We, the Gods - Theodorus the Atheist as Inspiration

Theodorus the Atheist (c. 340 - c. 250 B.C.) was an ancient Cyrenaic philosopher who studied under Aristippus the Younger, and later learned from Anniceris, branching off from the orthodox strain and creating a new school of Theodoreans with a somewhat eclectic doctrine. There is much to gain by studying Theodorus’ innovations and applying his teaching to our own lives, due to the admirable qualities he cultivated on the basis of Cyrenaic philosophy. Although the following principles signal something of a departure from his predecessors, we ought increase the scope of our interest to cautiously adopt attenuated Theodorean values, without abandoning the fundamentals of Aristippus the Elder, in our quest towards defining a New Cyrenaicism of individual self-sufficiency, best equipped for navigating the real world. 

Theodorean Modifications:

The New Telos: 

Theodorus reinterpreted the ethical ends of Cyrenaic philosophy, and in the place of pleasure (hedonē) and pain (ponos), substituted instead the emotional states of joy (kharis/charis) and grief (lupē) as the supreme good and evil. This development signifies an attempt to identify a more robust telos, likely in response to the growing popularity of Epicureanism, transferring the focus from predominantly physical sensations towards a more abiding state of positive mental enjoyment. Epicurus also, when speaking of the kinetic emotion of pleasure, referred to this condition as charā, or joy, although his usual wont is to define the goal in terms of its limits in the removal of mental disturbance, referring to ataraxia, a more static state of tranquility. This option is of course foreign to the Cyrenaics, who can only admit to feelings which result from some level of physical activity causing perception. Nevertheless, Theodorus considers pleasure and pain, presumably intending those that are bodily, as intermediate to these states of joy and grief.

As avowed hedonists, we cannot follow Theodorus this far if his reclassification is taken at face value, which usually means interpretating the intermediates Stoically as “indifferent” — however, I suggest that we instead understand this differentiation between particular pleasures or pains, and the ethical telos of joy, as indicating roughly the same observation the Hellenic contemporary Epicurus (341- 270 B.C.) makes in his letter to Menoeceus:  

And since pleasure is the first good and natural to us, for this very reason we do not choose every pleasure, but sometimes we pass over many pleasures, when greater discomfort accrues to us as the result of them: and similarly we think many pains better than pleasures, since a greater pleasure comes to us when we have endured pains for a long time. Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided. Yet by a scale of comparison and by the consideration of advantages and disadvantages we must form our judgment on all these matters. For the good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and conversely the bad as good.

Here, we might also make sense of a relevant passage in Laërtius’ doxography on the Cyrenaics: “Hence, although pleasure is in itself desirable, yet they hold that the things which are productive of certain pleasures are often of a painful nature, the very opposite of pleasure; so that to accumulate the pleasures which are productive of happiness appears to them a most irksome business.” By distinguishing between pleasures themselves, and the pleasant state of mind called “joy”, Theodorus can more easily excerise discretion amongst particular sources of pleasure, some of which are to be pursued while some are to be avoided, having reference not primarily to the character of the pleasure itself, but assessing its value according to the influence on his cheerful eudaimonia.

Diogenes Laërtius tells us that Epicurus was influenced by Theodorus, and although he makes this connection primarily in regards to his doctrine on the gods, it is eminently plausible that his influence went further than that. Epicurus borrowed more than is commonly recognised from the Cyrenaics, including the much-lauded Cradle Argument, and based on multiple similarities it is clear that the ideas of Anniceris provide something of a bridge between Cyrenaic and Epicurean hedonism. It would not be surprising to discover further points of influence from Theodorus than have hitherto been granted, especially considering both men attended the court of Lysimachus while Theodorus was the ambassador for Ptolemy I, who later also became interested in the philosophy of the Garden. Permitting this speculation, we may note a further connection in this regard when it comes to the Theodorean virtues. 

The New Virtues:

Theodorus identifies the virtues of practical wisdom (phronesis) and justice (dikaiosunē) as goods which bring about our joy, while their opposites, foolishness and injustice, are evils which lead to grief. While the exhortation of phronesis, often translated as “prudence”, is easy enough to understand, the emphasis placed on justice presents more difficulties for interpretation, especially in regards to Theodorus’ insistence that, upon occasion, acts such as theft and adultery are permissible. In order to offer a possible solution, I’ll introduce another plausible connection to Epicurean philosophy, taken from the same letter:

Of all this the beginning and the greatest good is prudence. Wherefore prudence is a more precious thing even than philosophy: for from prudence are sprung all the other virtues, and it teaches us that it is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently and honorably and justly, nor, again, to live a life of prudence, honor, and justice without living pleasantly. For the virtues are by nature bound up with the pleasant life, and the pleasant life is inseparable from them. For indeed who, think you, is a better man than he who holds reverent opinions concerning the gods, and is at all times free from fear of death, and has reasoned out the end ordained by nature? (Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus).

Prudence and justice, so highly praised by Epicurus as inseparable from the pleasant life, are precisely those virtues identified by Theodorus. We may also note the remaining criteria, for as regards the opinions concerning the gods, we have good reason to suspect Epicurus learned these from Theodorus, according to Diogenes Laërtius. Furthermore, if anyone can be said to display full confidence in the belief that “death is nothing to us”, it is the very same man. Preserved from antiquity are numerous anecdotes illustrating Theodorus’ courage in the face of deadly threats from powerful figures, and one taken from Cicero’s account will suffice: “when Lysimachus threatened to crucify him, [Theodorus] bade him keep those menaces for his courtiers: ‘To Theodorus it makes no difference whether he rot in the air or underground.’” Of course, this analysis is certainly speculative, but I would argue it is both plausible and illuminating to consider that Theodorus intends his use and understanding of these terms in much the same way as Epicurus does, given their temporal, geographical, and ideological proximity. 

If this much is admitted, we can deal fairly easily with Theodorus’ conception of justice, following the same understanding that Epicurus offers. Principle Doctrine 31 tells us that, “The justice which arises from nature is a pledge of mutual advantage to restrain men from harming one another and save them from being harmed.” This contextual social-contract notion is much easier to reconcile with Theodorus’ attitude towards theft and adultery, given the right circumstances, since not only can we easily imagine contexts within which prudent judgment would recommend ignoring certain laws or norms, we are also dealing with a concretised understanding of what justice really consists of, rather than strictly adhering to some Platonic absolute. This interpretation also intersects neatly with other feature of Theodorean philosophy, which we will turn to now.

The New Self-Sufficiency:

Theodorus’ philosophy proceeds from precious few elementary principles, and his confident polemical approach also indicates a skeptical attitude towards casuistry — yet the wise person must make prudential and righteous judgements upon some grounds, in order to achieve his sought-after joyous end. Here we come to the true expression of Theodorus’ self-sufficiency, wherein philosophical wisdom comes together with the realities of a specific situation, and the individual must make their own judgement. This further explains the following account from the doxography, which we have already touched upon: “He allowed that a wise man might steal, and commit adultery and sacrilege, at proper seasons: for that none of these actions were disgraceful by nature, if one only put out of sight the common opinion about them, which owes its existence to the consent of fools. And he said that the wise man would indulge his passions openly, without any regard to circumstances.” Against the interpretation that Theodorus was “indifferent” to passions and pleasures, the doxography suggests instead that prudence advises the wise how best to indulge these desires, according to the occasion that presents itself, even against standard social conventions ordering the relations of the common population. Hence, although this latter Cyrenaic places more emphasis on the virtues than his predecessors, and they are not strictly instrumental, they have much the same relationship to the good life as they do for Epicurus, as inseparable partial-constituents of a wise and joyous character. 

Theodorus also expands upon the illusive civic position of Aristippus and proclaims that the whole World is his country. We also see him argue in favour of pursuing relations with courtesans, and explain that the proper use of beauty is to be enjoyed, in every sense of that term. On this account Theodorus claims that the foolish multitude cause their own grief — they are ignorant regarding how, when, and even if to indulge their desires. Instead, ordinary people base their beliefs on general consensus, lacking trust in their own judgement, missing the virtues of prudence and justice, and thus failing to achieve any lasting happiness. The Theodorean pupil, on the other hand, is perceptive and sensitive to all relevant factors, skilled in handling diverse situations, adaptable to circumstances, and able to indulge his will freely as a result. 

Theodorus’ autarchy also resulted in controversial views toward friendship, which he asserts does not exist among the wise themselves, the foolish themselves, or between these groups. The wise are self-sufficient (autarkis), and thus do not require friends. The so-called “friendship” of the foolish, on the other hand, is based on need or use, and when this departs, so too does the friendship — such an empty relationship is not even truly deserving of the name. This attitude signifies a radical departure, not only from orthodox Cyrenaicism, but particularly from the doctrines of Anniceris. This self-aggrandising attitude finds even greater expression in the behaviour which earned Theodorus his iconic appellation. 

