his confident expression — though these are erected upon familiar intellectual soil — rather than as someone promoting a rather complex foundationalist theory, completely divergent from any of his contemporaries, in a manner starkly at odds with the anti-dogmatic, moderate-skepticism he expressed elsewhere. 

The next step is of course to proceed with a breakdown of those component qualities which one ought to cultivate in order to achieve and enjoy the pleasant life. That subject will be covered in a future post, where I will enumerate the “Pillars of Pleasure” which support successful, happy living. 

Aristippus As A Socratic

Voula Tsouna McKirahan - The Socratic Origins of the Cynics and Cyrenaics

- There are two categories of testimony on Aristippean ethics, one that attributes to him a straightforward hedonism and one that does not consider him a hedonist at all. According to the former, Aristippus was the first Cyrenaic to define the moral end as a smooth movement that results in a pleasure of the body, is confined strictly to the present, and is very short-lived. Pleasure must be distinguished from happiness (eudaemonia), which is the sum of particular pleasures, present as well as past and future ones, extended over one’s lifetime. It is pleasure and not happiness that is pursued for its own sake. 

- On the other hand, Aristocles denies that Aristippus defined pleasure as the only thing that is intrinsically good, and there is further information that he never lectured defending a particular moral end, whether pleasure of anything else — a piece of evidence that fits perfectly with Aristippus’ distaste for a didactic tone in teaching or speaking (Arist. Rh. 2.23). 

- Instead, Aristippus believes that pleasure is to be sought and enjoyed not unconditionally but only if it does not endanger our self-control. The latter is the result of philosophical education, together with the acquisition of internal freedom, self-awareness, and the promotion of the well-being of the soul by means of study and endurance. These goods are not instrumental to the enjoyment of pleasure but valuable in themselves. If one obtains them, one may securely savour bodily pleasures; if one does not obtain them, one presumably should not pursue bodily pleasures, for they would hinder promotion of virtue in the soul. 

- It is undoubtedly true that the Cyrenaics who came after Aristippus developed a hedonistic theory in which the moral end was the momentary present pleasure. Their ethics was backed by their epistemology that claims that the only knowledge accessible to us is the knowledge of our undergoings (pathē). The ethical claim that momentary pleasure is the good has an irrefutable character precisely in virtue of the fact that pleasure is an undergoing and therefore self-evident. 

- In the non-hedonistic tradition Aristippus’ ethical theory is firmly based on the beliefs common to the members of the Socratic circle, is coherent and intuitively persuasive. 

- …we infer that Aristippus and Socrates differ on the subject of pleasure with respect to its practical implications, not in their respective definitions of the moral end. For Socrates, control over bodily pleasure dictates a life of moderation, while for Aristippus it does not. 

- …regarding the passage from Xenophon. First, it provides direct evidence for the claim that Aristippus was a eudaemonist and not a hedonist. Second, Socrates’ argument leaves unscathed Aristippus’ belief that it is morally right for one to enjoy various pleasures. 

- …part of Aristippus’ answer [to Socrates] is that he aims at the easiest and pleasantest life and that he wishes to live a life of freeedom that leads to happiness. But this indicates that Aristippus does not seek pleasure for their own sake but presumably views them as a means to or a component of happiness. Also, he does not look at momentary pleasures of the present but at his life as a whole. 

- Independent evidence tells us that Aristippus indulged in pleasure but at the same time made sure that he was in control of his experiences and that pleasure did not master him instead. 

- We are left to wonder whether Aristippus is right: although pleasure is not the moral end, it is an important constituent of happiness. And one can be self-disciplined without abstaining from pleasure either partially or totally. 

- His [Aristippus’] primary interest was in ethical questions. It may be that he mostly dealt with practical ethics, but we are also allowed to glimpse a theoretical argument to the effect that every object is associated with a moral end, and therefore objects that are morally neutral do not exist. On account of this argument he dismissed the study of mathematics and perhaps also of natural science. On the other hand, some titles of his books indicate an interest in rhetoric. History and perhaps literature complete the list of his interests. 

- Nor can his knowledge… of[familiar topics of Greek intellectual tradition] have been complete superficial, for he taught in the competitive environment of Athenian culture for a substantial fee and fairly successfully. 

- Aristippus’ apolitical stance, “that leads neither through ruling nor through slavery but through freedom” to happiness. Aristippus’ disavowal of civic bonds appears like a means to the end of enjoying an easy and pleasant life. 

Source: 

Tsouna-McKirahan, Voula. (1994). “The Socratic Origins of the Cynics and Cyrenaics”, in Paul A Vander Waerdt (ed.), The Socratic Movement. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 367-91.

New Cyrenaic Virtues

Pleasure (ἡδονή/hedonē): The pursuit of pleasure is the foundational virtue of Cyrenaic philosophy, as pleasant living is our telos. The Cyrenaic ethical project is a life organized around the life-guiding truth of pleasure and pain. Perception of the world is made in terms of opportunities for enjoyment, and risks of suffering distress. This is hedonic calculus in the economy of pleasure. We must investigate the causes and conditions that secure happiness and well-being, which means understanding physiology, psychology, and relevant externalities. We ought pursue sensual pleasures, intellectual excitement, and aesthetic delights. 

Education (παιδεία/paideia): The goals of philosophical education are tranquility, social mastery, and connoisseurship. Transforming “slavish” characters into free ones involves cultivating self-mastery (see: temperance), the capacity to speak with sophistication (see: sociability), and proper philosophical understanding. Education thereby removes impediments to the purest and most immediate reception of pleasurable experiences (see: presentism), including anxiety, regret, and unjustified (merely conventional) compunctions. Training also includes cultivation of appetite and the refinement of its satisfaction, increasing capacity for appreciation (see: sensitivity).

Presentism (monokhronos hēdonē): The pleasures we actively experience in the present moment are the true sensations of value. We telescope our concerns to the present moment as a spiritual exercise, prudential rule of thumb, and emotional attitude — not as an ontological straight-jacket. We thereby diminish discomfort and become more receptive to present pleasures. Due to the greater ability to affect the present moment, we put less faith in painstaking long-term planning than in our ability to adapt to circumstances. We must still plan and reflect, but we do so mindfully, always with an eye upon current conditions. 

Adaptability: Ability to harmonize with place, time, and role, and perform harmoniously in any circumstance. Confidence means feeling comfortable rather than anxious or fearful in unknown or threatening situations. Paradoxically, it is only a person of firm character and profound insight who can be so malleable, adapting comfortably to every situation. This requires gaining a range of basic competencies so that we can respond well in any situations, making us self-sufficient.

Temperance (σωφροσύνη/sōphrosūnē): Temperance involves keeping in mind what really matters and what does not. What really matters is simply to avoid pain and distress, and to experience some modicum of pleasure. We achieve the former by disdaining excess, which does not entail embracing austerity. Excess is relative to what is actually good — pleasure. This does not exclude luxury, but we avoid becoming attached to specific sources of pleasure and reduce our desires accordingly. Simple pleasure is enjoyable and sufficient, we ought never covet more than we currently possesses, nor be overcome by sensual enjoyment and lose our contentment.

