Philodemus of Gadara references Aristippus of Cyrene

The Epicurean philosopher Philodemus of Gadara offers a rare explicit reference to Aristippus of Cyrene in a fragmentary segment from his work Against the Sophists. Unfortunately the papyrus scroll is damaged and the text is corrupt, but we can glean the general direction of the statement, which follows: 

μετὰ ταῦτα˙ περὶ ὧν εἶπον ὑμῖν πολλ' ἐστὶν ἐπείσακτα καὶ ὑποψία τις ὕπεστιν, ἀλλὰ . . . . . . οἴδαμενεἶναι πιστὸν Κράτητος καὶ Ἀριστίππου τὰς περί τινων τοῦ Πλάτωνος διατριβάς, καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους τ'ἀναλυτικὰ καὶ τὰ περὶ φύσεως, ὅσαπερ ἐκλέγομεν.

I’m no translator of Ancient Greek, unfortunately, so the best I’ve been able to do in terms of deriving a workable English version of this text myself has been to run it through various translating software and comparing them. Luckily, this seems to be a fairly straightforward fragment, and the sense seems to loosely intend something like this: 

“After these things: Concerning what I have told you, much is introduced, and there is some suspicion present, but… we know that the discussions of Crates and Aristippus concerning certain things of Plato are trustworthy, as well as the Analytics and the works on nature of Aristotle, which we select.”

This fragment seems to imply, at the very least, that some testimony of Aristippus regarding Plato, whether written by himself or recorded from an oral statement by another, survived to Philodemus’ day and he considered it a trustworthy account. Anything further than that would be speculative. In the future I may find a better translation of this selection and perhaps an expert analysis as to its meaning, but this is an interesting artefact nonetheless. 

The Greek script is preserved in the Socratis et socraticorum reliquiae by Gabriel Giannantoni, and the exact reference is in Book IV, A 147 PHILODEM.  adv. <Sophist.> fr. 1³ Sbordone. I will provide a link below to an online resource that contains all the Socratic fragments, and this one in particular:

http://ancientsource.daphnet.iliesi.cnr.it/box_view_url_shortener?u=fY

We, the Gods - Theodorus the Atheist as Inspiration

Theodorus the Atheist (c. 340 - c. 250 B.C.) was an ancient Cyrenaic philosopher who studied under Aristippus the Younger, and later learned from Anniceris, branching off from the orthodox strain and creating a new school of Theodoreans with a somewhat eclectic doctrine. There is much to gain by studying Theodorus’ innovations and applying his teaching to our own lives, due to the admirable qualities he cultivated on the basis of Cyrenaic philosophy. Although the following principles signal something of a departure from his predecessors, we ought increase the scope of our interest to cautiously adopt attenuated Theodorean values, without abandoning the fundamentals of Aristippus the Elder, in our quest towards defining a New Cyrenaicism of individual self-sufficiency, best equipped for navigating the real world. 

Theodorean Modifications:

The New Telos: 

Theodorus reinterpreted the ethical ends of Cyrenaic philosophy, and in the place of pleasure (hedonē) and pain (ponos), substituted instead the emotional states of joy (kharis/charis) and grief (lupē) as the supreme good and evil. This development signifies an attempt to identify a more robust telos, likely in response to the growing popularity of Epicureanism, transferring the focus from predominantly physical sensations towards a more abiding state of positive mental enjoyment. Epicurus also, when speaking of the kinetic emotion of pleasure, referred to this condition as charā, or joy, although his usual wont is to define the goal in terms of its limits in the removal of mental disturbance, referring to ataraxia, a more static state of tranquility. This option is of course foreign to the Cyrenaics, who can only admit to feelings which result from some level of physical activity causing perception. Nevertheless, Theodorus considers pleasure and pain, presumably intending those that are bodily, as intermediate to these states of joy and grief.

As avowed hedonists, we cannot follow Theodorus this far if his reclassification is taken at face value, which usually means interpretating the intermediates Stoically as “indifferent” — however, I suggest that we instead understand this differentiation between particular pleasures or pains, and the ethical telos of joy, as indicating roughly the same observation the Hellenic contemporary Epicurus (341- 270 B.C.) makes in his letter to Menoeceus:  

And since pleasure is the first good and natural to us, for this very reason we do not choose every pleasure, but sometimes we pass over many pleasures, when greater discomfort accrues to us as the result of them: and similarly we think many pains better than pleasures, since a greater pleasure comes to us when we have endured pains for a long time. Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided. Yet by a scale of comparison and by the consideration of advantages and disadvantages we must form our judgment on all these matters. For the good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and conversely the bad as good.