The New God:

Contrary to Theodorus’ title as “ho atheos”, it’s unlikely, based on the testimony remaining, that Theodorus positively denied the existence of the Gods in the modern sense of the term, though no doubt he severely undermined the popular opinion, and was likely sufficiently skeptical to earn the epithet. Due to the comments of Diogenes relating the content of Epicurus’ theology to that of Theodorus, and the observation from Plutarch that Theodorus “the godless” only seems to imply that, whatever the gods may be, they are not imperishable, we may suspect a more nuanced position. We also have another humorous anecdote related by Diogenes Laërtius which could indicate some level of belief:

Mithras, the king's minister, standing by [said], “It seems that you can ignore not only gods but kings as well,” Theodorus replied, “How can you say that I ignore the gods when I regard you as hateful to the gods?”

More relevant to our purposes here, however, and what inspired the title of this post, is the interesting symmetry regarding the two titles which designate Theodorus in our sources. Although he is commonly referred to as “the Atheist”, or “the Godless”, he is also known by another name, allegedly resulting from this exchange with Stilpo of Megara: 

He appears to have been called θεός (god) in consequence of the following argument addressed to him by Stilpo. “Are you, Theodorus, what you declare yourself to be?” To this he assented, and Stilpo continued, “And do you say you are god?” To this he agreed. “Then it follows that you are god.” Theodorus accepted this, and Stilpo said with a smile, “But, you rascal, at this rate you would allow yourself to be a jackdaw and ten thousand other things.”

In a case of apparent auto-proclamation, Theodorus declared himself to actually be a god, though this clearly should not be taken literally. In an earlier post I have collected the anecdotes which relate Theodorus’ comparison of himself to Greek heroes, and this seems to be a further instance of self-aggrandisement from the unusually pugnacious Cyrenaic, perhaps a further expression of autarchy and joyful self-assurance, no doubt with an overflowing sense of superiority not unlike the classic Grecian virtue of Pride.

Conclusion:

When it comes to what we should make of the foregoing, I’d recommend exercising caution in approaching the innovations of Theodorus. For all his boisterousness and intrigue as a provocative character, I find it incredibly unlikely that this man of Cyrene actually found the kind of joy most of us would wish to possess. With that said, there are elements of Theodorus’ confident expression, self-assurance, and intellectual modifications which can serve as an inspiration for the modern Cyrenaic, particularly in regards to increasing the emphasis on achieving abiding happiness while pursuing particular pleasurable experiences. Overall, I certainly would not recommend adopting Theodorus’ egotistical, aggressive, and frankly insolent approach, not to mention his outright rejection of friendship — in all this we find an excess of dialectical sophisms which undermine the achievement and appreciation of pleasurable experiences — but, as always, we may pick the flowers while not eating of the fruit, and for this purpose, Theodorus offers an engaging viewing experience. 

Credit Where It Is Due: Tracing the Cyrenaic Origin of Key Ideas

Recently, I read Roderick T. Long’s excellent monograph Reason and Value: Aristotle Versus Rand, which offers a comparative analysis of Ayn Rand’s foundationalist theory of truth to the coherentism of the Peripatetics, and explores how this understanding relates to her ethical standard. Perhaps I shall have more to say about this text in the future, but something entirely orthogonal came to my attention in the process of reading, because Long quotes a phrase attributed to Aristotle by Diogenes Laërtius which possesses remarkable similarity to another pronounced by Aristippus. Compare, 

When asked what advantage he had ever gained for himself from philosophy, Aristotle said, “That I do, without being subject to compulsion, what some do through fear of the laws”. 

With, 

Being once asked what advantage philosophers have, he [Aristippus] replied, “Should all laws be repealed, we shall go on living as we do now.”

Now, there’s nothing particularly unusual about this apparent repetition, and although Aristippus was Aristotle’s older contemporary, which may indicate a certain direction of influence, it is possible that both statements are original, or apocryphal, and such retellings with different characters abound in the doxography. Nevertheless, this incident had me contemplating just how many interesting strains of thought seem to originate with, or significantly evolve from, the Cyrenaic philosophers, and how dreadfully uncredited their influences remains to this day. To take just one example, every casual Greek philosophy enthusiast knows of Diogenes the Cynic, and among many other tidbits, he is generally considered a pioneer of cosmopolitanism. And yet, Aristippus of Cyrene is famously depicted by Xenophanes rebutting the false dichotomy of Socrates thusly (underlining for emphasis is my own), 

[Soc]: you are yourself a Hellene—which among Hellenes enjoy the happier existence, think you, the dominant or the subject states? [Ar.] Nay, I would have you to understand that I am just as far from placing myself in the ranks of slavery; there is, I take it, a middle path between the two which it is my ambition to tread, avoiding rule and slavery alike; it lies through freedom—the high road which leads to happiness. [Soc.] True, if only your path could avoid human beings, as it avoids rule and slavery, there would be something in what you say. But being placed as you are amidst human beings, if you purpose neither to rule nor to be ruled, and do not mean to dance attendance, if you can help it, on those who rule, you must surely see that the stronger have an art to seat the weaker on the stool of repentance both in public and in private, and to treat them as slaves. I daresay you have not failed to note this common case: a set of people has sown and planted, whereupon in comes another set and cuts their corn and fells their fruit-trees, and in every way lays siege to them because, though weaker, they refuse to pay them proper court, till at length they are persuaded to accept slavery rather than war against their betters. And in private life also, you will bear me out, the brave and powerful are known to reduce the helpless and cowardly to bondage, and to make no small profit out of their victims. [Ar.] Yes, but I must tell you I have a simple remedy against all such misadventures. I do not confine myself to any single civil community. I roam the wide world a foreigner.

What Aristippus is describing, again as the elder contemporary, is that selfsame cosmopolitanism, the consideration of the whole world as one’s country, that Diogenes of Sinope more famously advocates — and yet who knows of this? 

When we move to better-known territory, Epicurus’ debt to Aristippus and the Cyrenaics is generally admitted, but even here the scope is severely overlooked. The general impression given is that Epicurus and Aristippus share only the superficial similarity of regarding the ethical end to be pleasure, by which terminology they really mean very different things, and that is where the comparison dries up, though generosity dictates acknowledging the first Greek hedonists for completeness’ sake before promptly moving on. 

I have already written a seperate post comparing key Epicurean ideas with close (or at least, closer than one would imagine) parallels found among Aristippus and the orthodox Cyrenaics. One major idea that the Cyrenaics supply the Epicureans is commonly referred to as The Cradle Argument, wherein the instinctive, natural, uncorrupted desires of infants and animals is taken as good evidence for the proper values of man, and an arch example of Nature supplying the norm. If you research this topic, you will find sources citing Epicureans, Stoics, perhaps even mention of Eudoxus, but in fact, according to Diognes Laërtius, the Cyrenaics actually pioneered this argument, claiming that “a proof that pleasure is the end is that we are favorably inclined to it without deliberate choice from childhood”, and as further evidence, “pleasure is satisfying to all animals, and pain is repellent”. Laërtius also claims that Epicurus’ infamous understanding of the Gods, that is, his denial of the common myths, was largely inspired by the book On the Gods by the later Cyrenaic philosopher Theodorus the Atheist. This is not to mention the tempering, pro-social influence of Anniceris, whose exaltation of friendship, more than any other predecessor, resemble the mature ethics of Epicurus. 

Much more could be said on this topic, but I plan instead to create a follow-up post in the future simply highlighting some key ideas introduced by the Cyrenaics in an effort to ground a foundation for practice and belief, without taking too much effort to chase down the influential flow-on effects. 

Why a “New” Cyrenaicism?

It may interest some readers to know why we may adopt a “new” Cyrenaicism, and what is intended by this modifying adjective. I have in mind three distinct, yet entangled, reasons for adopting the label, and I’ll proceed from least to most essential. 

1. Walter Pater: 

It is no secret that my philosophical project is highly influenced by the aestheticism of Walter Pater, who dedicated a chapter in his historical novel Marius: The Epicurean to describing the protagonist’s ideological wrestling with quasi-hedonistic sensibilities and strong religio-moral intuitions, and he titled this important section “New Cyrenaicism”. Pater creatively reinterprets Cyrenaic doctrines to serve his narrative purposes, and in so doing, breathes new life and meaning into what is commonly regarded as a rather empty-headed sophistical movement. Although the popular shallow impression of Cyrenaicism is false, Marius’ complex adaptation of philosophical ideas nevertheless struck a chord with me, due not only to shared aesthetic concerns, but also because Pater builds up from the basic foundational principles of the ancient school while widening the scope of interest to address then-contemporary Victorian moral issues. Such a move is not only interesting and engaging, I believe it is also necessary, for reasons I will explore in the following sections. Moreover, when we investigate the evolution of Cyrenaicism in Greece, we find that this practice of creative reinterpretation was also a common historical process, with the schools of Theodorus, Anniceris, and Hegesias marking significant departures from the orthodox philosophy of the Metrodidact. For these inspirational reasons, I decided that New Cyrenaic was an appropriate label for my philosophic foundations, although my interests are significantly wider than Pater’s.