Sociability (φιλία/philia): Capable of getting along with any sort of person whatsoever, and to do so without anxiety. This social confidence is based on the understanding both cognitively and emotionally that; 1. all one needs is to avoid pain and discover some modicum of pleasure, therefore, one feels more relaxed around other people. He or she does not need to impress anyone, since we are not after anything another can provide which we could not procure ourselves. 2. Just about every situation presents opportunities for enjoyment, which encourages simple accommodation of oneself to one’s company at any given moment. Training responsiveness, versatility, and adroitness. The wise man is comfortable in any situation, and adroit enough to turn it to his advantage. He speaks well, with knowledge and sophistication, possessing charm, humor, and quick-wittedness.

Sensitivity: Explore diverse and evocative sources of pleasure which require increased capacities for appreciation, such as aesthetic discernment, cultural enrichment, physical ability, dexterous skills, and intellectual stimulation. Training sensitivity to aesthetic delights, judged based on the virtuous merits regarding their degree, type, and unique sensory impressions with which they affect the individual’s “imaginative reason”. We refine all instruments of inward and outward intuition and impression, developing our capacities, in order to best receive and interact with the “beatific vision” of our experience in the world. This training involves, not the conveyance of doctrine or principles, but rather, the teaching of an art. Education increases one’s capacity for enjoyment.

Sympathy:  We have an empathetic distaste for causing or witnessing pain and discomfort due to our immediate grasp of the inherently evil nature of pain and suffering. We appeal to the aesthetic revulsion caused by the ugliness of suffering, prompting an amelioration of its causes if reasonable, and an avoidance of behavior which would bring it about. “How tenderly—more tenderly than many stricter souls—we might yield to kindly instinct, what fineness of charity in passing judgment on others, what an exquisite conscience of other men’s susceptibilities. We go beyond most people in our care for all weakly creatures.”

Earthen Character: Development generally of the more human and earthly elements of character. Virile consciousness of the realities of life, poetic apprehension, united with something of personal ambition and self-assertion. The earthly end comes like a final revelation of nothing less than the soul’s extinction. To the sentiment of the body, and the affections it defines — the flesh — one must cling; a materialist with the temper of a devotee. Amid abstract metaphysical doubts, as to what might lie one step only beyond that experience, we reinforce the deep original materialism or eathliness of human nature itself, bound so intimately to the sensuous world — let us at least make the most of what is “here and now”. 

The New Cyrenaic System

With this entry I present a condensed vision of the entire New Cyrenaic system. All credit for philosophical originality properly belongs to the individual figures named and tagged - these are, in chronological order, Heraclitus of Ephesus, Aristippus of Cyrene, Epicurus of Samos, and Walter Pater. Additional credit is due to Charles Sanders Peirce, who, though I do not reproduce his doctrine in depth, broadly influenced the interpretation and perspective provided. My contribution is entirely dependent on underlying primary material provided by the aforementioned persons, and consists solely of trans-historical creative reinterpretation, aiming at a functional pastiche of cohesive elements. The unitive principle which informs this ethical project is total commitment to our immediate affectations as the sole criteria of truth and value. It is for the reader to test the following for themselves. 

Metaphysics and Epistemology: 

Empirical Idealism: Complete fidelity to immediate experience, consisting of sensory affections, as the sole source and criteria of knowledge. These subjective impressions vouch for themselves, and they do so inwardly, unmistakably, truly, and incorrigibly. Affections are elements of sensational awareness generated by movements of our physical being due to relational contact with external stimuli, and they fall into three categories: pleasurable, painful, or neutral. These latter, intermediate states provide representational information, of which there are innumerable varieties, and may also be accompanied by/provoke pleasurable or painful sensations. 

Hedonic Motivation: Among the affections we have the feelings called pleasure and pain. Pleasure is self-evidently choice-worthy, pain is self-evidently avoidance-worthy, and no other sensations possess these monadic qualities as a matter of brute experience. Consequently, these feelings alone are directly capable of motivating or guiding choice and avoidance. Emotions are the positive and negative responses respectively resulting from cognitive judgements, evaluative or prospective, according to the criteria of these two states. As further evidence of nature supplying the norm, we have the Cradle Argument, according to which we judge the evidence provided by uncorrupted beings, such as animals and young children, who, from birth, automatically pursue pleasure and shun pain without moralistic confusion.

Purgative Skepticism: Withdrawal of interest from all other alleged sources of knowledge beyond what can be accessed and verified through direct sense-perception, or can be inferred therefrom, eliminating concerns with speculative metaphysics and intrinsic axiological dogma, narrowing the field of legitimate concern and circumscribing the scope of epistemic ability. 

Impressionistic Flux: The impressions of experience are constantly undergoing changes, at different rates and in varying respects, with underlying continuity and fixed relationships among them. We observe that change is oppositional and bi-polar, operating according to an interplay of centrifugal and centripetal tendencies. Human beings, like all phenomena, are a developmental result of this self-same process, and within the nexus of experience, the mode of organic sense-perception operates along multiple qualitative continuums, the extremes of which we declare opposites. The mind is sensitive to patterns of behavior resulting from the interactivity of balanced forces because it is of the same nature, these habitual relationships being deemed “lawful” when applied to the predictable motions of external objects, and “logical” when considered cognitively. The universe is therefore comprehensible, directly as a matter of immediate experience, and inferentially as the approximate value of statistical ratios. 

Pragmatic Theory of Objects: Our conception of an object’s identity consists entirely in that confluence of present and expected relational effects, on other objects and on oneself directly, according to which we group and categorize entities in terms of their general characteristics and principles of action, within ranges of practical significance. 

Presentism: The present moment alone is truly ours, a bubble wherein experience unfolds and phenomena are open to purposeful interactivity. We yield to the improvement of the present, excluding all embarrassment alike of regret for the past and calculation for the future, as far as possible, in order to maximize attentive receptivity. (See “Present Focus” below for the practical application of this insight).

Ethics:

Individual Sensual Hedonism: The highest good (summum bonum) is one’s own pleasurable existence as a living organism. The end (to telos) is to live pleasantly/pleasurably, which is called happiness. All other goods are instrumental to securing and adorning one’s own pleasant living. Human happiness is psychosomatic, requiring physical health and mental well-being as both foundational states for seeking greater pleasure, and for maintaining the sensitivity of our apparatus for enjoyment.

Peace of Mind and Homeostasis of Body: The active pursuit of pleasures is balanced with the value of freedom from mental distress (or, possessing peace of mind), and freedom from bodily pain (or, preserving physical well-being). It is by pursuing, attaining, and maintaining this dual-aspect of healthiness, we may say biological hygiene, which provides pleasure in itself, and establishes the necessary pre-conditions for pursuing and appreciating higher pleasures.