Here, we might also make sense of a relevant passage in Laërtius’ doxography on the Cyrenaics: “Hence, although pleasure is in itself desirable, yet they hold that the things which are productive of certain pleasures are often of a painful nature, the very opposite of pleasure; so that to accumulate the pleasures which are productive of happiness appears to them a most irksome business.” By distinguishing between pleasures themselves, and the pleasant state of mind called “joy”, Theodorus can more easily excerise discretion amongst particular sources of pleasure, some of which are to be pursued while some are to be avoided, having reference not primarily to the character of the pleasure itself, but assessing its value according to the influence on his cheerful eudaimonia.

Diogenes Laërtius tells us that Epicurus was influenced by Theodorus, and although he makes this connection primarily in regards to his doctrine on the gods, it is eminently plausible that his influence went further than that. Epicurus borrowed more than is commonly recognised from the Cyrenaics, including the much-lauded Cradle Argument, and based on multiple similarities it is clear that the ideas of Anniceris provide something of a bridge between Cyrenaic and Epicurean hedonism. It would not be surprising to discover further points of influence from Theodorus than have hitherto been granted, especially considering both men attended the court of Lysimachus while Theodorus was the ambassador for Ptolemy I, who later also became interested in the philosophy of the Garden. Permitting this speculation, we may note a further connection in this regard when it comes to the Theodorean virtues. 

The New Virtues:

Theodorus identifies the virtues of practical wisdom (phronesis) and justice (dikaiosunē) as goods which bring about our joy, while their opposites, foolishness and injustice, are evils which lead to grief. While the exhortation of phronesis, often translated as “prudence”, is easy enough to understand, the emphasis placed on justice presents more difficulties for interpretation, especially in regards to Theodorus’ insistence that, upon occasion, acts such as theft and adultery are permissible. In order to offer a possible solution, I’ll introduce another plausible connection to Epicurean philosophy, taken from the same letter:

Of all this the beginning and the greatest good is prudence. Wherefore prudence is a more precious thing even than philosophy: for from prudence are sprung all the other virtues, and it teaches us that it is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently and honorably and justly, nor, again, to live a life of prudence, honor, and justice without living pleasantly. For the virtues are by nature bound up with the pleasant life, and the pleasant life is inseparable from them. For indeed who, think you, is a better man than he who holds reverent opinions concerning the gods, and is at all times free from fear of death, and has reasoned out the end ordained by nature? (Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus).

Prudence and justice, so highly praised by Epicurus as inseparable from the pleasant life, are precisely those virtues identified by Theodorus. We may also note the remaining criteria, for as regards the opinions concerning the gods, we have good reason to suspect Epicurus learned these from Theodorus, according to Diogenes Laërtius. Furthermore, if anyone can be said to display full confidence in the belief that “death is nothing to us”, it is the very same man. Preserved from antiquity are numerous anecdotes illustrating Theodorus’ courage in the face of deadly threats from powerful figures, and one taken from Cicero’s account will suffice: “when Lysimachus threatened to crucify him, [Theodorus] bade him keep those menaces for his courtiers: ‘To Theodorus it makes no difference whether he rot in the air or underground.’” Of course, this analysis is certainly speculative, but I would argue it is both plausible and illuminating to consider that Theodorus intends his use and understanding of these terms in much the same way as Epicurus does, given their temporal, geographical, and ideological proximity. 

If this much is admitted, we can deal fairly easily with Theodorus’ conception of justice, following the same understanding that Epicurus offers. Principle Doctrine 31 tells us that, “The justice which arises from nature is a pledge of mutual advantage to restrain men from harming one another and save them from being harmed.” This contextual social-contract notion is much easier to reconcile with Theodorus’ attitude towards theft and adultery, given the right circumstances, since not only can we easily imagine contexts within which prudent judgment would recommend ignoring certain laws or norms, we are also dealing with a concretised understanding of what justice really consists of, rather than strictly adhering to some Platonic absolute. This interpretation also intersects neatly with other feature of Theodorean philosophy, which we will turn to now.