2. Modern Updates: 

Ancient Cyrenaicism died out somewhere in the 3rd Century BCE, and although the basic philosophical commitments remain timeless, our modern context calls for a fresh perspective on the Good Life, a re-evaluation of what is possible to us, and countless additional questions of application. In addition to surveying the situation afresh, there has also been incredible, revolutionary intellectual progress made in the intervening years. Our understanding of ourselves and the world around us is far superior to that of the Ancients, and we must adapt ourselves accordingly. We also face social, cultural, scientific, and interpersonal situations that Aristippus and his descendants could never have imagined. It would not only be ludicrous to dogmatically restrict our scope to that which interested early Cyrenaics, it would also be diametrically opposed to the core spirit of Cyrenaic practice. Although we do follow the foundational attitude of our philosophical ancestors, applying these insights to modern challenges requires significant interpretive development. Due to the requirements of an updated outlook, it is fitting to call our Cyrenaicism comparatively “new”. 

3. Philosophical Expansion:

Cyrenaic philosophy, while incredibly useful and clarifying as a foundational basis, is admittedly limited, which is both a strength and a weakness. Due to the main concerns of the original Cyrenaics, revolving around pragmatic ethical guidance, philosophical inquiry itself remained quite bare, and even the epistemology is comparatively underdeveloped. If we understand that the proper goal of life is not theoretical speculation, but engagement with the world in pursuit of happiness, we see that this emphasis of attention is both appropriate and necessary. Nevertheless, while this focus prevents idealistic dead-ends, and was not unusual for the early Greek context in which it appeared, philosophical theory has also developed significantly since the early Cyrenaics were active, and provides an opportunity to gain greater clarity and precision over our foundational commitments. We must also operate within the current theoretical paradigm, which contains far more precise terminology, original and updated argumentative styles, and a whole cast of competitive challengers. Even the systems that sprung up with near-contemporaries, such as those of the Academy, the Lyceum, or the Garden, offered a more sophisticated approach to systematising and justifying beliefs, and lacking a familiarity with other philosophical schools can place us at a disadvantage and cloud our judgement. In addition, while we could continue to fight the ghost of dead enemies, it is not really modern Stoics, Peripatetics, or Epicureans that we should be worried about critiquing, as the old Cyrenaics may have been. In today’s climate, these groups are better counted as allies, such is the shift of context and beliefs. Arriving at a deeper understanding of our own situation also provides practical and experiential benefits, both proactive and defensive. For this reason, the final goal of this project is to strengthen Cyrenaic philosophy through dialogue with other philosophical movements, while conducting an expansive and reconstructive investigation into the basic principles, in an effort to approach Cyrenaicism on an updated footing and enhance the ethical guidance this philosophy can supply, which is the true fruit of inquiry.

Pillars of Pleasure

Aristippus of Cyrene is famously quoted as stating the following: “The kind of possessions and traveling provisions free men ought to acquire are those which can swim away from a ship-wreck with them.” (Vitruvius, De Arch. 6.1.1). These possessions and provisions are, of course, the values and virtues endowed by proper philosophical education — those characteristics and excellencies of ability which the wise man ought cultivate in order to flourish. Based on my study and understanding of Cyrenaic philosophy, I’d like to offer the following Pillars of Pleasure as best representing the foundational elements which enable, express, and constitute the pleasant life.

Pillar I - Satisfaction (εὐδοκέω/eudokeo): 

The Cyrenaic ethical project is centered around achieving and maintaining satisfaction through the pursuit and enjoyment of pleasures, so emphasis is placed on active appreciation and savouring of pleasant experiences. Peace of mind is essential to maximal enjoyment, and alongside the possession of confidence, involves exercising present-focus in order to make the most of what is at hand. Success according to our hedonistic eudaemonism requires taking satisfaction as both the criteria of action and the purpose of living, rendering this the cardinal value of our school. 

Pillar II - Self-Mastery (ἐνκράτεια/enkráteia): 

Self-mastery or self-control, within Cyrenaic ethics, refers to the ability to maintain purposeful awareness and direction over one’s actions. This value forms the bedrock for wisely exercising choice and avoidance (prudence), informed by the fundamental virtue of temperance (disdaining excess), while also underpinning the importance placed on securing internal and external freedom (autonomy), so that we are able to act according to our own sober judgement. The successful Cyrenaic engages in philosophical education and study in order to properly understand the nature of pleasure, self, and world — cutting through attachment and insatiability, thereby transforming actions and outlook in accordance with the true philosophy.

Pillar III - Confidence (θάρσος/thársos): 

Confidence is a Cyrenaic watchword, appearing multiple times in the doxography, and describes the foundational attitude formed from the reasonable expectation of success, due to an assurance of personal ability and versatility, underpinning the active pursuit of simple pleasures. Confidence is concomitant with the development of the Cyrenaic virtues of adaptability and sociability, dovetailing with the simple accomodation of oneself to the available pleasures most situations easily offer, these being all that is necessary for enjoyment, and the sage masterfully capitalises on any circumstance.

Hedonic Eudaemonism - Achieving The Pleasant Life

In this post, I’d like to thread the needle on a topic of importance for promoting and following Cyrenaicism as a way of life: what, properly considered, is our purpose, end, or telos? I’ll offer the label “hedonic eudaemonism” as best encapsulating the telos of our New Cyrenaicism, because it emphasises the long-range, totalising focus on the happiness of our life as a whole, while also describing the pleasurable quality and content in present-experiential terms. By describing our goal in these terms, we leave no room for Stoicising interpretations of apathetic calm as commanding the character of “eudaimonia”, for example, and we also head-off any lingering misunderstanding that the tantalising fancy of the moment ought enslave our attention. We are concerned with achieving happiness in a robust and lasting manner, and the nature of that happiness is found in living “as easily and pleasantly as possible”. 

Other questions follow: what is our ultimate good? What is the status of other goods in relation to our end and our ultimate good? How do we go about achieving our end?

I propose the following: 

1. Our ultimate good, or summum bonum, is this life itself. The purpose or end of this life is to live pleasantly/pleasurably.

2. Other goods are either instrumental to, or essential components of, the pleasant life.

3. Achieving and enjoying the pleasant life requires exercising practical reason in the realm of choice and avoidance, in order to secure and maintain those aforementioned goods. It is the role of philosophical education to identify, enumerate, and categorise those goods, while also providing us the tools and techniques required to achieve them.

I believe this presentation of Aristippean Cyrenaicism is historically defensible, philosophically preferable, and practically beneficial. The doxographical material we have regarding Aristippus himself suggests a figure who is undeniably concerned with the quality of his life as a whole — it shows us someone who engages in training and study with clear future-concern, someone who values personal character and virtues not merely as means to the end of gaining particular pleasures, but as inseparable elements of The Good Life itself. 

Such an understanding not only brings early Cyrenaicism into clearer alignment with the Greek ethical tradition in which Aristippus was embedded at Athens, it also better accounts for the Socratic flavour of his associations, and more easily accommodates the extant anecdotes, as against any awkward attempts to read later Cyrenaic developments back onto the founder of the school. With this in mind, we come to understand Aristippus as a radical innovator more so in terms of his attitude towards pleasure, his manner of achieving it, and his confident expression — though these are erected upon familiar intellectual soil — rather than as someone promoting a rather complex foundationalist theory, completely divergent from any of his contemporaries, in a manner starkly at odds with the anti-dogmatic, moderate-skepticism he expressed elsewhere. 

The next step is of course to proceed with a breakdown of those component qualities which one ought to cultivate in order to achieve and enjoy the pleasant life. That subject will be covered in a future post, where I will enumerate the “Pillars of Pleasure” which support successful, happy living. 

Aristippus As A Socratic

Voula Tsouna McKirahan - The Socratic Origins of the Cynics and Cyrenaics

- There are two categories of testimony on Aristippean ethics, one that attributes to him a straightforward hedonism and one that does not consider him a hedonist at all. According to the former, Aristippus was the first Cyrenaic to define the moral end as a smooth movement that results in a pleasure of the body, is confined strictly to the present, and is very short-lived. Pleasure must be distinguished from happiness (eudaemonia), which is the sum of particular pleasures, present as well as past and future ones, extended over one’s lifetime. It is pleasure and not happiness that is pursued for its own sake. 

- On the other hand, Aristocles denies that Aristippus defined pleasure as the only thing that is intrinsically good, and there is further information that he never lectured defending a particular moral end, whether pleasure of anything else — a piece of evidence that fits perfectly with Aristippus’ distaste for a didactic tone in teaching or speaking (Arist. Rh. 2.23). 

- Instead, Aristippus believes that pleasure is to be sought and enjoyed not unconditionally but only if it does not endanger our self-control. The latter is the result of philosophical education, together with the acquisition of internal freedom, self-awareness, and the promotion of the well-being of the soul by means of study and endurance. These goods are not instrumental to the enjoyment of pleasure but valuable in themselves. If one obtains them, one may securely savour bodily pleasures; if one does not obtain them, one presumably should not pursue bodily pleasures, for they would hinder promotion of virtue in the soul. 