Unitemporal Pleasure: The pleasures of the present experience are to be enjoyed fully as our highest goal, without undue concern for what has passed or what is to come, which is self-defeating. Pleasant living is to be accomplished within each individual unit of time, enjoying what is at hand, without excessive toil or yearning for what is not currently available.

Hierarchy of Desires: In order to prioritise our desires, we categorize them according to their level of necessity for the pleasant life, and their origin in natural or unnatural conditions, creating three distinct categories. Of the desires that are both natural and necessary, there are those which are required for our survival, those required for removing bodily pain, and those required for achieving happiness. Unnecessary desires ought to be pursued as augmenting necessary desires and contributing to happiness, but should not be chased at the expense of more basic requirements. 

Aesthetic Exemplarism: Projecting a vision of the successful life, informed by other persons and artistic representations, as tangible exemplars for our own aspirations. Additionally, 

“We may well adorn and beautify, in scrupulous self-respect, our souls, and whatever our souls touch upon — these wonderful bodies, these material dwelling-places through which the shadows pass together for a while, the very raiments we wear, our very pastimes and the inter course of society.” - Walter Pater. 

True aesthetic culture is realizable as a new form of the contemplative life, founded on the vision of perfect men, objects, and environments. Whatever form of human life which may be heroic, impassioned, ideal: these are the criterion of inspirational values.

Character and Attitude:

Education: The goals of philosophical education are tranquility, social mastery, and connoisseurship. Transforming “slavish” characters into free ones involves cultivating self-possession/-mastery, the capacity to speak with sophistication, and proper philosophical understanding. Education thereby removes impediments to the purest and most immediate reception of pleasurable experiences, including anxiety, regret, and unjustified (that is, merely conventional) compunctions. Training also includes cultivation of appetite and the refinement of its satisfaction, increasing capacity for appreciation.

Temperance: We strive to keep in mind what really matters and what does not. What really matters is simply to avoid pain and distress, and to experience some sort of pleasure. We achieve the former by disdaining excess, which does not entail embracing austerity, and not becoming attached/dependent to any particular source of pleasure. Excess is relative to what is actually good, which is pleasure, and this does not exclude luxury, but we avoid upsetting the hierarchy by chasing corrosive desires which cannot be satisfied. Those who are always dissatisfied, no matter what they acquire, have an illness. New Cyrenaic philosophy cures practitioners of their attachment to superfluities, freeing them from stress, insomnia, and the stranglehold of their preoccupations. Temperance also enables enjoyment: those with a sound mind can indulge in luxurious pleasures without becoming corrupted — that is, beginning to feel these are necessities.

Present Focus: Telescoping of concerns to the present moment as a spiritual exercise, prudential rule of thumb, and emotional attitude - not an ontological straight-jacket. We thereby diminish discomfort and become more receptive to present pleasures. Due to the greater ability to affect the present moment, we put less faith in painstaking long-term planning than in our ability to adapt to circumstances.

Adaptability and Confidence: Able to harmonize with place, time, and role, and perform harmoniously in any circumstance. Confidence means feeling comfortable rather than anxious or fearful in unknown or threatening situations. Paradoxically, it is only a person of firm character and profound insight who can be so malleable, adapting comfortably to every situation.

Sociability: Capable of getting along with any sort of person whatsoever, and do so without anxiety. This confidence is based on the understanding both cognitively and emotionally that; 1. all one needs is to avoid pain and discover some modicum of pleasure, therefore, the sage feels more relaxed around people. He or she does not need to impress anyone, since we are not after anything another can provide which we could not procure ourselves. 2. Just about every situation presents opportunities for enjoyment, which encourages simple accommodation of oneself to one’s company at any given moment.

Suavity: Training responsiveness, versatility, and adroitness. The wise man is comfortable in any situation, and adroit enough to turn it to his advantage. He speaks well, with knowledge and sophistication, possessing charm, humor, and quick-wittedness.

A Charitable Portrayal of Aristippus

When Cyrenaicism is mentioned in historical accounts, it is often referenced in order to provide an unfavorable contrast with the more sophisticated philosophical developments of the Epicureans. Whilst I have immense respect for Epicurus and his philosophy, these two schools actually have far more in common than the conveniently exaggerated juxtapositions would lead us to believe. It is no secret that Epicurus borrowed from his predecessors, which is easily conceded in regards to Democritus and Leucippus, but what is less commonly recognized is that Epicureanism is similarly situated in regards to Cyrenaicism, representing an innovative evolution rather than a sharp departure. In order to dramatize Epicurus’ unique elements, Aristippus and the Cyrenaics are often caricatured as empty-headed goldfish flitting from one source or momentary pleasure to another, while the level-headed Epicureans plan for the future, exercise moderation, and make calculated decisions. Let us interrogate this simplified picture, explore the Cyrenaic theory in greater depth, and analyze the clear parallels with much-needed charity. 

Physics:

Epicurus famously defended an atomistic materialism in the vein of Democritus, albeit with idiosyncratic updates (and we may say, improvements), such as breaking from the latter’s strict determinism by introducing the “swerve” to account for human volition, or treating phenomenal qualities as faithfully representing an underlying structural reality rather asserting that they exist by mere “convention”. 

Aristippus and the Cyrenaics are also essentially common-sense physicalists (though not properly materialists), arguing that all sensation consists of varieties of motions in our bodies caused by relational interactions with external objects, producing either gentle, violent, or calm vibrations, corresponding to pleasurable, painful, or indifferent sensational feelings in our awareness. This theory was clearly borrowed from Protagoras, and is not greatly elaborated upon in the extant remains of the Cyrenaics, who did not much care for natural investigation, but note there is no fundamental disagreement between the two hedonistic schools on this point. 

It is ultimately unclear that the sensory impressionism of Cyrenaics epistemology could support a more robust theory of matter, particularly dubious would be an atomistic theory, but something like Mill’s phenomenalism seems compatible. Nevertheless, Epicurus’ developments are far superior in specification, explanation, and argumentation, but he is not essentially at odds with his hedonistic predecessors. 

Epistemology:

Epicurus is, for all intents and purposes, a straightforward empiricist who additionally acknowledges that human beings have innate predispositions and pattern-recognition abilities. The Canon is a triadic account of the faculties for gaining knowledge, and includes the Senses (our six classical organs of awareness), the Feelings (pleasure and pain), and the Anticipations (variously interpreted as pre-conceptual patterning, socio-political navigation, conceptual categorization based on repetitive experiences, etc.). 

The Cyrenaics begin from a somewhat skeptical framework, wherein we can only be completely sure of our directly experienced affections, rather than the intrinsic nature of that which causes them. Another clear outgrowth of Protagorean relativism, we are nevertheless in a similar epistemic situation to the Epicureans, in which empirical evidence is incorrigible and certain, while all other alleged sources of information are considered dubious or non-existent, unless they can be established to originate from what is immediately sensible. 