The New Self-Sufficiency:

Theodorus’ philosophy proceeds from precious few elementary principles, and his confident polemical approach also indicates a skeptical attitude towards casuistry — yet the wise person must make prudential and righteous judgements upon some grounds, in order to achieve his sought-after joyous end. Here we come to the true expression of Theodorus’ self-sufficiency, wherein philosophical wisdom comes together with the realities of a specific situation, and the individual must make their own judgement. This further explains the following account from the doxography, which we have already touched upon: “He allowed that a wise man might steal, and commit adultery and sacrilege, at proper seasons: for that none of these actions were disgraceful by nature, if one only put out of sight the common opinion about them, which owes its existence to the consent of fools. And he said that the wise man would indulge his passions openly, without any regard to circumstances.” Against the interpretation that Theodorus was “indifferent” to passions and pleasures, the doxography suggests instead that prudence advises the wise how best to indulge these desires, according to the occasion that presents itself, even against standard social conventions ordering the relations of the common population. Hence, although this latter Cyrenaic places more emphasis on the virtues than his predecessors, and they are not strictly instrumental, they have much the same relationship to the good life as they do for Epicurus, as inseparable partial-constituents of a wise and joyous character. 

Theodorus also expands upon the illusive civic position of Aristippus and proclaims that the whole World is his country. We also see him argue in favour of pursuing relations with courtesans, and explain that the proper use of beauty is to be enjoyed, in every sense of that term. On this account Theodorus claims that the foolish multitude cause their own grief — they are ignorant regarding how, when, and even if to indulge their desires. Instead, ordinary people base their beliefs on general consensus, lacking trust in their own judgement, missing the virtues of prudence and justice, and thus failing to achieve any lasting happiness. The Theodorean pupil, on the other hand, is perceptive and sensitive to all relevant factors, skilled in handling diverse situations, adaptable to circumstances, and able to indulge his will freely as a result. 

Theodorus’ autarchy also resulted in controversial views toward friendship, which he asserts does not exist among the wise themselves, the foolish themselves, or between these groups. The wise are self-sufficient (autarkis), and thus do not require friends. The so-called “friendship” of the foolish, on the other hand, is based on need or use, and when this departs, so too does the friendship — such an empty relationship is not even truly deserving of the name. This attitude signifies a radical departure, not only from orthodox Cyrenaicism, but particularly from the doctrines of Anniceris. This self-aggrandising attitude finds even greater expression in the behaviour which earned Theodorus his iconic appellation. 

The New God:

Contrary to Theodorus’ title as “ho atheos”, it’s unlikely, based on the testimony remaining, that Theodorus positively denied the existence of the Gods in the modern sense of the term, though no doubt he severely undermined the popular opinion, and was likely sufficiently skeptical to earn the epithet. Due to the comments of Diogenes relating the content of Epicurus’ theology to that of Theodorus, and the observation from Plutarch that Theodorus “the godless” only seems to imply that, whatever the gods may be, they are not imperishable, we may suspect a more nuanced position. We also have another humorous anecdote related by Diogenes Laërtius which could indicate some level of belief:

Mithras, the king's minister, standing by [said], “It seems that you can ignore not only gods but kings as well,” Theodorus replied, “How can you say that I ignore the gods when I regard you as hateful to the gods?”

More relevant to our purposes here, however, and what inspired the title of this post, is the interesting symmetry regarding the two titles which designate Theodorus in our sources. Although he is commonly referred to as “the Atheist”, or “the Godless”, he is also known by another name, allegedly resulting from this exchange with Stilpo of Megara: 

He appears to have been called θεός (god) in consequence of the following argument addressed to him by Stilpo. “Are you, Theodorus, what you declare yourself to be?” To this he assented, and Stilpo continued, “And do you say you are god?” To this he agreed. “Then it follows that you are god.” Theodorus accepted this, and Stilpo said with a smile, “But, you rascal, at this rate you would allow yourself to be a jackdaw and ten thousand other things.”

In a case of apparent auto-proclamation, Theodorus declared himself to actually be a god, though this clearly should not be taken literally. In an earlier post I have collected the anecdotes which relate Theodorus’ comparison of himself to Greek heroes, and this seems to be a further instance of self-aggrandisement from the unusually pugnacious Cyrenaic, perhaps a further expression of autarchy and joyful self-assurance, no doubt with an overflowing sense of superiority not unlike the classic Grecian virtue of Pride.