- It is undoubtedly true that the Cyrenaics who came after Aristippus developed a hedonistic theory in which the moral end was the momentary present pleasure. Their ethics was backed by their epistemology that claims that the only knowledge accessible to us is the knowledge of our undergoings (pathē). The ethical claim that momentary pleasure is the good has an irrefutable character precisely in virtue of the fact that pleasure is an undergoing and therefore self-evident. 

- In the non-hedonistic tradition Aristippus’ ethical theory is firmly based on the beliefs common to the members of the Socratic circle, is coherent and intuitively persuasive. 

- …we infer that Aristippus and Socrates differ on the subject of pleasure with respect to its practical implications, not in their respective definitions of the moral end. For Socrates, control over bodily pleasure dictates a life of moderation, while for Aristippus it does not. 

- …regarding the passage from Xenophon. First, it provides direct evidence for the claim that Aristippus was a eudaemonist and not a hedonist. Second, Socrates’ argument leaves unscathed Aristippus’ belief that it is morally right for one to enjoy various pleasures. 

- …part of Aristippus’ answer [to Socrates] is that he aims at the easiest and pleasantest life and that he wishes to live a life of freeedom that leads to happiness. But this indicates that Aristippus does not seek pleasure for their own sake but presumably views them as a means to or a component of happiness. Also, he does not look at momentary pleasures of the present but at his life as a whole. 

- Independent evidence tells us that Aristippus indulged in pleasure but at the same time made sure that he was in control of his experiences and that pleasure did not master him instead. 

- We are left to wonder whether Aristippus is right: although pleasure is not the moral end, it is an important constituent of happiness. And one can be self-disciplined without abstaining from pleasure either partially or totally. 

- His [Aristippus’] primary interest was in ethical questions. It may be that he mostly dealt with practical ethics, but we are also allowed to glimpse a theoretical argument to the effect that every object is associated with a moral end, and therefore objects that are morally neutral do not exist. On account of this argument he dismissed the study of mathematics and perhaps also of natural science. On the other hand, some titles of his books indicate an interest in rhetoric. History and perhaps literature complete the list of his interests. 

- Nor can his knowledge… of[familiar topics of Greek intellectual tradition] have been complete superficial, for he taught in the competitive environment of Athenian culture for a substantial fee and fairly successfully. 

- Aristippus’ apolitical stance, “that leads neither through ruling nor through slavery but through freedom” to happiness. Aristippus’ disavowal of civic bonds appears like a means to the end of enjoying an easy and pleasant life. 

Source: 

Tsouna-McKirahan, Voula. (1994). “The Socratic Origins of the Cynics and Cyrenaics”, in Paul A Vander Waerdt (ed.), The Socratic Movement. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 367-91.

Diogenes Läertius - The Lives of Eminent Philosophers - Chapter 8: Aristippus (R.D. Hicks Edition)

Chapter 8. ARISTIPPUS (c. 435-350 B.C.)

Aristippus was by birth a citizen of Cyrene and, as Aeschines informs us, was drawn to Athens by the fame of Socrates. Having come forward as a lecturer or sophist, as Phanias of Eresus, the Peripatetic, informs us, he was the first of the followers of Socrates to charge fees and to send money to his master. And on one occasion the sum of twenty minae which he had sent was returned to him, Socrates declaring that the supernatural sign would not let him take it; the very offer, in fact, annoyed him. Xenophon was no friend to Aristippus; and for this reason he has made Socrates direct against Aristippus the discourse in which he denounces pleasure. Not but what Theodorus in his work On Sects abuses him, and so does Plato in the dialogue On the Soul, as has been shown elsewhere.

He was capable of adapting himself to place, time and person, and of playing his part appropriately under whatever circumstances. Hence he found more favour than anybody else with Dionysius, because he could always turn the situation to good account. He derived pleasure from what was present, and did not toil to procure the enjoyment of something not present Hence Diogenes called him the king's poodle Timon, too, sneered at him for luxury in these words:

Such was the delicate nature of Aristippus, who groped after error by touch.

He is said to have ordered a partridge to be bought at a cost of fifty drachmae, and, when someone censured him, he inquired, "Would not you have given an obol for it?" and, being answered in the affirmative, rejoined, "Fifty drachmae are no more to me." And when Dionysius gave him his choice of three courtesans, he carried off all three, saying, "Paris paid dearly for giving the preference to one out of three." And when he had brought them as far as the porch, he let them go. To such lengths did he go both in choosing and in disdaining. Hence the remark of Strato, or by some accounts of Plato, "You alone are endowed with the gift to flaunt in robes or go in rags." He bore with Dionysius when he spat on him, and to one who took him to task he replied, "If the fishermen let themselves be drenched with sea-water in order to catch a gudgeon, ought I not to endure to be wetted with negus in order to take a blenny?"

Diogenes, washing the dirt from his vegetables, saw him passing and jeered at him in these terms, "If you had learnt to make these your diet, you would not have paid court to kings," to which his rejoinder was, "And if you knew how to associate with men, you would not be washing vegetables." Being asked what he had gained from philosophy, he replied, "The ability to feel at ease in any society." Being reproached for his extravagance, he said, "If it were wrong to be extravagant, it would not be in vogue at the festivals of the gods."

Being once asked what advantage philosophers have, he replied, "Should all laws be repealed, we shall go on living as we do now." When Dionysius inquired what was the reason that philosophers go to rich men's houses, while rich men no longer visit philosophers, his reply was that "the one know what they need while the other do not." When he was reproached by Plato for his extravagance, he inquired, "Do you think Dionysius a good man?" and the reply being in the affirmative, "And yet," said he, "he lives more extravagantly than I do. So that there is nothing to hinder a man living extravagantly and well." To the question how the educated differ from the uneducated, he replied, "Exactly as horses that have been trained differ from untrained horses." One day, as he entered the house of a courtesan, one of the lads with him blushed, whereupon he remarked, "It is not going in that is dangerous, but being unable to go out."

Some one brought him a knotty problem with the request that he would untie the knot. "Why, you simpleton," said he, "do you want it untied, seeing that it causes trouble enough as it is?" "It is better," he said, "to be a beggar than to be uneducated; the one needs money, the others need to be humanized." One day that he was reviled, he tried to slip away; the other pursued him, asking, "Why do you run away?" "Because," said he, "as it is your privilege to use foul language, so it is my privilege not to listen." In answer to one who remarked that he always saw philosophers at rich men's doors, he said, "So, too, physicians are in attendance on those who are sick, but no one for that reason would prefer being sick to being a physician."

It happened once that he set sail for Corinth and, being overtaken by a storm, he was in great consternation. Some one said, "We plain men are not alarmed, and are you philosophers turned cowards?" To this he replied, "The lives at stake in the two cases are not comparable." When some one gave himself airs for his wide learning, this is what he said: "As those who eat most and take the most exercise are not better in health than those who restrict themselves to what they require, so too it is not wide reading but useful reading that tends to excellence." An advocate, having pleaded for him and won the case, thereupon put the question, "What good did Socrates do you?" "Thus much," was the reply, "that what you said of me in your speech was true."

He gave his daughter Arete the very best advice, training her up to despise excess. He was asked by some one in what way his son would be the better for being educated. He replied, "If nothing more than this, at all events, when in the theatre he will not sit down like a stone upon stone." When some one brought his son as a pupil, he asked a fee of 500 drachmae. The father objected, "For that sum I can buy a slave." "Then do so," was the reply, "and you will have two." He said that he did not take money from his friends for his own use, but to teach them upon what objects their money should be spent. When he was reproached for employing a rhetorician to conduct his case, he made reply, "Well, if I give a dinner, I hire a cook."

Being once compelled by Dionysius to enunciate some doctrine of philosophy, "It would be ludicrous," he said, "that you should learn from me what to say, and yet instruct me when to say it." At this, they say, Dionysius was offended and made him recline at the end of the table. And Aristippus said, "You must have wished to confer distinction on the last place." To some one who boasted of his diving, "Are you not ashamed," said he, "to brag of that which a dolphin can do?" Being asked on one occasion what is the difference between the wise man and the unwise, "Strip them both," said he, "and send them among strangers and you will know." To one who boasted that he could drink a great deal without getting drunk, his rejoinder was, "And so can a mule."