The Epicureans reason from what is evident to what is not, in the case of both their atomic theory and their various accounts of remote meteorological phenomena, using analogy. The Cyrenaics refrain from engaging in abstract ontology and focus their attention on what is practical, based on that which we do know for sure. They sweep aside with indifference the unfounded supernatural speculations of the masses — those concerns which motivate Epicurean efforts to debunk cosmic sources of mortal fears — because, according to their epistemic theory, there is no corresponding experience which makes this a plausible area for concern to begin with. While there are important differences in these approaches, note again the essential agreements.

Pleasure:

For Epicurus, it is the faculty of the Feelings wherein our natural end is to be understood, since we are supplied by nature with a built-in mechanism for automatic evaluation, judging what phenomena are for or against us according to how they please or disturb us. Epicureans find the limit of pleasure in the elimination of pain in the body and disturbances in the mind, and accordingly they urge us to satisfy our natural and necessary desires through fulfillment, while eliminating corrosive desires, and prudently moderating our merely unnecessary desires. What evidence is brought to support this identification of human nature supplying the norm? The Epicureans place great weight on the example of uncorrupted and unconfused beings, such as young infants or animals, and they ask us to consult our own internal experiences. 

It is with the Cyrenaics that both of these naturalistic arguments originate. Similar to the empiricist Epicureans, the Cyrenaics who admit only direct knowledge of our sensations can find no possible competing criteria by which to judge the good or the bad, except for these selfsame sensations, all of which are either pleasant, painful, or neutral. We naturally gravitate towards the former, shrink away from the next, and are neither compelled nor repelled by the latter. Nevertheless, through corruption we can become confused and work against these innate feelings. The Cyrenaics also greatly value peace of mind, but there is no question of this tranquility supplanting the pleasurable end we seek, it is merely the healthy foundation from which we work to maximize positive experiences. By carefully managing the economy of pleasures and pains, we maintain our constitution while making calculated risks for greater rewards, forgoing superfluous excesses, and making the most of every situation. 

Presentism: 

The Epicureans no doubt have a far-ranging theory of pleasure, taking great delight in reminiscence on pleasurable experiences gone by, and finding solace in the well-founded expectation of future pleasures to come. Due to this temporal extension, Epicureans place greater emphasis on mental pleasures and pains, because while titillations and afflictions of the body only occur during the moment of physical excitement, those of the mind stretch across time, as yesterday’s regrets become today’s anguish, while tomorrow’s rewards induce present excitement.

The Cyrenaics, on the other hand, are unfairly portrayed as radical ontological presentists, occupying a minuscule sliver of time, paying no heed to future consequences, lacking reflection on the past, and busying themselves with any potential source of elation their eyes may fix upon. In reality, Aristippus and his followers are really more concerned with pointing out a pair of fairly intuitive observations: that present pleasures and pains are of higher degree, intensity, and reality than their copies in recollection or anticipation, and; that people often spend too much time brooding over the past or worrying about the future, while losing focus on the present situation and missing their chance to act here and now, to enjoy what is at hand. 

A cursory reading of Cyrenaic material reveals an emphasis on education, the development of skills and character, a knack for controlling our desires and forgoing those which promise greater troubles than they are worth. None of these concerns make any sense for a movement which is confined to the ever-vanishing moment. Cyrenaic presentism is nothing more than the reasonable exercise of attending to the real world right in front of us, rather than wandering around in one’s imagination — not exclusively, not at the expense of planning and executing long-range goals, but as a prudential rule-of-thumb. 

Friendship and Society:

Epicurus placed great emphasis on the value of living among a community of close friends, a situation which provides greater assurance of security, continuous opportunities for socializing, and a network of mutual support. Epicurus also cautions against risky political engagement, not necessarily advocating complete withdrawal of the kind usually attributed to him, but nevertheless acknowledging the danger to health and serenity that accompanies such public forays, and certainly suspiciously interrogating the corrosive motivations that tend to spur such activity in the first place.

Aristippus tended to pursue pleasures that involved cheerful association with others, adapting to new circumstances and making the most of available opportunities. If the anecdotes recorded by Diogenes Laërtius show us anything, it’s that Aristippus was incredibly quick-witted, jovial, and humorous. Politically, the Socratic dialogue of Xenophon reveals a character prizing personal freedom, rejecting the roles of ruler or ruled, and preferring instead to travel as a stranger everywhere in order to maintain his independence. Though there is apparently greater self-sufficiency and individualism present here than in the Epicurean communities, it is clear nevertheless that Aristippus highly values social relationships, and the genealogy of his school, as well as a collection of spurious letters, suggests that he cared deeply for his daughter Arete, teaching her in his ways and advising her not to worry about inessential losses.

Virtue:

It is impossible, says Epicurus, to live pleasantly without living honorably, wisely, and justly. The virtues are instrumental means to securing the good life, and are inseparable necessities for navigating the world successfully. One must abide by the niceties regulating social conduct, one must exercise prudent judgement in practical matters, and one must abide by the laws and regulations designed to maintain cohesion and protect men from one another. Conversely, nobody who does so fails to live happily, either. Epicurean prudence generally consists of rationally pursuing the necessary and natural desires, taking care to moderate unnecessary desires so as to guard against inviting additional pains in their wake, or in the effort to obtain them, lest we counterproductively disturb our tranquility. 

Breaking from the usual portrayal, and though the Cyrenaics are rather more indulgent, Aristippus  actually emphasizes a perfected version of Socratic temperance, urging the disdain for excess, understanding that all we require is to experience some level of comfortable pleasure while avoiding disturbances, and arguing that those who are dissatisfied no matter what are undergoing a mental illness. We find in Aristuppus the embryonic form of Epicurus’ threefold division of desires, though in a simplified form which highlights the Cyrenaic belief that it is he who wisely indulges in a controlled fashion, not he who cautiously abstains, that exhibits the greatest self-mastery. 

Conclusion:

My hope with this rough overview is merely to provide the beginning of a counter narrative against the popular view that the Cyrenaics were a mere infantile anomaly, whose only continuing interest, if any, is as a historical curiosity portraying misguided Socratics stretching the limits of sophistic excesses. In reality, there is much greater insight available here, later expanded by orthodox and heterodox Cyrenaics over time, and of course, extended by the Epicurean school, albeit with new foundations and greater coherence. 

Bare Essentials

This post is merely a skeletal companion piece to the more fleshed-out summary of Cyrenaic practice found here. It consists only of the essential points to keep in mind as we navigate the world, without excess information.

Bare Essentials:

Our immediate, subjective, sensory affections vouch for themselves, not whatever they appear to represent, and they do so inwardly, unmistakably, truly and incorrigibly. They are our only source of knowledge. The passage and dissolution of fleeting sensations and images is where analysis leaves off.  

Pleasure is self-evidently choice-worthy, pain is self-evidently avoidance-worthy, and no other experiences possess these monadic axiological characteristics. Our ethical project is a life organized around the life-guiding truth of pleasure and pain — the only natural, native, and concrete referents for our understanding of good and evil. 