Conclusion:

When it comes to what we should make of the foregoing, I’d recommend exercising caution in approaching the innovations of Theodorus. For all his boisterousness and intrigue as a provocative character, I find it incredibly unlikely that this man of Cyrene actually found the kind of joy most of us would wish to possess. With that said, there are elements of Theodorus’ confident expression, self-assurance, and intellectual modifications which can serve as an inspiration for the modern Cyrenaic, particularly in regards to increasing the emphasis on achieving abiding happiness while pursuing particular pleasurable experiences. Overall, I certainly would not recommend adopting Theodorus’ egotistical, aggressive, and frankly insolent approach, not to mention his outright rejection of friendship — in all this we find an excess of dialectical sophisms which undermine the achievement and appreciation of pleasurable experiences — but, as always, we may pick the flowers while not eating of the fruit, and for this purpose, Theodorus offers an engaging viewing experience. 

Credit Where It Is Due: Tracing the Cyrenaic Origin of Key Ideas

Recently, I read Roderick T. Long’s excellent monograph Reason and Value: Aristotle Versus Rand, which offers a comparative analysis of Ayn Rand’s foundationalist theory of truth to the coherentism of the Peripatetics, and explores how this understanding relates to her ethical standard. Perhaps I shall have more to say about this text in the future, but something entirely orthogonal came to my attention in the process of reading, because Long quotes a phrase attributed to Aristotle by Diogenes Laërtius which possesses remarkable similarity to another pronounced by Aristippus. Compare, 

When asked what advantage he had ever gained for himself from philosophy, Aristotle said, “That I do, without being subject to compulsion, what some do through fear of the laws”. 

With, 

Being once asked what advantage philosophers have, he [Aristippus] replied, “Should all laws be repealed, we shall go on living as we do now.”

Now, there’s nothing particularly unusual about this apparent repetition, and although Aristippus was Aristotle’s older contemporary, which may indicate a certain direction of influence, it is possible that both statements are original, or apocryphal, and such retellings with different characters abound in the doxography. Nevertheless, this incident had me contemplating just how many interesting strains of thought seem to originate with, or significantly evolve from, the Cyrenaic philosophers, and how dreadfully uncredited their influences remains to this day. To take just one example, every casual Greek philosophy enthusiast knows of Diogenes the Cynic, and among many other tidbits, he is generally considered a pioneer of cosmopolitanism. And yet, Aristippus of Cyrene is famously depicted by Xenophanes rebutting the false dichotomy of Socrates thusly (underlining for emphasis is my own), 

[Soc]: you are yourself a Hellene—which among Hellenes enjoy the happier existence, think you, the dominant or the subject states? [Ar.] Nay, I would have you to understand that I am just as far from placing myself in the ranks of slavery; there is, I take it, a middle path between the two which it is my ambition to tread, avoiding rule and slavery alike; it lies through freedom—the high road which leads to happiness. [Soc.] True, if only your path could avoid human beings, as it avoids rule and slavery, there would be something in what you say. But being placed as you are amidst human beings, if you purpose neither to rule nor to be ruled, and do not mean to dance attendance, if you can help it, on those who rule, you must surely see that the stronger have an art to seat the weaker on the stool of repentance both in public and in private, and to treat them as slaves. I daresay you have not failed to note this common case: a set of people has sown and planted, whereupon in comes another set and cuts their corn and fells their fruit-trees, and in every way lays siege to them because, though weaker, they refuse to pay them proper court, till at length they are persuaded to accept slavery rather than war against their betters. And in private life also, you will bear me out, the brave and powerful are known to reduce the helpless and cowardly to bondage, and to make no small profit out of their victims. [Ar.] Yes, but I must tell you I have a simple remedy against all such misadventures. I do not confine myself to any single civil community. I roam the wide world a foreigner.

What Aristippus is describing, again as the elder contemporary, is that selfsame cosmopolitanism, the consideration of the whole world as one’s country, that Diogenes of Sinope more famously advocates — and yet who knows of this? 

When we move to better-known territory, Epicurus’ debt to Aristippus and the Cyrenaics is generally admitted, but even here the scope is severely overlooked. The general impression given is that Epicurus and Aristippus share only the superficial similarity of regarding the ethical end to be pleasure, by which terminology they really mean very different things, and that is where the comparison dries up, though generosity dictates acknowledging the first Greek hedonists for completeness’ sake before promptly moving on. 