To one who accused him of living with a courtesan, he put the question, "Why, is there any difference between taking a house in which many people have lived before and taking one in which nobody has ever lived?" The answer being "No," he continued, "Or again, between sailing in a ship in which ten thousand persons have sailed before and in one in which nobody has ever sailed?" "There is no difference." "Then it makes no difference," said he, "whether the woman you live with has lived with many or with nobody." To the accusation that, although he was a pupil of Socrates, he took fees, his rejoinder was, "Most certainly I do, for Socrates, too, when certain people sent him corn and wine, used to take a little and return all the rest; and he had the foremost men in Athens for his stewards, whereas mine is my slave Eutychides." He enjoyed the favours of Laïs, as Sotion states in the second book of his Successions of Philosophers. To those who censured him his defence was, "I have Lais, not she me; and it is not abstinence from pleasures that is best, but mastery over them without ever being worsted." to one who reproached him with extravagance in catering, he replied, "Wouldn't you have bought this if you could have got it for three obols?" The answer being in the affirmative, "Very well, then," said Aristippus, "I am no longer a lover of pleasure, it is you who are a lover of money." One day Simus, the steward of Dionysius, a Phrygian by birth and a rascally fellow, was showing him costly houses with tesselated pavements, when Aristippus coughed up phlegm and spat in his face. And on his resenting this he replied, "I could not find any place more suitable."

When Charondas (or, as others say, Phaedo) inquired, "Who is this who reeks with unguents?" he replied, "It is I, unlucky wight, and the still more unlucky Persian king. But, as none of the other animals are at any disadvantage on that account, consider whether it be not the same with man. Confound the effeminates who spoil for us the use of good perfume." Being asked how Socrates died, he answered, "As I would wish to die myself." Polyxenus the sophist once paid him a visit and, after having seen ladies present and expensive entertainment, reproached him with it later. After an interval Aristippus asked him, "Can you join us today?" On the other accepting the invitation, Aristippus inquired, "Why, then, did you find fault? For you appear to blame the cost and not the entertainment." When his servant was carrying money and found the load too heavy--the story is told by Bion in his Lectures--Aristippus cried, "Pour away the greater part, and carry no more than you can manage." Being once on a voyage, as soon as he discovered the vessel to be manned by pirates, he took out his money and began to count it, and then, as if by inadvertence, he let the money fall into the sea, and naturally broke out into lamentation. Another version of the story attributes to him the further remark that it was better for the money to perish on account of Aristippus than for Aristippus to perish on account of the money. Dionysius once asked him what he was come for, and he said it was to impart what he had and obtain what he had not. But some make his answer to have been, "When I needed wisdom, I went to Socrates; now that I am in need of money, I come to you." He used to complain of mankind that in purchasing earthenware they made trial whether it rang true, but had no regular standard by which to judge life. Others attribute this remark to Diogenes. One day Dionysius over the wine commanded everybody to put on purple and dance. Plato declined, quoting the line:

I could not stoop to put on women's robes.

Aristippus, however, put on the dress and, as he was about to dance, was ready with the repartee:

Even amid the Bacchic revelry

True modesty will not be put to shame.

He made a request to Dionysius on behalf of a friend and, failing to obtain it, fell down at his feet. And when some one jeered at him, he made reply, "It is not I who am to blame, but Dionysius who has his ears in his feet." He was once staying in Asia and was taken prisoner by Artaphernes, the satrap. "Can you be cheerful under these circumstances?" some one asked. "Yes, you simpleton," was the reply, "for when should I be more cheerful than now that I am about to converse with Artaphernes?" Those who went through the ordinary curriculum, but in their studies stopped short at philosophy, he used to compare to the suitors of Penelope. For the suitors won Melantho, Polydora and the rest of the handmaidens, but were anything but successful in their wooing of the mistress. A similar remark is ascribed to Ariston. For, he said, when Odysseus went down into the under-world, he saw nearly all the dead and made their acquaintance, but he never set eyes upon their queen herself.

Again, when Aristippus was asked what are the subjects which handsome boys ought to learn, his reply was, "Those which will be useful to them when they are grown up." To the critic who censured him for leaving Socrates to go to Dionysius, his rejoinder was, "Yes, but I came to Socrates for education and to Dionysius for recreation." When he had made some money by teaching, Socrates asked him, "Where did you get so much?" to which he replied, "Where you got so little."

A courtesan having told him that she was with child by him, he replied, "You are no more sure of this than if, after running through coarse rushes, you were to say you had been pricked by one in particular." Someone accused him of exposing his son as if it was not his offspring Whereupon he replied, "Phlegm, too, and vermin we know to be of our own begetting, but for all that, because they are useless, we cast them as far from us as possible." He received a sum of money from Dionysius at the same time that Plato carried off a book and, when he was twitted with this, his reply was,, "Well, I want money, Plato wants books." Some one asked him why he let himself be refuted by Dionysius. "For the same reason," said he, "as the others refute him."

Dionysius met a request of his for money with the words, "Nay, but you told me that the wise man would never be in want." To which he retorted, "Pay! Pay! and then let us discuss the question;" and when he was paid, "Now you see, do you not," said he, "that I was not found wanting?" Dionysius having repeated to him the lines:

Whoso betakes him to a prince's court

Becomes his slave, albeit of free birth,

he retorted:

If a free man he come, no slave is he.From a lost play of Sophocles: Plutarch, De audiendis poetis, 12, p. 33 d, Vita Pomp. 78, p. 661 s.f.

This is stated by Diocles in his work On the Lives of Philosophers; other writers refer the anecdotes to Plato. After getting in a rage with Aeschines, he presently addressed him thus: "Are we not to make it up and desist from vapouring, or will you wait for some one to reconcile us over the wine-bowl?" To which he replied, "Agreed." "Then remember," Aristippus went on, "that, though I am your senior, I made the first approaches." Thereupon Aeschines said, "Well done, by Hera, you are quite right; you are a much better man than I am. For the quarrel was of my beginning, you make the first move to friendship." Such are the repartees which are attributed to him.

[…]

He laid down as the end the smooth motion resulting in sensation.

Having written his life, let me now proceed to pass in review the philosophers of the Cyrenaic school which sprang from him, although some call themselves followers of Hegesias, others followers of Anniceris, others again of Theodorus. Not but what we shall notice further the pupils of Phaedo, the chief of whom were called the school of Eretria. [86] The case stands thus. The disciples of Aristippus were his daughter Arete, Aethiops of Ptolemais, and Antipater of Cyrene. The pupil of Arete was Aristippus, who went by the name of mother-taught, and his pupil was Theodorus, known as the atheist, subsequently as "god." Antipater's pupil was Epitimides of Cyrene, his was Paraebates, and he had as pupils Hegesias, the advocate of suicide, and Anniceris, who ransomed Plato.

Those then who adhered to the teaching of Aristippus and were known as Cyrenaics held the following opinions. They laid down that there are two states, pleasure and pain, the former a smooth, the latter a rough motion, and that pleasure does not differ from pleasure nor is one pleasure more pleasant than another. The one state is agreeable and the other repellent to all living things. However, the bodily pleasure which is the end is, according to Panaetius in his work On the Sects, not the settled pleasure following the removal of pains, or the sort of freedom from discomfort which Epicurus accepts and maintains to be the end. They also hold that there is a difference between "end" and "happiness." Our end is particular pleasure, whereas happiness is the sum total of all particular pleasures, in which are included both past and future pleasures.

Particular pleasure is desirable for its own sake, whereas happiness is desirable not for its own sake but for the sake of particular pleasures. That pleasure is the end is proved by the fact that from our youth up we are instinctively attracted to it, and, when we obtain it, seek for nothing more, and shun nothing so much as its opposite, pain. Pleasure is good even if it proceed from the most unseemly conduct, as Hippobotus says in his work On the Sects. For even if the action be irregular, still, at any rate, the resultant pleasure is desirable for its own sake and is good. The removal of pain, however, which is put forward in Epicurus, seems to them not to be pleasure at all, any more than the absence of pleasure is pain. For both pleasure and pain they hold to consist in motion, whereas absence of pleasure like absence of pain is not motion, since painlessness is the condition of one who is, as it were, asleep. They assert that some people may fail to choose pleasure because their minds are perverted; not all mental pleasures and pains, however, are derived from bodily counterparts. For instance, we take disinterested delight in the prosperity of our country which is as real as our delight in our own prosperity. Nor again do they admit that pleasure is derived from the memory or expectation of good, which was a doctrine of Epicurus. For they assert that the movement affecting the mind is exhausted in course of time. Again they hold that pleasure is not derived from sight or from hearing alone. At all events, we listen with pleasure to imitation of mourning, while the reality causes pain. They gave the names of absence of pleasure and absence of pain to the intermediate conditions. However, they insist that bodily pleasures are far better than mental pleasures, and bodily pains far worse than mental pains, and that this is the reason why offenders are punished with the former. For they assumed pain to be more repellent, pleasure more congenial. For these reasons they paid more attention to the body than to the mind. Hence, although pleasure is in itself desirable, yet they hold that the things which are productive of certain pleasures are often of a painful nature, the very opposite of pleasure; so that to accumulate the pleasures which are productive of happiness appears to them a most irksome business.

They do not accept the doctrine that every wise man lives pleasantly and every fool painfully, but regard it as true for the most part only. It is sufficient even if we enjoy but each single pleasure as it comes. They say that prudence is a good, though desirable not in itself but on account of its consequences; that we make friends from interested motives, just as we cherish any part of the body so long as we have it; that some of the virtues are found even in the foolish; that bodily training contributes to the acquisition of virtue; that the sage will not give way to envy or love or superstition, since these weaknesses are due to mere empty opinion; he will, however, feel pain and fear, these being natural affections; and that wealth too is productive of pleasure, though not desirable for its own sake.