The highest good is one’s own pleasure, and the end is to live pleasantly, which is happiness. All other goods are instrumental to securing one’s own pleasure. The pursuit of pleasures is balanced with the value of maintaining freedom from mental distress and from bodily pain. Perception of the world is made in terms of opportunities for enjoyment and risks of suffering, informing our hedonic calculus in the economy of pleasure.

The pleasures of the present experience are to be enjoyed fully as our highest goal, without undue concern for what has passed or what is to come, which is self-defeating. Pleasant living is to be accomplished within each individual unit of time, enjoying what is at hand, without excessive toil or yearning for what is not currently available. 

We skilfully cultivate an earthen character, with virile consciousness of the natural and instinctive sentiments of the body and the affections our flesh defines — a poetic apprehension of experience united with something of personal ambition and self-assertion. This opens an aesthetic dimension of pleasure-seeking. We regard all objects — works of art, the fairer forms of nature and human life, engaging personalities — as powers or forces producing pleasurable sensations, each of a more or less peculiar, unique kind. 

We adorn and beautify, in scrupulous self-respect, our souls, and whatever our souls touch upon — these bodies, the raiments we wear, our pastimes, and the intercourse of society. We build ourselves in accordance with a beatific vision of successful living — exemplified by heroic, impassioned, and joyful modes of being and behaving, taken from living or artistically depicted examples. To burn always with this hard, gem-like flame, to maintain this ecstasy, is success in life. 

To strong sensual passions we must unite a calm regulative intellect, in order to indulge various pleasures without being worsted. We temper our enjoyment with moderation, holding dominion over desires by keeping in mind what really matters and what does not. What really matters is simply to avoid pain and distress, and to experience some sort of pleasure. We achieve the former by disdaining excess. This does not entail embracing austerity, because excess is relative to what is actually good — pleasure. We do not exclude luxury, if available, but avoid becoming attached or dependent on specific sources of pleasure, and reduce our desires accordingly. Temperance also enables enjoyment: those with a sound mind can indulge freely in luxurious pleasures without becoming corrupted — that is, beginning to feel these are necessities.

We keep an easy and yielding disposition, with infinite mirth, adapting ourselves to place, time, and role, performing harmoniously in any circumstance. With confidence, healthy virtue, and elegant vice, we feel comfortable rather than anxious or fearful in unknown or threatening situations. Paradoxically, it is only a person of firm character and profound insight who can be so malleable, adapting comfortably to every situation.

Our easy gaiety and careless enjoyment aids sociability, and we are capable of getting along with any sort of person whatsoever, and can do so without anxiety. This social confidence is based on the understanding both cognitively and emotionally that all we need is to avoid pain and discover some modicum of pleasure, so we feel more relaxed around other people. We do not need to impress anyone, since we are not after anything another can provide which we could not procure for ourselves. Just about every situation presents opportunities for enjoyment, which encourages simple accommodation of ourselves to our company at any given moment.

Suavity involves training responsiveness, versatility, and adroitness. The wise man is comfortable in any situation, and adroit enough to turn it to his advantage. He speaks well, with knowledge and sophistication, possessing charm, humor, and quick-wittedness.

Pleasure Principles

The following program is a result of my own philosophical reflection upon, and distillation of, Ancient Cyrenaic material, augmented by the later aesthetic developments and creative reinterpretations of Walter Pater. My personal approach to philosophy proceeds ever with an eye towards practical application. The theory or idea which does not inform somehow one’s attitude and actions is idle — of no consequence. As a result, this summary is not presented as rigorous theory, but as a pragmatic code informing outlook and behavior. I have cannibalized content from prior writing in order to create this current pastiche, and am liable to update its content as my understanding evolves. As always, all credit for originality properly belongs to past figures, from whose efforts I pilfer.

Pleasure Principles:

Maintain complete fidelity to the subjective experience of immediate sensory impressions as the sole origin and criteria of knowledge. These affections vouch for themselves, and they do so inwardly, unmistakably, truly, and incorrigibly. Accordingly, we have inferior epistemic access to other alleged sources for guidance of action and care. This focus induces a drily practical purgative skepticism, justifying withdrawal of interest, and suspension of judgement, regarding speculative metaphysical theorizing about what may lie beyond or behind experiential phenomena. With the individual for our standard, we are unable to wholly accept the valuations of others without personal verification, foundational for intellectual integrity. 

Only the feelings of pleasure and pain possess monadic qualities of attraction and repulsion, respectively. Pleasure is self-evidently choice-worthy, pain is self-evidently avoidance-worthy, and no other experiences possess these monadic qualities. We organize our lives around the life-guiding truth of pleasure and pain. The highest good is my own pleasure, and the end is to live pleasantly. All other goods are of instrumental value. The maximal achievement, appreciation, and enjoyment of pleasurable experiences across a lifetime constitutes happiness. The pursuit of pleasure is balanced with maintaining freedom from mental distress and bodily pain. Perception of the world is made in terms of opportunities for enjoyment, and risks of suffering, informing our hedonic calculus in the economy of pleasure.

The feeling of pleasure, like all affections, occurs only while it is being experienced — it is unitemporal. The present alone is truly real, and we yield completely to its improvement. We telescope our focus of concern and care to the present moment as a spiritual exercise, prudential rule of thumb, and emotional attitude — not an ontological straight-jacket. We exclude all embarrassment alike of regret for the past and calculation for the future, as far as possible, and train ourselves to focus on what is before us, not what is absent. We thereby diminish discomfort and become more receptive to present pleasures. Pleasant living is to be accomplished within each individual unit of time. Due to the greater ability to affect the present moment, we put less faith in painstaking long-term planning than in our ability to adapt to circumstances.

Education shapes our character by training tranquility, social mastery, and connoisseurship. In order to achieve happiness, we must transform our behavior and attitude so we can rationally secure, maintain, and enjoy pleasurable experiences, while minimising negative consequences. This involves transforming slavish characters into free ones by cultivating self-possession/-mastery, the capacity to speak with sophistication, and proper philosophical understanding. Education thereby removes impediments to the purest and most immediate reception of pleasurable experiences, including anxiety, regret, and unjustified (merely conventional) compunctions. Training also includes cultivation of appetite and the refinement of its satisfaction, increasing capacity for appreciation. We skilfully cultivate an earthen character, with virile consciousness of the sentiments of the body and the affections our flesh defines — a poetic apprehension of experience united with something of personal ambition and self-assertion. This opens an aesthetic dimension of pleasure-seeking. We regard all objects, works of art, the fairer forms of nature and human life, engaging personalities, as powers or forces producing pleasurable sensations, each of a more or less peculiar or unique kind. 