I have already written a seperate post comparing key Epicurean ideas with close (or at least, closer than one would imagine) parallels found among Aristippus and the orthodox Cyrenaics. One major idea that the Cyrenaics supply the Epicureans is commonly referred to as The Cradle Argument, wherein the instinctive, natural, uncorrupted desires of infants and animals is taken as good evidence for the proper values of man, and an arch example of Nature supplying the norm. If you research this topic, you will find sources citing Epicureans, Stoics, perhaps even mention of Eudoxus, but in fact, according to Diognes Laërtius, the Cyrenaics actually pioneered this argument, claiming that “a proof that pleasure is the end is that we are favorably inclined to it without deliberate choice from childhood”, and as further evidence, “pleasure is satisfying to all animals, and pain is repellent”. Laërtius also claims that Epicurus’ infamous understanding of the Gods, that is, his denial of the common myths, was largely inspired by the book On the Gods by the later Cyrenaic philosopher Theodorus the Atheist. This is not to mention the tempering, pro-social influence of Anniceris, whose exaltation of friendship, more than any other predecessor, resemble the mature ethics of Epicurus. 

Much more could be said on this topic, but I plan instead to create a follow-up post in the future simply highlighting some key ideas introduced by the Cyrenaics in an effort to ground a foundation for practice and belief, without taking too much effort to chase down the influential flow-on effects. 

Why a “New” Cyrenaicism?

It may interest some readers to know why we may adopt a “new” Cyrenaicism, and what is intended by this modifying adjective. I have in mind three distinct, yet entangled, reasons for adopting the label, and I’ll proceed from least to most essential. 

1. Walter Pater: 

It is no secret that my philosophical project is highly influenced by the aestheticism of Walter Pater, who dedicated a chapter in his historical novel Marius: The Epicurean to describing the protagonist’s ideological wrestling with quasi-hedonistic sensibilities and strong religio-moral intuitions, and he titled this important section “New Cyrenaicism”. Pater creatively reinterprets Cyrenaic doctrines to serve his narrative purposes, and in so doing, breathes new life and meaning into what is commonly regarded as a rather empty-headed sophistical movement. Although the popular shallow impression of Cyrenaicism is false, Marius’ complex adaptation of philosophical ideas nevertheless struck a chord with me, due not only to shared aesthetic concerns, but also because Pater builds up from the basic foundational principles of the ancient school while widening the scope of interest to address then-contemporary Victorian moral issues. Such a move is not only interesting and engaging, I believe it is also necessary, for reasons I will explore in the following sections. Moreover, when we investigate the evolution of Cyrenaicism in Greece, we find that this practice of creative reinterpretation was also a common historical process, with the schools of Theodorus, Anniceris, and Hegesias marking significant departures from the orthodox philosophy of the Metrodidact. For these inspirational reasons, I decided that New Cyrenaic was an appropriate label for my philosophic foundations, although my interests are significantly wider than Pater’s.

2. Modern Updates: 

Ancient Cyrenaicism died out somewhere in the 3rd Century BCE, and although the basic philosophical commitments remain timeless, our modern context calls for a fresh perspective on the Good Life, a re-evaluation of what is possible to us, and countless additional questions of application. In addition to surveying the situation afresh, there has also been incredible, revolutionary intellectual progress made in the intervening years. Our understanding of ourselves and the world around us is far superior to that of the Ancients, and we must adapt ourselves accordingly. We also face social, cultural, scientific, and interpersonal situations that Aristippus and his descendants could never have imagined. It would not only be ludicrous to dogmatically restrict our scope to that which interested early Cyrenaics, it would also be diametrically opposed to the core spirit of Cyrenaic practice. Although we do follow the foundational attitude of our philosophical ancestors, applying these insights to modern challenges requires significant interpretive development. Due to the requirements of an updated outlook, it is fitting to call our Cyrenaicism comparatively “new”. 