They affirm that mental affections can be known, but not the objects from which they come; and they abandoned the study of nature because of its apparent uncertainty, but fastened on logical inquiries because of their utility. But Meleager in his second book On Philosophical Opinions, and Clitomachus in his first book On the Sects, affirm that they maintain Dialectic as well as Physics to be useless, since, when one has learnt the theory of good and evil, it is possible to speak with propriety, to be free from superstition, and to escape the fear of death. They also held that nothing is just or honourable or base by nature, but only by convention and custom. Nevertheless the good man will be deterred from wrong-doing by the penalties imposed and the prejudices that it would arouse. Further that the wise man really exists. They allow progress to be attainable in philosophy as well as in other matters. They maintain that the pain of one man exceeds that of another, and that the senses are not always true and trustworthy.

The school of Hegesias, as it is called, adopted the same ends, namely pleasure and pain. In their view there is no such thing as gratitude or friendship or beneficence, because it is not for themselves that we choose to do these things but simply from motives of interest, apart from which such conduct is nowhere found. They denied the possibility of happiness, for the body is infected with much suffering, while the soul shares in the sufferings of the body and is a prey to disturbance, and fortune often disappoints. From all this it follows that happiness cannot be realized. Moreover, life and death are each desirable in turn. But that there is anything naturally pleasant or unpleasant they deny; when some men are pleased and others pained by the same objects, this is owing to the lack or rarity or surfeit of such objects. Poverty and riches have no relevance to pleasure; for neither the rich nor the poor as such have any special share in pleasure. Slavery and freedom, nobility and low birth, honour and dishonour, are alike indifferent in a calculation of pleasure. To the fool life is advantageous, while to the wise it is a matter of indifference. The wise man will be guided in all he does by his own interests, for there is none other whom he regards as equally deserving. For supposing him to reap the greatest advantages from another, they would not be equal to what he contributes himself. They also disallow the claims of the senses, because they do not lead to accurate knowledge. Whatever appears rational should be done. They affirmed that allowance should be made for errors, for no man errs voluntarily, but under constraint of some suffering; that we should not hate men, but rather teach them better. The wise man will not have so much advantage over others in the choice of goods as in the avoidance of evils, making it his end to live without pain of body or mind. [96] This then, they say, is the advantage accruing to those who make no distinction between any of the objects which produce pleasure.

The school of Anniceris in other respects agreed with them, but admitted that friendship and gratitude and respect for parents do exist in real life, and that a good man will sometimes act out of patriotic motives. Hence, if the wise man receive annoyance, he will be none the less happy even if few pleasures accrue to him. The happiness of a friend is not in itself desirable, for it is not felt by his neighbour. Instruction is not sufficient in itself to inspire us with confidence and to make us rise superior to the opinion of the multitude. Habits must be formed because of the bad disposition which has grown up in us from the first. A friend should be cherished not merely for his utility--for, if that fails, we should then no longer associate with him--but for the good feeling for the sake of which we shall even endure hardships. Nay, though we make pleasure the end and are annoyed when deprived of it, we shall nevertheless cheerfully endure this because of our love to our friend.

The Theodoreans derived their name from Theodorus, who has already been mentioned, and adopted his doctrines. Theodorus was a man who utterly rejected the current belief in the gods. And I have come across a book of his entitled Of the Gods which is not contemptible. From that book, they say, Epicurus borrowed most of what he wrote on the subject.

Theodorus was also a pupil of Anniceris and of Dionysius the dialectician, as Antisthenes mentions in his Successions of Philosophers. He considered joy and grief to be the supreme good and evil, the one brought about by wisdom, the other by folly. Wisdom and justice he called goods, and their opposites evils, pleasure and pain being intermediate to good and evil. Friendship he rejected because it did not exist between the unwise nor between the wise; with the former, when the want is removed, the friendship disappears, whereas the wise are selfsufficient and have no need of friends. It was reasonable, as he thought, for the good man not to risk his life in the defence of his country, for he would never throw wisdom away to benefit the unwise.

He said the world was his country. Theft, adultery, and sacrilege would be allowable upon occasion, since none of these acts is by nature base, if once you have removed the prejudice against them, which is kept up in order to hold the foolish multitude together. The wise man would indulge his passions openly without the least regard to circumstances. Hence he would use such arguments as this. "Is a woman who is skilled in grammar useful in so far as she is skilled in grammar?" "Yes." "And is a boy or a youth skilled in grammar useful in so far as he is skilled in grammar?" "Yes." "Again, is a woman who is beautiful useful in so far as she is beautiful? And the use of beauty is to be enjoyed?" "Yes." When this was admitted, he would press the argument to the conclusion, namely, that he who uses anything for the purpose for which it is useful does no wrong. And by some such interrogatories he would carry his point.

He appears to have been called theos (god) in consequence of the following argument addressed to him by Stilpo. "Are you, Theodorus, what you declare yourself to be?" To this he assented, and Stilpo continued, "And do you say you are god?" To this he agreed. "Then it follows that you are god." Theodorus accepted this, and Stilpo said with a smile, "But, you rascal, at this rate you would allow yourself to be a jackdaw and ten thousand other things."

[However, Theodorus, sitting on one occasion beside Euryclides, the hierophant, began, "Tell me, Euryclides, who they are who violate the mysteries?" Euryclides replied, "Those who disclose them to the uninitiated." "Then you violate them," said Theodorus, "when you explain them to the uninitiated." Yet he would hardly have escaped from being brought before the Areopagus if Demetrius of Phalerum had not rescued him. And Amphicrates in his bookUpon Illustrious Men says he was condemned to drink the hemlock.

For a while he stayed at the court of Ptolemy the son of Lagus, and was once sent by him as ambassador to Lysimachus. And on this occasion his language was so bold that Lysimachus said, "Tell me, are you not the Theodorus who was banished from Athens?" To which he replied, "Your in- formation is correct, for, when Athens could not bear me any more than Semele could Dionysus, she cast me out." And upon Lysimachus adding, "Take care you do not come here again," "I never will," said he, "unless Ptolemy sends me." Mithras, the king's minister, standing by and saying, "It seems that you can ignore not only gods but kings as well," Theodorus replied, "How can you say that I ignore the gods when I regard you as hateful to the gods?" He is said on one occasion in Corinth to have walked abroad with a numerous train of pupils, and Metrocles the Cynic, who was washing chervil, remarked, "You, sophist that you are, would not have wanted all these pupils if you had washed vegetables." Thereupon Theodorus retorted, "And you, if you had known how to associate with men, would have had no use for these vegetables." A similar anecdote is told of Diogenes and Aristippus, as mentioned above.

Such was the character of Theodorus and his surroundings. At last he retired to Cyrene, where he lived with Magas and continued to be held in high honour. The first time that he was expelled from Cyrene he is credited with a witty remark: "Many thanks, men of Cyrene," said he, "for driving me from Libya into Greece."

Skeletal Cyrenaicism

I would like to take a more personal approach, rather than a historical one, and elaborate on the true import of the lessons I have learned from Cyrenaic theory, as one who is also influenced by far later strands of philosophical thought, chief among these being Epicurus’s hedonism, Charles Peirce’s pragmaticism, Ayn Rand’s objectivism, and Walter Pater’s aestheticism. The following basic commitments are, I believe, the fundamental building blocks upon which to erect a full worldview and lifestyle, and agreement on these points constitutes New Cyrenaic alignment.

Skeletal Cyrenaicism:

Cyrenaic epistemology is a commitment to sensational empiricism. Immediate experience is the foundation for all knowledge, providing us with incorrigible awareness of the world around us as it relates to our psycho-physical constitution, within the basic unity of awareness. Our affections are direct, self-evident, personal, and unmistaken. The practical import of limited Cyrenaic skepticism is purgative — eschewing all unfounded abstract speculation or essentialism, and dismissing any alleged alternative sources of information. 

Cyrenaic ethics is a recognition of the feelings as evaluative faculties. Pleasure and pain are automatic motivating reactions to raw sense data, and are the life-guiding origin of all further judgements of value and disvalue. Pleasure is naturally attractive and choice-worthy, pain is naturally repellent and avoidance-worthy, experienced psychosomatically, and teaches that the ultimate goal of life is to live pleasantly and peacefully, an achievement of happiness. To achieve happiness requires cultivating the personal qualities of Satisfaction, Self-Mastery, and Confidence, which describe necessary constituent components of the pleasant life. Perception of the world is made in terms of opportunities for enjoyment, and risks of suffering to the individual — managing these we call hedonic calculus in the economy of pleasure. 