To indulge in various pleasures without being worsted, we must exercise self-control and train certain excellencies. Temperance involves disdaining excess desires and curbing dependency on any particular allures, as the sentimental and practical application of the precept of true value. What really matters is simply to avoid pain and distress, and to experience some sort of pleasure. Excess is relative to what is actually good: pleasure. This does not exclude luxury, but we avoid becoming attached to specific sources of pleasure and reduce our desires accordingly. Practical reason involves applying the rational account of what is good and what is bad to particular situations, and choosing correctly — this also provides a sound foundation for rhetoric. Adaptability signifies that we possess the ability to harmonize with place, time, and role, and perform harmoniously in any circumstance. Paradoxically, it is only a person of firm character and profound insight who can be so malleable, adapting comfortably to every situation. Confidence means feeling comfortable rather than anxious or fearful in unknown or threatening situations. Sociability denotes the ability to get along with any sort of person whatsoever, and to do so without anxiety. This social confidence is based on the understanding both cognitively and emotionally that all we need is to avoid pain and discover some modicum of pleasure. We not need to impress anyone, since we are not after anything they can provide which we could not procure for ourselves. Just about every situation presents opportunities for enjoyment, which encourages simple accommodation of oneself to one’s company and situation at any given moment. Suavity involves training responsiveness, versatility, and adroitness. The wise man is comfortable in any situation, and adroit enough to turn it to his advantage. He speaks well, with knowledge and sophistication, possessing charm, humor, and quick-wittedness.

Friendships, familial relationships, and romantic partnerships are entered into or continued for self-interested motives due to the pleasures they command. Natural affection follows and we become pleased seeing those we care about happy, motivating us to help ensure their well-being. Magnanimity and concern are important interpersonal qualities. Justice is the prudent course of action because of the pleasant social consequences which follow. This means being generally fair, meritorious, and law-abiding in our dealings with others. We have an empathetic distaste for causing or witnessing pain and discomfort. We appeal to the aesthetic revulsion caused by the ugliness of suffering, prompting an amelioration of its causes if reasonable, and an avoidance of behavior which would bring it about. Veneration for life itself is due to our immediate grasp of the inherently distressing nature of pain and suffering.

Cyrenaic Principles

Based on a careful reading of Aristippean anecdotes, in addition to adjacent orthodox material, I’ve synthesized a number of general principles, collected according to similarity of theme. Due to the interconnected nature of all philosophical systems, it’s appropriate that many points would fit under multiple headings, but there is a useful hierarchy here. Short summaries like this provide a quick reference for practical application. 

Hedonism:

• To live pleasantly/pleasurably is the ultimate end of man.
• Pleasure is the telos, pain is the greatest evil, and as proof of this we have the example of young children, animals, and the natural feelings of men. 
• Pleasure is the smooth/moderate motion of the soul/body, resulting in sensation.
• Bend world to self, not self to world.
• A happy life holds heroic value over an ordinary existence.
• Opulence and extravagance are not to be shunned, if available.
• The man who masters pleasure is not the one who abstains, but the one who enjoys without allowing himself to be carried away.
• Education improves receptivity and appreciation.

Peace of Mind:

• Maintain calm temper, regardless of the situation.
• Aim higher, while content with what you have.
• A man ought not covet more than he possesses, else he risks the degree and purity of his joy.
• Greed for excess is an illness, and we ought not become attached to any particular source of pleasure.
• Accustom oneself to living on little so as to do nothing shameful for the purpose of gaining wealth.
• Express amiability in relationships, avoid holding grudges, and aim for reconciliation.
• We should not allow our words to be guided by anger, but ought use our words to put a check on our anger.
• Eschew the troubles of politics.

Adaptability and Confidence:

• Extract enjoyment from all circumstances, controlling adversity and prosperity alike.
• Our philosophy imparts the ability to feel at ease in any society. We become skilled at adapting ourselves to place, time, and person. We can play our role in the manner that befits each circumstance. 
• All states, styles, and circumstances suit us.
• Wit, rhetorical skills, and suavity are valuable.
• Fortune and chance are negligible.

Presentism:

• The pleasures of the present moment are paramount.
• Derive pleasure from what is present, without troublesome toil for what is not.
• We should not be anxious about things past or future. Such an attitude is a sign of confidence and gives proof of a cheerful frame of mind.
• Telescope your attention first on the day, and in that day, on the very moment in which we are acting and thinking, as a spiritual exercise to increase pleasurable appreciation. 
• Only the present truly belongs to us. 

Virtue:

• Skills of character are the most valuable possessions; those habits which conduce to pleasure are virtuous.
• Virtue is praiseworthy only because it is productive of pleasure.
• True wisdom consists of transforming disagreeable into agreeable sensations.
• Temperance means to control desires, not to be controlled by them. It is not abstinence from pleasure, but mastery over it that is best, in order to indulge without being worsted.
• Moderation prevents against corruption.
• Disdain excess.
• Freedom is the high road that leads most surely to happiness, being neither master nor slave.
• Gratitude and rejoicing in what one has is superior to mourning what is lost or not achieved.

Sources:

Diogenes & Hard, R. (2012). Sayings and anecdotes: with other popular moralists. Oxford University Press.

Redmond, F. (2012). Cyreniacs Handbook. Createspace Independent Publishing Platform.

Kurt Lampe’s “Aristippus on Education, Virtue, and Happiness” from THE BIRTH OF HEDONISM

Here I present Kurt Lampe’s section regarding “Aristippus on Education, Virtue, and Happiness” from Chapter 4 of his excellent book The Birth of Hedonism, lightly edited, with select content underlined for emphasis and ease of reference.

Aristippus on Education, Virtue, and Happiness:

Pleasure, pain, and distress are not the only items of value in Aristippean thinking. The evidence for his commitment to the development of philosophical insight and ethical character is extremely strong. In this section I explore the anecdotal evidence for the value he places on education, wisdom, and virtue. In many anecdotes Aristippus argues that “education” (paideia), and especially the education he himself offers, is a precious thing. Two examples will suffice:

When someone asked him how much he was asking for the education of his son, [Aristippus] replied, “A thousand drachmas.” The other said, “By Heracles! That’s an exorbitant demand! I could buy a slave for a thousand drachmas!” “Then you’ll have two slaves,” Aristippus replied, “your son and the one you buy.” (Plut. Mor. 4f = SSR 4A.5; cf. D.L. 2.72)

Aristippus said that he took money from his associates not in order to use it, but so they would know on what they should spend their money. (D.L. 2.72; cf. Gnom. Vat. 743 n. 24 = SSR 4a.7)

The primary reason that numerous anecdotes on this topic have been preserved is because Socrates did not accept payments, so Aristippus’s fee-charging arrangements opened him to accusations of “un-Socratic” behavior. Thus it is hardly surprising to find him defending the merit of his product. But there is no reason to doubt that Aristippus genuinely believed the training he offered was excellent value for money. While he may have taught the rhetorical art of “speaking well,” the anecdotes consistently suggest that he provided much more: as he implies above, his students were transforming their “slavish” characters into “free” ones. Having a “free” character might involve not only the capacity to speak with sophistication but also the understanding and self-possession to merit the privileges accorded to free males (as opposed to women or slaves) in the hierarchical world of Greek antiquity. Another saying on this topic corroborates the transformational power of education, but does so rather differently: “When he was asked how those who are educated exceed those who are not, he said, ‘In the same way as tame horses exceed wild ones’” (D.L. 2.69). Rather than moving from slavishness to freedom, these pupils move from savagery to civilization. It is unclear precisely how Aristippus believes tame horses exceed wild ones. It is obvious, however, that breaking and training a horse not only gives it the capacity to perform new tasks, but also transforms its attitudes about many experiences and provides it with a new way of life. Aristippus is suggesting that the education of a human being has the same breadth of effect, and therefore is worth every obol.