3. Philosophical Expansion:

Cyrenaic philosophy, while incredibly useful and clarifying as a foundational basis, is admittedly limited, which is both a strength and a weakness. Due to the main concerns of the original Cyrenaics, revolving around pragmatic ethical guidance, philosophical inquiry itself remained quite bare, and even the epistemology is comparatively underdeveloped. If we understand that the proper goal of life is not theoretical speculation, but engagement with the world in pursuit of happiness, we see that this emphasis of attention is both appropriate and necessary. Nevertheless, while this focus prevents idealistic dead-ends, and was not unusual for the early Greek context in which it appeared, philosophical theory has also developed significantly since the early Cyrenaics were active, and provides an opportunity to gain greater clarity and precision over our foundational commitments. We must also operate within the current theoretical paradigm, which contains far more precise terminology, original and updated argumentative styles, and a whole cast of competitive challengers. Even the systems that sprung up with near-contemporaries, such as those of the Academy, the Lyceum, or the Garden, offered a more sophisticated approach to systematising and justifying beliefs, and lacking a familiarity with other philosophical schools can place us at a disadvantage and cloud our judgement. In addition, while we could continue to fight the ghost of dead enemies, it is not really modern Stoics, Peripatetics, or Epicureans that we should be worried about critiquing, as the old Cyrenaics may have been. In today’s climate, these groups are better counted as allies, such is the shift of context and beliefs. Arriving at a deeper understanding of our own situation also provides practical and experiential benefits, both proactive and defensive. For this reason, the final goal of this project is to strengthen Cyrenaic philosophy through dialogue with other philosophical movements, while conducting an expansive and reconstructive investigation into the basic principles, in an effort to approach Cyrenaicism on an updated footing and enhance the ethical guidance this philosophy can supply, which is the true fruit of inquiry.

Dale Carnegie - How To Win Friends and Influence People - NOTES

As part of my pursuit of self-development in the realms of sociability and communication, I recently read Dale Carnegie’s popular handbook How to Win Friends and Influence People. My overall impression is that the consensus opinion of the content here is both overblown and overrated. I failed to find either the manipulation-manual or the people-pleasing pocketbook which reviewers often allude to, no doubt due to the general rule according to which the stronger impression grows in the most genial soil already found there. Instead, this is a fairly basic book of communication skills, especially useful for managing prickly people. The lack of objective backing for any of the claims made by Carnegie renders the information highly dubious, although it appeals to popular anecdotes, business experiences, and common sense for the most part. As far as it goes, there are some interesting, useful principles to keep in mind for smoothing communication in various relationship. These notes distill the essence of the book and serve as a useful reminder of the recommended techniques. I would advise against rigidly adopting any of what follows as a matter of habit or personality, against Carnegie own recommendation in the introduction, and instead, I would treat these observations as a tool-box with potential applicability, to consider in situations where ordinary people-skills fall short. 

Fundamental Techniques in Handling People:

PRINCIPLE 1: Don’t criticize, condemn or complain.

Instead of condemning people, let’s try to understand them. Let’s try to figure out why they do what they do. That’s a lot more profitable and intriguing than criticism, and it breeds sympathy, tolerance and kindness. “To know all is to forgive all.”

As Dr. Johnson said, “God himself, sir, does not propose to judge man until the end of his days.” Why should you and I?

PRINCIPLE 2: Give honest and sincere appreciation.

We nourish the bodies of our children and friends and employees, but how seldom do we nourish their self-esteem? We provide them with roast beef and potatoes to build energy, but we neglect to give them kind words of appreciation that would sing in their memories for years like the music of the morning stars.

Some of the things most people want include:

1. Health and the preservation of life.

2. Food.

3. Sleep.

4. Money and the things money will buy.

5. Life in the hereafter.

6. Sexual gratification.

7. The well-being of our children.

8. A feeling of importance.

Almost all these wants are usually gratified—all except one. But there is one longing—almost as deep, almost as imperious, as the desire for food or sleep—which is seldom gratified. It is what Freud calls “the desire to be great.” It is what Dewey calls the “desire to be important”.

In our interpersonal relations we should never forget that all our associates are human beings and hunger for appreciation. It is the legal tender that all souls enjoy. Try leaving a friendly trail of little sparks of gratitude on your daily trips.

PRINCIPLE 3: Arouse in the other person an eager want.

If out of reading this book you get just one thing—an increased tendency to think always in terms of other people’s point of view, and see things from their angle—if you get that one thing out of this book, it may easily prove to be one of the building blocks of your career.

Six Ways to Make People Like You:

PRINCIPLE 1: Become genuinely interested in other people.

Alfred Adler, the famous Viennese psychologist, wrote a book entitled What Life Should Mean to You. In that book he says, “It is the individual who is not interested in his fellow men who has the greatest difficulties in life and provides the greatest injury to others. It is from among such individuals that all human failures spring.”

PRINCIPLE 2: Smile.