Cyrenaic education and practice holistically transforms belief, attitude, desire, and capacity. This program has the dual benefits of removing impediments to the purest, most immediate reception of pleasurable experiences, while cultivating hedonic appetite and the refinement of its satisfaction. Education consists of philosophical investigation, training self-awareness, exercising presentism, and learning sociability. Respectively, these skills help us control and eliminate excessive desires through temperance, manage current circumstances through adaptability, and succeed in inter-personal relationships with suavity and compassion. Possessing these virtues renders us both competent and comfortable.

Paterian aesthetics applies hedonistic sensationalism to the appreciation of artistic and experiential phenomena, imparting a form of earthly sensitivity, beatific idealism, and connoisseurship. We regard all objects — works of art, the fairer forms of nature and human life, engaging personalities — as powers or forces producing pleasurable sensations, each of a more or less peculiar or unique kind. We shape ourselves in accordance with an aspirational vision of successful living — exemplified by heroic, impassioned, and joyful modes of being and behaving, taking inspiration from living or artistically depicted exemplars. 

New Cyrenaic Virtues

Pleasure (ἡδονή/hedonē): The pursuit of pleasure is the foundational virtue of Cyrenaic philosophy, as pleasant living is our telos. The Cyrenaic ethical project is a life organized around the life-guiding truth of pleasure and pain. Perception of the world is made in terms of opportunities for enjoyment, and risks of suffering distress. This is hedonic calculus in the economy of pleasure. We must investigate the causes and conditions that secure happiness and well-being, which means understanding physiology, psychology, and relevant externalities. We ought pursue sensual pleasures, intellectual excitement, and aesthetic delights. 

Education (παιδεία/paideia): The goals of philosophical education are tranquility, social mastery, and connoisseurship. Transforming “slavish” characters into free ones involves cultivating self-mastery (see: temperance), the capacity to speak with sophistication (see: sociability), and proper philosophical understanding. Education thereby removes impediments to the purest and most immediate reception of pleasurable experiences (see: presentism), including anxiety, regret, and unjustified (merely conventional) compunctions. Training also includes cultivation of appetite and the refinement of its satisfaction, increasing capacity for appreciation (see: sensitivity).

Presentism (monokhronos hēdonē): The pleasures we actively experience in the present moment are the true sensations of value. We telescope our concerns to the present moment as a spiritual exercise, prudential rule of thumb, and emotional attitude — not as an ontological straight-jacket. We thereby diminish discomfort and become more receptive to present pleasures. Due to the greater ability to affect the present moment, we put less faith in painstaking long-term planning than in our ability to adapt to circumstances. We must still plan and reflect, but we do so mindfully, always with an eye upon current conditions. 

Adaptability: Ability to harmonize with place, time, and role, and perform harmoniously in any circumstance. Confidence means feeling comfortable rather than anxious or fearful in unknown or threatening situations. Paradoxically, it is only a person of firm character and profound insight who can be so malleable, adapting comfortably to every situation. This requires gaining a range of basic competencies so that we can respond well in any situations, making us self-sufficient.

Temperance (σωφροσύνη/sōphrosūnē): Temperance involves keeping in mind what really matters and what does not. What really matters is simply to avoid pain and distress, and to experience some modicum of pleasure. We achieve the former by disdaining excess, which does not entail embracing austerity. Excess is relative to what is actually good — pleasure. This does not exclude luxury, but we avoid becoming attached to specific sources of pleasure and reduce our desires accordingly. Simple pleasure is enjoyable and sufficient, we ought never covet more than we currently possesses, nor be overcome by sensual enjoyment and lose our contentment.

Sociability (φιλία/philia): Capable of getting along with any sort of person whatsoever, and to do so without anxiety. This social confidence is based on the understanding both cognitively and emotionally that; 1. all one needs is to avoid pain and discover some modicum of pleasure, therefore, one feels more relaxed around other people. He or she does not need to impress anyone, since we are not after anything another can provide which we could not procure ourselves. 2. Just about every situation presents opportunities for enjoyment, which encourages simple accommodation of oneself to one’s company at any given moment. Training responsiveness, versatility, and adroitness. The wise man is comfortable in any situation, and adroit enough to turn it to his advantage. He speaks well, with knowledge and sophistication, possessing charm, humor, and quick-wittedness.

Sensitivity: Explore diverse and evocative sources of pleasure which require increased capacities for appreciation, such as aesthetic discernment, cultural enrichment, physical ability, dexterous skills, and intellectual stimulation. Training sensitivity to aesthetic delights, judged based on the virtuous merits regarding their degree, type, and unique sensory impressions with which they affect the individual’s “imaginative reason”. We refine all instruments of inward and outward intuition and impression, developing our capacities, in order to best receive and interact with the “beatific vision” of our experience in the world. This training involves, not the conveyance of doctrine or principles, but rather, the teaching of an art. Education increases one’s capacity for enjoyment.

Sympathy:  We have an empathetic distaste for causing or witnessing pain and discomfort due to our immediate grasp of the inherently evil nature of pain and suffering. We appeal to the aesthetic revulsion caused by the ugliness of suffering, prompting an amelioration of its causes if reasonable, and an avoidance of behavior which would bring it about. “How tenderly—more tenderly than many stricter souls—we might yield to kindly instinct, what fineness of charity in passing judgment on others, what an exquisite conscience of other men’s susceptibilities. We go beyond most people in our care for all weakly creatures.”

Earthen Character: Development generally of the more human and earthly elements of character. Virile consciousness of the realities of life, poetic apprehension, united with something of personal ambition and self-assertion. The earthly end comes like a final revelation of nothing less than the soul’s extinction. To the sentiment of the body, and the affections it defines — the flesh — one must cling; a materialist with the temper of a devotee. Amid abstract metaphysical doubts, as to what might lie one step only beyond that experience, we reinforce the deep original materialism or eathliness of human nature itself, bound so intimately to the sensuous world — let us at least make the most of what is “here and now”. 

Encyclopedia Britannica, “Cyrenaics”, by Hugh Chrisholm

CYRENAICS, a Greek school of philosophy, so called from Cyrene, the birthplace of the founder, Aristippus (q.v.). It was one of the two earliest Socratic schools, and emphasized one side only of the Socratic teaching (cf. Cynic). Socrates, although he held that virtue was the only human good, admitted to a certain extent the importance of its utilitarian side, making happiness at least a subsidiary end of moral action. Aristippus and his followers seized upon this, and made it the prime factor in existence, denying to virtue any intrinsic value. Logic and physical science they held to be useless, for all knowledge is immediate sensation (see Protagoras). These sensations are motions (κινήσεις) which (1) are purely subjective, and (2) are painful, indifferent or pleasant, according as they are violent, tranquil or gentle. Further they are entirely individual, and can in no way be described as constituting absolute objective knowledge. Feeling, therefore, is the only possible criterion alike of knowledge and of conduct. “Our modes of being affected (πάθη) alone are knowable.” Thus Cyrenaicism goes beyond the critical scepticism of the Sophists and deduces a single, universal aim for all men, namely pleasure. Furthermore, all feeling is momentary and homogeneous. It follows (1) that past and future pleasure have no real existence for us, and (2) that among present pleasures there is no distinction of kind, but only of intensity. Socrates had spoken of the higher pleasures of the intellect; the Cyrenaics denied the validity of this distinction and said that bodily pleasures as being more simple and more intense are to be preferred. Momentary pleasure (μονόχρονος ἡδόνη), preferably of a carnal kind, is the only good for man. Yet Aristippus was compelled to admit that some actions which give immediate pleasure entail more than their equivalent of pain. This fact was to him the basis of the conventional distinction of right and wrong, and in this sense he held that regard should be paid to law and custom. It is of the utmost importance that this development of Cyrenaic hedonism should be fully realized. To overlook the Cyrenaic recognition of social obligation and the hedonistic value of altruistic emotion is a very common expedient of those who are opposed to all hedonistic theories of life. Like many of the leading modern utilitarians, they combined with their psychological distrust of popular judgments of right and wrong, and their firm conviction that all such distinctions are based solely on law and convention, the equally unwavering principle that the wise man who would pursue pleasure logically must abstain from that which is usually denominated “wrong” or “unjust.” This idea, which occupies a prominent position in systems like those of Bentham, Volney, and even Paley, was evidently of prime importance at all events to the later Cyrenaics.

Developing from this is a new point of practical importance to the hedonism of the Cyrenaics. Aristippus, both in theory and in practice, insisted that true pleasure belongs only to him who is self-controlled and master of himself. The truly happy man must have φρόνησις (prudence), which alone can save him from falling a prey to mere passion. Thus, in the end, Aristippus, the founder of the purest hedonism in the history of thought, comes very near not only to the Cynics, but to the more cultured hedonism of Epicurus and modern thinkers. Theodorus, held even more strongly that passing pleasure may be a delusion, and that permanent tranquillity is a truer end of conduct. Hegesias denied the possibility of real pleasure and advocated suicide as ensuring at least the absence of pain. Anniceris, in whose thought the school reached its highest perfection, declared that true pleasure consists sometimes in self-sacrifice and that sympathy in enjoyment is a real source of happiness. Other members of the school were Arete, wife of Aristippus, Aristippus the younger (her son), Bio and Euhemerus.