The content of this character- and life-transforming pedagogy is surely nothing other than Aristippus’s own philosophy. Certainly this is the case regarding his daughter: “He instructed his daughter Arete in the best fashion, sharing with her his training in being disdainful of excess” (D.L. 2.72). This description emphasizes the exercises through which Arete accustoms herself to a new mode of thinking and feeling: Aristippus “shared his training” (sunaskōn); he taught Arete “to be disdainful of excess” (huperoptikēn tou pleionos einai). These exercises would have been underpinned by reasoning about what is good and what is bad, as the anonymous authors of the spurious Socratic Epistles have imaginatively reconstructed.

In the twenty-seventh epistle, Aristippus, who has fallen ill on the way home from Sicily, indicates that he has received a letter from Arete complaining about how the officials in Cyrene are treating her. Aristippus counsels her,

I instruct you to manage this business with the rulers in such a way that my advice benefits you. That advice was not to desire what is excessive. In this way you’ll live out your life in the best fashion, if you’re disdainful of every excess. Those men will never wrong you so much that you’ll be in want, since you still have the two orchards, and they suffice even for a luxurious life. Even if only the property in Berenice were left, it wouldn’t fail to support an excellent lifestyle. (Socr. Ep. 27.2)

Here the authors imagine Aristippus in the very act of “instructing” his daughter (hupotithemai). It is clear that he has already taught the principles of “not wanting excess” (mē tou pleonos orignasthai) and “being disdainful of every excess” (huperoptikē pantos . . . tou pleonos). It is now a matter of helping her to see how they apply in this circumstance. Arete already has several properties in and around Cyrene. Aristippus urges her to consider that those properties are more than sufficient for an “excellent” and even “luxurious” lifestyle. Note, therefore, that “disdaining excess” does not entail embracing austerity: excess is defined relative to what is actually good, which for Aristippus is pleasure, not excluding luxurious enjoyment. Aristippus makes this explicit later: “Since you share this pleasant lifestyle with those women, let the officials in Cyrene wrong you as much as they want: they won’t wrong you with respect to your natural end” (27.3). The phrase “natural end” (phusikon telos) is anachronistic for Aristippus, but we can nevertheless appreciate how this letter recreates his effort, through both teaching Arete principles and training her in their application, to mold her thoughts and feelings with the rational standards of judgment articulated by their shared philosophy. The result at which this kind of education aims is not only understanding of what is good and bad, but also everyday feelings and actions in accord with this understanding. In short, it is a transformation of both belief and desire.

Since it is a behavioral disposition with a rational underpinning, we can usefully think of the ability to disdain excess as one of the virtues of Aristippean philosophy. In fact, we could call it Aristippus’s version of “temperance” or “soundness of mind” (sōphrosunē). Numerous anecdotes display the value Aristippus attributes to this disposition and the positive consequences he recognizes from it. In one family of anecdotes he is threatened at sea, either by pirates or by his fellow passengers. He ensures his safety by tossing his money overboard (D.L. 2.77, Suda A 3909, Gnom. Vat. 743 n. 39 = SSR 4a.79, 82). After all, he needs his life, but not his money. In a saying recorded by Plutarch, Aristippus explains the virtue of disdaining excess with a medical metaphor:

Anyone who remembers Aristippus would be especially amazed by people who haven’t lost anything, have many possessions, but always still need more [pleonos]. He used to say, “If someone eats a lot and drinks a lot and is never satisfied, he goes to the doctor and asks what his illness is, what his condition is, and how he can be freed from it. But if someone has five couches and wants ten, or possesses ten tables and buys as many again, or isn’t satisfied when plenty of estates and money are available, but remains stressed, sleepless, and insatiable with everything, this man doesn’t think he needs someone to care for him and show him why he has this illness.” (Mor. 524a–b = SSR 4a.73)

Those who are always dissatisfied, no matter what they acquire, have an “illness” (pathos). The justification for pathologizing this state is not only that it is “unreasonable” or “unnatural,” which some might contest, but also—and more importantly from a hedonistic perspective—that it is uncomfortable: its symptoms include stress (suntetatai) and insomnia (agrupnei). Another Aristippean saying makes a similar point: “It’s better to live by sleeping on straw but feeling confident than to have wealth but be strangled by your own thoughts” (Anecd. Gr. ed. Boissonade I p. 36.18–21 = SSR 4a.77). Aristippus’s philosophy aims to equip its practitioners with the beliefs and attitudes they need in order to be “cured” of their attachment to superfluities, and thus to be freed from their stress, insomnia, and the stranglehold of their own preoccupations.

Aristippean temperance also has a positive aspect. It not only eliminates mental “illness,” it also enables enjoyment. Once again there are numerous anecdotes testifying to this function. The most popular concerns an incident in the court of the tyrant Dionysius in Syracuse:

Once when they were drinking and Dionysius ordered everyone to put on purple robes and dance, Plato refused. “I couldn’t put on women’s clothing,” he said. But Aristippus took the robes and when he was about to dance he gracefully replied, “even in Bacchic celebrations, if a lady is sound of mind [sōphrōn], she won’t be corrupted.” (D.L. 2.78)

Here Plato is quoting the verses of Pentheus, the doomed protagonist in Euripides’ Bacchae (line 836). Aristippus, by contrast, is quoting the verses of the blind prophet Tiresias, who always perceives the truth that tragic protagonists stubbornly refuse to see (lines 317–18). The moral is obviously that whoever has a truly sound mind can indulge in beautiful clothes, dancing, and bodily pleasure without “being corrupted”—in other words, without beginning to feel that those things are necessary. Such a person will not forget that what really matters is simply to avoid pain and distress and experience some sort of pleasure. The source of that pleasure is unimportant, as a key passage testifies: “[Aristippus] enjoyed the pleasure of what was present, and didn’t hunt painfully after the enjoyment of what was not present” (D.L. 2.66). This is why Aristippus can walk away from any particular source of pleasure without even a twinge of regret, as he sometimes demonstrates very conspicuously:

Once Dionysius ordered [Aristippus] to choose one of three courte- sans. Aristippus led away all three, saying, “It didn’t do Paris any good to choose just one!” But they say that after he led them away, when he got as far as the gate he dismissed them. That’s how strong he was in both choosing and disdaining. (D.L. 2.67; cf. Athen. 544d, Socratic Epistle 9.1 = SSR 4a.86, 96, 222)

Aristippus can send away the courtesans because he knows that his night will be none the worse for it. Of course, having sex with three women would be pleasant and therefore choiceworthy. But a display of wit and magnanimity will impress Dionysius and thus secure future enjoyment. And for anyone with an understanding of what is really good and bad, three courtesans are excessive: one sexual partner, or even an alternative source of bodily pleasure, is just as good. This insight provides Aristippus with both the tranquility and the self-mastery to which every ancient Greek sage aspires. It is encapsulated in what may be Aristippus’s most famous saying, which refers to his relationship with the renowned courtesan Laïs: “I have, but I am not had” (SSR 4a.95–96). In other words, he knows what he wants from this relationship, which is simply pleasure. Unlike so many others, he has not become infatuated with this renowned courtesan; she has no hold over him.

