When Cyrenaicism is mentioned in historical accounts, it is often referenced in order to provide an unfavorable contrast with the more sophisticated philosophical developments of the Epicureans. Whilst I have immense respect for Epicurus and his philosophy, these two schools actually have far more in common than the conveniently exaggerated juxtapositions would lead us to believe. It is no secret that Epicurus borrowed from his predecessors, which is easily conceded in regards to Democritus and Leucippus, but what is less commonly recognized is that Epicureanism is similarly situated in regards to Cyrenaicism, representing an innovative evolution rather than a sharp departure. In order to dramatize Epicurus’ unique elements, Aristippus and the Cyrenaics are often caricatured as empty-headed goldfish flitting from one source or momentary pleasure to another, while the level-headed Epicureans plan for the future, exercise moderation, and make calculated decisions. Let us interrogate this simplified picture, explore the Cyrenaic theory in greater depth, and analyze the clear parallels with much-needed charity.
Physics:
Epicurus famously defended an atomistic materialism in the vein of Democritus, albeit with idiosyncratic updates (and we may say, improvements), such as breaking from the latter’s strict determinism by introducing the “swerve” to account for human volition, or treating phenomenal qualities as faithfully representing an underlying structural reality rather asserting that they exist by mere “convention”.
Aristippus and the Cyrenaics are also essentially common-sense physicalists (though not properly materialists), arguing that all sensation consists of varieties of motions in our bodies caused by relational interactions with external objects, producing either gentle, violent, or calm vibrations, corresponding to pleasurable, painful, or indifferent sensational feelings in our awareness. This theory was clearly borrowed from Protagoras, and is not greatly elaborated upon in the extant remains of the Cyrenaics, who did not much care for natural investigation, but note there is no fundamental disagreement between the two hedonistic schools on this point.
It is ultimately unclear that the sensory impressionism of Cyrenaics epistemology could support a more robust theory of matter, particularly dubious would be an atomistic theory, but something like Mill’s phenomenalism seems compatible. Nevertheless, Epicurus’ developments are far superior in specification, explanation, and argumentation, but he is not essentially at odds with his hedonistic predecessors.
Epistemology:
Epicurus is, for all intents and purposes, a straightforward empiricist who additionally acknowledges that human beings have innate predispositions and pattern-recognition abilities. The Canon is a triadic account of the faculties for gaining knowledge, and includes the Senses (our six classical organs of awareness), the Feelings (pleasure and pain), and the Anticipations (variously interpreted as pre-conceptual patterning, socio-political navigation, conceptual categorization based on repetitive experiences, etc.).
The Cyrenaics begin from a somewhat skeptical framework, wherein we can only be completely sure of our directly experienced affections, rather than the intrinsic nature of that which causes them. Another clear outgrowth of Protagorean relativism, we are nevertheless in a similar epistemic situation to the Epicureans, in which empirical evidence is incorrigible and certain, while all other alleged sources of information are considered dubious or non-existent, unless they can be established to originate from what is immediately sensible.
The Epicureans reason from what is evident to what is not, in the case of both their atomic theory and their various accounts of remote meteorological phenomena, using analogy. The Cyrenaics refrain from engaging in abstract ontology and focus their attention on what is practical, based on that which we do know for sure. They sweep aside with indifference the unfounded supernatural speculations of the masses — those concerns which motivate Epicurean efforts to debunk cosmic sources of mortal fears — because, according to their epistemic theory, there is no corresponding experience which makes this a plausible area for concern to begin with. While there are important differences in these approaches, note again the essential agreements.
Pleasure:
For Epicurus, it is the faculty of the Feelings wherein our natural end is to be understood, since we are supplied by nature with a built-in mechanism for automatic evaluation, judging what phenomena are for or against us according to how they please or disturb us. Epicureans find the limit of pleasure in the elimination of pain in the body and disturbances in the mind, and accordingly they urge us to satisfy our natural and necessary desires through fulfillment, while eliminating corrosive desires, and prudently moderating our merely unnecessary desires. What evidence is brought to support this identification of human nature supplying the norm? The Epicureans place great weight on the example of uncorrupted and unconfused beings, such as young infants or animals, and they ask us to consult our own internal experiences.
It is with the Cyrenaics that both of these naturalistic arguments originate. Similar to the empiricist Epicureans, the Cyrenaics who admit only direct knowledge of our sensations can find no possible competing criteria by which to judge the good or the bad, except for these selfsame sensations, all of which are either pleasant, painful, or neutral. We naturally gravitate towards the former, shrink away from the next, and are neither compelled nor repelled by the latter. Nevertheless, through corruption we can become confused and work against these innate feelings. The Cyrenaics also greatly value peace of mind, but there is no question of this tranquility supplanting the pleasurable end we seek, it is merely the healthy foundation from which we work to maximize positive experiences. By carefully managing the economy of pleasures and pains, we maintain our constitution while making calculated risks for greater rewards, forgoing superfluous excesses, and making the most of every situation.