The chairman of the board of directors of one of the largest rubber companies ‘in the United States told me that, according to his observations, people rarely succeed at anything unless they have fun doing it. This industrial leader doesn’t put much faith in the old adage that hard work alone is the magic key that will unlock the door to our desires, “I have known people,” he said, “who succeeded because they had a rip-roaring good time conducting their business. Later, I saw those people change as the fun became work. The business had grown dull, they lost all joy in it, and they failed.”

Act as if you were already happy, and that will tend to make you happy. Here is the way the psychologist and philosopher William James put it:

“Action seems to follow feeling, but really action and feeling go together; and by regulating the action, which is under the more direct control of the will, we can indirectly regulate the feeling, which is not. “Thus the sovereign voluntary path to cheerfulness, if our cheerfulness be lost, is to sit up cheerfully and to act and speak as if cheerfulness were already there...”

Thought is supreme. Preserve a right mental attitude—the attitude of courage, frankness, and good cheer. To think rightly is to create. All things come through desire and every sincere prayer is answered. We become like that on which our hearts are fixed. Carry your chin in and the crown of your head high. We are gods in the chrysalis.

PRINCIPLE 3: Remember that a person’s name is to that person the sweetest and most important sound in any language.

We should be aware of the magic contained in a name and realize that this single item is wholly and completely owned by the person with whom we are dealing and nobody else. The name sets the individual apart; it makes him or her unique among all others. The information we are imparting or the request we are making takes on a special importance when we approach the situation with the name of the individual. From the waitress to the senior executive, the name will work magic as we deal with others.

PRINCIPLE 4: Be a good listener. Encourage others to talk about themselves.

If you aspire to be a good conversationalist, be an attentive listener. To be interesting, be interested. Ask questions that other persons will enjoy answering. Encourage them to talk about themselves and their accomplishments.

PRINCIPLE 5: Talk in terms of the other person’s interests.

PRINCIPLE 6: Make the other person feel important—and do it sincerely.

If we are so contemptibly selfish that we can’t radiate a little happiness and pass on a bit of honest appreciation without trying to get something out of the other person in return—if our souls are no bigger than sour crab apples, we shall meet with the failure we so richly deserve. Oh yes, I did want something out of that chap. I wanted something priceless. And I got it. I got the feeling that I had done something for him without his being able to do anything whatever in return for me. That is a feeling that flows and sings in your memory lung after the incident is past.

There is one all-important law of human conduct. If we obey that law, we shall almost never get into trouble. In fact, that law, if obeyed, will bring us countless friends and constant happiness. But the very instant we break the law, we shall get into endless trouble. The law is this: Always make the other person feel important. John Dewey, as we have already noted, said that the desire to be important is the deepest urge in human nature; and William James said, “The deepest principle in human nature is the craving to be appreciated.” As I have already pointed out, it is this urge that differentiates us from the animals. It is this urge that has been responsible for civilization itself.

You don’t have to wait until you are ambassador to France or chairman of the Clambake Committee of your lodge before you use this philosophy of appreciation. You can work magic with it almost every day.

If, for example, the waitress brings us mashed potatoes when we have ordered French fries, let’s say, “I’m sorry to trouble you, but I prefer French fries.” She’ll probably reply, “No trouble at all” and will be glad to change the potatoes, because we have shown respect for her.

Little phrases such as “I’m sorry to trouble you,” “Would you be so kind as to...?” “Won't you please?” “Would you mind?” “Thank you”—little courtesies like these oil the cogs of the monotonous grind of everyday life—and, incidentally, they are the hallmark of good breeding.

Emerson said, “Every man I meet is my superior in some way. In that, I learn of him.”

How to Win People to Your Way of Thinking:

PRINCIPLE 1: The only way to get the best of an argument is to avoid it.

PRINCIPLE 2: Show respect for the other person’s opinions. Never say, “You're wrong.”

Don’t argue with your customer or your spouse or your adversary. Don’t tell them they are wrong, don’t get them stirred up. Use a little diplomacy.

PRINCIPLE 3: If you are wrong, admit it quickly and emphatically.

When we are right, let’s try to win people gently and tactfully to our way of thinking, and when we are wrong—and that will be surprisingly often, if we are honest with ourselves—let’s admit our mistakes quickly and with enthusiasm. Not only will that technique produce astonishing results; but, believe it or not, it is a lot more fun, under the circumstances, than trying to defend oneself.

PRINCIPLE 4: Begin in a friendly way.

PRINCIPLE 5: Get the other person saying “yes, yes”, immediately.