Aristippus’s particular interpretation of temperance dovetails with another of his virtues, which is mastery of interpersonal relations. For ease of reference I shall refer to this as “sociability.” Aristippus’s concern with sociability emerges from the way he reportedly characterizes the product of his understanding and training: “When he was asked what he got out of his philosophy, he said, ‘The ability to associate confidently with all people [pasi tharrountōs homilein]” (D.L. 2.68).17 This saying suggests at least two aspects to Aristippean sociability: first, he can get along with any sort of person whatsoever; second, he can do so without anxiety. It is possible to reconstruct links between both of these and Aristippean temperance. First, because Aristippus understands both cognitively and emotionally that all he really needs is to avoid pain and discover some modicum of pleasure, he feels more relaxed around people. He does not need to impress anyone, since he is not after wealth or political advancement. This is why he feels confident. Second, knowing that just about every situation presents opportunities for enjoyment encourages him simply to accommodate himself to his company at any given moment: “He was able to adapt himself to every place and time and role and to act harmoniously in every circumstance” (D.L. 2.51). This responsiveness could help him to get along with others.

Of course, responsiveness requires versatility and adroitness. That Aristippean sociability encompasses these capacities is corroborated by other sayings and anecdotes. For example, “When he was asked how a wise man differs from someone who is not wise, he said, ‘Send them both naked among strangers, and you’ll find out’” (D.L. 2.73). The point is not merely that the wise man will be feel comfortable, but also that he will be adroit enough to turn the situation to his advantage. A popular story illustrates this:

The Socratic philosopher Aristippus was shipwrecked and thrown onto the shore of Rhodes. When he saw geometrical figures drawn there, he reportedly said to his companions, “Cheer up! I see signs of humans,” and right away he hurried to the citadel of Rhodes and went straight to the gymnasium. There he was rewarded with gifts for his philosophical disputations, so that he not only equipped himself, he also provided clothes and food for those who were with him. When his companions wanted to return to their country and asked him what news he wanted sent home, he told them to say, “The kind of possessions and traveling provisions free men ought to acquire are those which can swim away from a ship-wreck with them.” (Vitruvius, De Arch. 6.1.1)

This anecdote actually brings together adroitness, confidence, and temperance. Aristippus’s adroitness is displayed through his ability to impress the Rhodians with his dazzling wit and wisdom. This adroitness is part of what gives him confidence. (In fact, the word “confidence” appears explicitly in Galen’s Greek version: “He became confident [etharrēse] when he saw a geometric drawing in the sand” [Protr. 5].) And the lesson of the entire anecdote, which Aristippus explicitly communicates to “the folks back home” (nominally the Cyreneans, but more importantly us who have not yet completed his philosophical “journey”), is about temperance. In the journey of life, we should only carry the kind and quantity of provisions that could swim away from a shipwreck along with us. Of course, Aristippus has in mind his own philosophical wisdom, which swims as well as he does. That is why a naked sage has everything he needs to flourish among strangers.

These intellectual and ethical virtues lead Aristippus to value both himself and his life as a whole, as a final anecdote attests:

Once when [Aristippus] was sailing to Corinth and was caught in a storm it happened that he became upset. Someone said, “We common people weren’t afraid, but you philosophers acted like cowards!” “Well,” he answered, “we aren’t contending for the same kind of soul!” (D.L. 2.71)

Aristippus has a lot more to lose than his fellow passengers, because his soul is the repository of his knowledge and capacities. There is an almost heroic grandiloquence in his statement that his soul is not of the same kind as that of his fellow passengers (ou . . . homoias psuchēs). In his version of the anecdote, Aulus Gellius brings this out in a slightly different way: “he replied that of course the other hadn’t been terribly worried about the soul of a totally worthless loser [nequissimi nebulonis], but he was afraid for the soul of Aristippus!” (Noct. Att. 19.1.1 = SSR 4a.49).

Aristippus is set apart from the class to which this uppity but ignorant critic belongs. And as Odysseus reasserts his status by beating Thersites with his scepter, Aristippus reasserts his with a put-down witty enough to be remembered throughout antiquity.

It may seem audacious to compare Aristippus with Odysseus, but we will see below that this comparison occurs more than once in our ancient evidence ([Plut.] Vit. Hom. 2.150 = SSR 4a.55, D.L. 2.79–80 [twice]). Moreover, the shipwreck anecdote we have just encountered recalls Odysseus’s shipwreck on Phaeacia, just as the overwhelming impression Aristippus makes on the Rhodians recalls Odysseus’s impression on the Phaeacians (whose young men he defeats in athletic competition, and whose king offers him the princess’s hand in marriage [Od. 7–8]). More generally, heroic posturing is a common element in Greek philosophizing. As Hobbs has convincingly shown, Plato’s dialogues contain an extended rumination on the allure and psychology of Homeric heroes and an attempt to represent philosophers like Socrates as alternative role models. Heroic motifs are also scattered throughout many Stoic and Epicurean texts, although no one, to my knowledge, has explored these in detail.

The aim of this section has been to explore how the objects of Aristippus’s care and pursuit extend beyond moments of pleasure and pain to comprehend an entire life. The primary concerns which knit together his life are education and the virtues at which it aims. I have not insisted that Aristippean virtues are valued purely as instruments for the generation of pleasure and avoidance of pain, since our evidence does not encourage doctrinal reconstructions, and besides Aristippus may not have favored systematic articulation. But such evidence as we possess suggests that Aristippus tends to view virtues as instrumental goods. It is therefore worth concluding by looking at a third version of the storm-at-sea anecdote. According to Aelian, Aristippus’s response to his fellow sailor is, “Naturally [I was afraid]! After all, your concern and risk just now involved an unhappy life, but mine involved a happy one” (VH 9.20). In this response what Aristippus values is neither his own heroic superiority nor the virtues contained in his soul. Rather, it is now explicit that Aristippus values those virtues for the sake of the happy life (biou . . . eudaimonos) which they will permit him to live in the years to come. Whether or not this wording goes back to Aristippus—and it probably does not—it is entirely plausible that the reason Aristippus prizes the virtues of temperance and sociability is indeed because they support a pleasant life.

Sources: 

Lampe, K. (2017). The Birth of Hedonism - The Cyrenaic Philosophers and Pleasure As a Way of Life. Princeton University Press.