Presentism:
The Epicureans no doubt have a far-ranging theory of pleasure, taking great delight in reminiscence on pleasurable experiences gone by, and finding solace in the well-founded expectation of future pleasures to come. Due to this temporal extension, Epicureans place greater emphasis on mental pleasures and pains, because while titillations and afflictions of the body only occur during the moment of physical excitement, those of the mind stretch across time, as yesterday’s regrets become today’s anguish, while tomorrow’s rewards induce present excitement.
The Cyrenaics, on the other hand, are unfairly portrayed as radical ontological presentists, occupying a minuscule sliver of time, paying no heed to future consequences, lacking reflection on the past, and busying themselves with any potential source of elation their eyes may fix upon. In reality, Aristippus and his followers are really more concerned with pointing out a pair of fairly intuitive observations: that present pleasures and pains are of higher degree, intensity, and reality than their copies in recollection or anticipation, and; that people often spend too much time brooding over the past or worrying about the future, while losing focus on the present situation and missing their chance to act here and now, to enjoy what is at hand.
A cursory reading of Cyrenaic material reveals an emphasis on education, the development of skills and character, a knack for controlling our desires and forgoing those which promise greater troubles than they are worth. None of these concerns make any sense for a movement which is confined to the ever-vanishing moment. Cyrenaic presentism is nothing more than the reasonable exercise of attending to the real world right in front of us, rather than wandering around in one’s imagination — not exclusively, not at the expense of planning and executing long-range goals, but as a prudential rule-of-thumb.
Friendship and Society:
Epicurus placed great emphasis on the value of living among a community of close friends, a situation which provides greater assurance of security, continuous opportunities for socializing, and a network of mutual support. Epicurus also cautions against risky political engagement, not necessarily advocating complete withdrawal of the kind usually attributed to him, but nevertheless acknowledging the danger to health and serenity that accompanies such public forays, and certainly suspiciously interrogating the corrosive motivations that tend to spur such activity in the first place.
Aristippus tended to pursue pleasures that involved cheerful association with others, adapting to new circumstances and making the most of available opportunities. If the anecdotes recorded by Diogenes Laërtius show us anything, it’s that Aristippus was incredibly quick-witted, jovial, and humorous. Politically, the Socratic dialogue of Xenophon reveals a character prizing personal freedom, rejecting the roles of ruler or ruled, and preferring instead to travel as a stranger everywhere in order to maintain his independence. Though there is apparently greater self-sufficiency and individualism present here than in the Epicurean communities, it is clear nevertheless that Aristippus highly values social relationships, and the genealogy of his school, as well as a collection of spurious letters, suggests that he cared deeply for his daughter Arete, teaching her in his ways and advising her not to worry about inessential losses.
Virtue:
It is impossible, says Epicurus, to live pleasantly without living honorably, wisely, and justly. The virtues are instrumental means to securing the good life, and are inseparable necessities for navigating the world successfully. One must abide by the niceties regulating social conduct, one must exercise prudent judgement in practical matters, and one must abide by the laws and regulations designed to maintain cohesion and protect men from one another. Conversely, nobody who does so fails to live happily, either. Epicurean prudence generally consists of rationally pursuing the necessary and natural desires, taking care to moderate unnecessary desires so as to guard against inviting additional pains in their wake, or in the effort to obtain them, lest we counterproductively disturb our tranquility.
Breaking from the usual portrayal, and though the Cyrenaics are rather more indulgent, Aristippus actually emphasizes a perfected version of Socratic temperance, urging the disdain for excess, understanding that all we require is to experience some level of comfortable pleasure while avoiding disturbances, and arguing that those who are dissatisfied no matter what are undergoing a mental illness. We find in Aristuppus the embryonic form of Epicurus’ threefold division of desires, though in a simplified form which highlights the Cyrenaic belief that it is he who wisely indulges in a controlled fashion, not he who cautiously abstains, that exhibits the greatest self-mastery.
Conclusion:
My hope with this rough overview is merely to provide the beginning of a counter narrative against the popular view that the Cyrenaics were a mere infantile anomaly, whose only continuing interest, if any, is as a historical curiosity portraying misguided Socratics stretching the limits of sophistic excesses. In reality, there is much greater insight available here, later expanded by orthodox and heterodox Cyrenaics over time, and of course, extended by the Epicurean school, albeit with new foundations and greater coherence.
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