The Cyrenaic ideal was, of course, utterly alien to Christianity, and, in general, subsequent thinkers found it an ideal of hopeless pessimism. Yet in modern times it has found expression in many ethical and literary works, and it is common also in other ancient non-Hellenic literature. There are quatrains in the Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyám and pessimistic verses in Ecclesiastes which might have been uttered by Aristippus. (“Then I commended mirth, because a man hath no better thing than to eat and to drink and to be merry; for that shall abide with him of his labour the days of his life which God giveth him under the sun”). So in Byron and Heine, and, in a sense, in Walter Pater (Marius the Epicurean), there is the same tendency to seek relief from the intellectual cul-de-sac in frankly aesthetic satisfaction. Thus Cyrenaicism did not entirely vanish with its absorption in Epicureanism.

The New Cyrenaic System

With this entry I present a condensed vision of the entire New Cyrenaic system. All credit for philosophical originality properly belongs to the individual figures named and tagged - these are, in chronological order, Heraclitus of Ephesus, Aristippus of Cyrene, Epicurus of Samos, and Walter Pater. Additional credit is due to Charles Sanders Peirce, who, though I do not reproduce his doctrine in depth, broadly influenced the interpretation and perspective provided. My contribution is entirely dependent on underlying primary material provided by the aforementioned persons, and consists solely of trans-historical creative reinterpretation, aiming at a functional pastiche of cohesive elements. The unitive principle which informs this ethical project is total commitment to our immediate affectations as the sole criteria of truth and value. It is for the reader to test the following for themselves. 

Metaphysics and Epistemology: 

Empirical Idealism: Complete fidelity to immediate experience, consisting of sensory affections, as the sole source and criteria of knowledge. These subjective impressions vouch for themselves, and they do so inwardly, unmistakably, truly, and incorrigibly. Affections are elements of sensational awareness generated by movements of our physical being due to relational contact with external stimuli, and they fall into three categories: pleasurable, painful, or neutral. These latter, intermediate states provide representational information, of which there are innumerable varieties, and may also be accompanied by/provoke pleasurable or painful sensations. 

Hedonic Motivation: Among the affections we have the feelings called pleasure and pain. Pleasure is self-evidently choice-worthy, pain is self-evidently avoidance-worthy, and no other sensations possess these monadic qualities as a matter of brute experience. Consequently, these feelings alone are directly capable of motivating or guiding choice and avoidance. Emotions are the positive and negative responses respectively resulting from cognitive judgements, evaluative or prospective, according to the criteria of these two states. As further evidence of nature supplying the norm, we have the Cradle Argument, according to which we judge the evidence provided by uncorrupted beings, such as animals and young children, who, from birth, automatically pursue pleasure and shun pain without moralistic confusion.

Purgative Skepticism: Withdrawal of interest from all other alleged sources of knowledge beyond what can be accessed and verified through direct sense-perception, or can be inferred therefrom, eliminating concerns with speculative metaphysics and intrinsic axiological dogma, narrowing the field of legitimate concern and circumscribing the scope of epistemic ability. 

Impressionistic Flux: The impressions of experience are constantly undergoing changes, at different rates and in varying respects, with underlying continuity and fixed relationships among them. We observe that change is oppositional and bi-polar, operating according to an interplay of centrifugal and centripetal tendencies. Human beings, like all phenomena, are a developmental result of this self-same process, and within the nexus of experience, the mode of organic sense-perception operates along multiple qualitative continuums, the extremes of which we declare opposites. The mind is sensitive to patterns of behavior resulting from the interactivity of balanced forces because it is of the same nature, these habitual relationships being deemed “lawful” when applied to the predictable motions of external objects, and “logical” when considered cognitively. The universe is therefore comprehensible, directly as a matter of immediate experience, and inferentially as the approximate value of statistical ratios. 

Pragmatic Theory of Objects: Our conception of an object’s identity consists entirely in that confluence of present and expected relational effects, on other objects and on oneself directly, according to which we group and categorize entities in terms of their general characteristics and principles of action, within ranges of practical significance. 

Presentism: The present moment alone is truly ours, a bubble wherein experience unfolds and phenomena are open to purposeful interactivity. We yield to the improvement of the present, excluding all embarrassment alike of regret for the past and calculation for the future, as far as possible, in order to maximize attentive receptivity. (See “Present Focus” below for the practical application of this insight).

Ethics:

Individual Sensual Hedonism: The highest good (summum bonum) is one’s own pleasurable existence as a living organism. The end (to telos) is to live pleasantly/pleasurably, which is called happiness. All other goods are instrumental to securing and adorning one’s own pleasant living. Human happiness is psychosomatic, requiring physical health and mental well-being as both foundational states for seeking greater pleasure, and for maintaining the sensitivity of our apparatus for enjoyment.

Peace of Mind and Homeostasis of Body: The active pursuit of pleasures is balanced with the value of freedom from mental distress (or, possessing peace of mind), and freedom from bodily pain (or, preserving physical well-being). It is by pursuing, attaining, and maintaining this dual-aspect of healthiness, we may say biological hygiene, which provides pleasure in itself, and establishes the necessary pre-conditions for pursuing and appreciating higher pleasures.

Unitemporal Pleasure: The pleasures of the present experience are to be enjoyed fully as our highest goal, without undue concern for what has passed or what is to come, which is self-defeating. Pleasant living is to be accomplished within each individual unit of time, enjoying what is at hand, without excessive toil or yearning for what is not currently available.

Hierarchy of Desires: In order to prioritise our desires, we categorize them according to their level of necessity for the pleasant life, and their origin in natural or unnatural conditions, creating three distinct categories. Of the desires that are both natural and necessary, there are those which are required for our survival, those required for removing bodily pain, and those required for achieving happiness. Unnecessary desires ought to be pursued as augmenting necessary desires and contributing to happiness, but should not be chased at the expense of more basic requirements. 

Aesthetic Exemplarism: Projecting a vision of the successful life, informed by other persons and artistic representations, as tangible exemplars for our own aspirations. Additionally, 

“We may well adorn and beautify, in scrupulous self-respect, our souls, and whatever our souls touch upon — these wonderful bodies, these material dwelling-places through which the shadows pass together for a while, the very raiments we wear, our very pastimes and the inter course of society.” - Walter Pater. 

True aesthetic culture is realizable as a new form of the contemplative life, founded on the vision of perfect men, objects, and environments. Whatever form of human life which may be heroic, impassioned, ideal: these are the criterion of inspirational values.

Character and Attitude:

Education: The goals of philosophical education are tranquility, social mastery, and connoisseurship. Transforming “slavish” characters into free ones involves cultivating self-possession/-mastery, the capacity to speak with sophistication, and proper philosophical understanding. Education thereby removes impediments to the purest and most immediate reception of pleasurable experiences, including anxiety, regret, and unjustified (that is, merely conventional) compunctions. Training also includes cultivation of appetite and the refinement of its satisfaction, increasing capacity for appreciation.

Temperance: We strive to keep in mind what really matters and what does not. What really matters is simply to avoid pain and distress, and to experience some sort of pleasure. We achieve the former by disdaining excess, which does not entail embracing austerity, and not becoming attached/dependent to any particular source of pleasure. Excess is relative to what is actually good, which is pleasure, and this does not exclude luxury, but we avoid upsetting the hierarchy by chasing corrosive desires which cannot be satisfied. Those who are always dissatisfied, no matter what they acquire, have an illness. New Cyrenaic philosophy cures practitioners of their attachment to superfluities, freeing them from stress, insomnia, and the stranglehold of their preoccupations. Temperance also enables enjoyment: those with a sound mind can indulge in luxurious pleasures without becoming corrupted — that is, beginning to feel these are necessities.

Present Focus: Telescoping of concerns to the present moment as a spiritual exercise, prudential rule of thumb, and emotional attitude - not an ontological straight-jacket. We thereby diminish discomfort and become more receptive to present pleasures. Due to the greater ability to affect the present moment, we put less faith in painstaking long-term planning than in our ability to adapt to circumstances.

Adaptability and Confidence: Able to harmonize with place, time, and role, and perform harmoniously in any circumstance. Confidence means feeling comfortable rather than anxious or fearful in unknown or threatening situations. Paradoxically, it is only a person of firm character and profound insight who can be so malleable, adapting comfortably to every situation.

Sociability: Capable of getting along with any sort of person whatsoever, and do so without anxiety. This confidence is based on the understanding both cognitively and emotionally that; 1. all one needs is to avoid pain and discover some modicum of pleasure, therefore, the sage feels more relaxed around people. He or she does not need to impress anyone, since we are not after anything another can provide which we could not procure ourselves. 2. Just about every situation presents opportunities for enjoyment, which encourages simple accommodation of oneself to one’s company at any given moment.

Suavity: Training responsiveness, versatility, and adroitness. The wise man is comfortable in any situation, and adroit enough to turn it to his advantage. He speaks well, with knowledge and sophistication, possessing charm, humor, and quick-wittedness.