In his theory of life, Aristippus followed closely the teaching of Protagoras, just as Antisthenes followed the direction of Gorgias. Indeed he developed the relativism of the Protagorean theory of perception to a remarkably valuable psychology of the sense feelings. Sense perception instructs us only as to our own states and is not concerned with the causes of those states. The causes are not recognizable; our knowledge directs itself only to the changes of our own essence, and these alone concern us. Sensations, since they are a consciousness of our own condition, are always true. In this spirit the Cyrenaics assumed an attitude of skeptical indifference to natural science. They followed Protagoras in the individualistic turn of this theory when they asserted that the individual knows only his own sensations, and common nomenclature is no guarantee of similarity in the content of the thought.
That these epistemological investigations of the school of Aristippus were used for a basis of their ethics but did not evoke their ethics, is proved for the most part by the subordinate position which they received in the later systematizations of the school. According to Sextus Empiricus {Adv. math, VIL 11), the treatment at this time was divided into five parts : concerning good and evil ; concerning the states of the soul; concerning actions; concerning external causes; and, finally, concerning the criteria of truth.
However, the fundamental problem of the Cyrenaics (as of the Cynics) was that concerning the real happiness of man, and they emphasized simply the included moment of pleasure or displeasure in those states of mind to which knowledge is limited. As, however, Protagoras had referred the theoretic content of perception to differing corporeal motions, the Cyrenaics sought to derive also the affective tone of the same from the different states of motion of him perceiving. Gentle motion corresponds to pleasure, violent to displeasure, rest from motion to absence of pleasure and pain. Since now these three possibilities include the whole range of stimuli, there are only two, perhaps three: pleasant, unpleasant and the states of indifference between them. Since, however, among these three possible states, pleasure alone is worth striving for, is the only goal of the will, and accordingly is happiness or the Good itself. Whatever gives pleasure is good. Whatever creates displeasure is bad. All else is indifferent.
The question concerning the content of the concept of the Good, which was not really answered by Socrates, was answered by these Hedonists, in that they declared pleasure to be this content, and indeed all pleasures, whatever their occasion, to be indistinguishable. By this only the single momentary state of pleasure is meant. The highest, the only good, for these Hedonists was the enjoyment of the moment.
From these presuppositions the Hedonists concluded, with entire correctness, that the distinction of value between single feelings of pleasure is determined not by the content or the cause, but only by the intensity of the feelings. They asserted that the degree of intensity of the bodily feelings is greater than that of the spiritual feelings. The later Cyrenaics, particularly Theodorus, came therefore to the conclusion that the Wise Man need not regard himself restricted by law, convention, or indeed religious scruples, but he should so use things as to serve his pleasure best. Here, again, the Sophistic antithesis between convention and nature is repeated, and the natural individual pleasurable feeling is taken as the absolute motive of action. Still more pronounced than in the degenerate phases of Cynicism appeared here the egoistic, naturalistic, and individualistic trait which is basal in the common problem of both theories. On the other hand, Anniceris sought later to temper this radicalism and to ennoble the desire for pleasure by emphasizing the enjoyment of friendship, of family life, and of social organization as more valuable. At the same time he did not lose sight of the egoistic fundamental principle, but only carefully refined it with this turn in its course, however, the Cyrenaic philosophy merged into Epicurean hedonism.
Virtue was, accordingly, for Aristippus identical with the ability to enjoy. The utility of science consists in directing men to the proper satisfaction. Right enjoyment is, however, only possible through reasonable self-control. Requisite insight for this frees us from prejudice, and teaches us how to use the goods of life in the most reasonable way. Above all else it gives to the Wise Man that security in himself by which he remains proof against weakly yielding to influences of the outer world. It teaches him, while in enjoyment, to remain master of himself and his surroundings. The problem for both Cynic and Cyrenaic was the attainment of this individual independence of the course of the world. The Cynic school sought independence in renunciation; the Cyrenaic in lordship over enjoyment, and Aristippus was right when he said that the latter was more difficult and more valuable than the former. In opposition to the Cynic ideal of renunciation of the world, the Cyrenaic drew, as his picture of the Wise Man, that of the perfected man of the world. He is susceptible to the enjoyment of life, he knows what animal satisfactions are, and how to prize spiritual joy, riches, and honor. In elevated spirit he scrupulously makes use of men and things, but even then never forgets himself in his enjoyment. He remains lord of his appetites; he never wishes the impossible, and even in the few happy days of his existence he knows how to preserve victoriously the peace and serenity of his soul.
With these qualifications (reminding us of Socrates), Aristippus went beyond the principle of momentary enjoyment of pleasure when he, for example, explained activity as reprehensible if, on the whole, it yields more unpleasurableness than pleasure. He commended on this same ground that there be universal subordination to custom and law. Theodorus, then went still further, and sought to find the telos of mankind, not in individual satisfaction, but in serene disposition. This is also already a transition to the Epicurean conception.
If the principle that only educated men know how to enjoy happily verified itself in the temperament and circumstances of Aristippus, his school on the other hand drew another irresistible ~~- consequence from the hedonistic principle, viz., pessimism. If “pleasure is said to give value to life, the greater part of humanity fails of its purpose, and thus life becomes worthless. It was Hegesias who dissipated the theory of Aristippus with this doctrine. The desire for happiness cannot be satisfied,” he taught. No insight, no opulence, protects us from the pain which nature imposes on the body. The highest we can reach and even as telos strive for is painlessness, of which death most certainly assures us. The particular ethical teachings of Hegesias appear more nearly like the precepts of the Cynics than like many of the expressions of Aristippus.
The isolation of the individual shows itself in the hedonistic philosophers in their indifference to public life. Aristippus rejoiced that in his Sophistic wanderings no interest in politics infringed upon his personal freedom. Theodorus called the world his country, and said that patriotic sacrifice was a folly which the Wise Man is above. These all are sentiments in which the Cynics and Cyrenaics agree almost verbally, and in these the decline of Greek civilization was most characteristically expressed.
Religious beliefs are among the things which the Hedonists shoved one side with skeptical indifference. Freedom from religious prejudices seemed to them (Diog. Laert., II. 91) to be indispensable for the Wise Man. It is not related, however, that they set up in any way in opposition to positive religion another conception. Theodorus proclaimed his atheism quite openly. Euhemerus devised for an explanation of the belief in gods the theory to-day called after him, and often accepted in modem anthropology in many forms. According to this theory, the worship of the gods and heroes is developed from a reverence of rulers and otherwise remarkable men. (Cicero, De not. deor. L 42, 119; Sext. £mp. Ado. IX. 17.)
Source:
Windelband, W. & Cushman, H. E. (1899). History of Ancient Philosophy. Charles Scribner’s Sons.
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