Socrates, “the gadfly of Athens,” was one of the greatest philosophers the world has ever known. He did something that only a handful of men in all history have been able to do: he sharply changed the whole course of human thought; and now, twenty-four centuries after his death, he is honored as one of the wisest persuaders who ever influenced this wrangling world.

His method? Did he tell people they were wrong? Oh, no, not Socrates. He was far too adroit for that. His whole technique, now called the ‘Socratic method’, was based upon getting a “yes, yes” response. He asked questions with which his opponent would have to agree. He kept on winning one admission after another until he had an armful of yeses. He kept on asking questions until finally, almost without realizing it, his opponents found themselves embracing a conclusion they would have bitterly denied a few minutes previously.

The next time we are tempted to tell someone he or she is wrong, let’s remember old Socrates and ask a gentle question—a question that will get the “yes, yes” response.

PRINCIPLE 6: Let the other person do a great deal of the talking.

PRINCIPLE 7: Let the other person feel that the idea is his or hers.

Ralph Waldo Emerson in his essay “Self-Reliance” stated, “In every work of genius we recognize our own rejected thoughts; they come back to us with a certain alienated majesty.”

PRINCIPLE 8: Try honestly to see things from the other person’s point of view.

If, as a result of reading this book, you get only one thing—an increased tendency to think always in terms of the other person’s point of view, and see things from that person’s angle as well as your own - if you get only that one thing from this book, it may easily prove to be one of the stepping stones of your career.

“Stop a minute,” says Kenneth M. Goode in his book How to Turn People Into Gold, “stop a minute to contrast your keen interest in your own affairs with your mild concern about anything else. Realize then, that everybody else in the world feels exactly the same way! Then, along with Lincoln and Roosevelt, you will have grasped the only solid foundation for interpersonal relationships; namely, that success in dealing with people depends on a sympathetic grasp of the other persons’ viewpoint.”

PRINCIPLE 9: Be sympathetic with the other person’s ideas and desires.

PRINCIPLE 10: Appeal to the nobler motives.

PRINCIPLE 11: Dramatize your ideas.

PRINCIPLE 12: Throw down a challenge.

I have never found,” said Harvey S. Firestone, founder of the great Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, “that pay and pay alone would either bring together or hold good people. I think it was the game itself.”

Frederic Herzberg, one of the great behavorial scientists, concurred. He studied in depth the work attitudes of thousands of people ranging from factory workers to senior executives. What do you think he found to be the most motivating factor—the one facet of the jobs that was most stimulating? Money? Good working conditions? Fringe benefits? No, not any of those. The one major factor that motivated people was the work itself. If the work was exciting and interesting, the worker looked forward to doing it and was motivated to do a good job.

That is what every successful person loves: the game. The chance for self-expression. The chance to prove his or her worth, to excel, to win. That is what makes foot-races and hog-calling and pie-eating contests. The desire to excel. The desire for a feeling of importance.

How To Change People Without Giving Offence Or Arousing Resentment:

PRINCIPLE 1: Begin with praise and honest appreciation.

PRINCIPLE 2: Call attention to people’s mistakes indirectly.

PRINCIPLE 3: Talk about your own mistakes before criticizing the other person.

PRINCIPLE 4: Ask questions instead of giving direct orders.

PRINCIPLE 5: Let the other person save face.

Even if we are right and the other person is definitely wrong, we only destroy ego by causing someone to lose face. The legendary French aviation pioneer and author Antoine de Saint-Exupéry wrote: "I have no right to say or do anything that diminishes a man in his own eyes. What matters is not what I think of him, but what he thinks of himself. Hurting a man in his dignity is a crime.”

PRINCIPLE 6: Praise the slightest improvement and praise every improvement. Be “hearty in your approbation and lavish in your praise.”

Everybody likes to be praised, but when praise is specific, it comes across as sincere—not something the other person may be saying just to make one feel good.

Remember, we all crave appreciation and recognition, and will do almost anything to get it. But nobody wants insincerity. Nobody wants flattery.

Listen to these sage words from William James, one of the most distinguished psychologists and philosophers America has ever produced: “Compared with what we ought to be, we are only half awake. We are making use of only a small part of our physical and mental resources. Stating the thing broadly, the human individual thus lives far within his limits. He possesses powers of various sorts which he habitually fails to use.”

PRINCIPLE 7: Give the other person a fine reputation to live up to.

“The average person,” said Samuel Vauclain, then president of the Baldwin Locomotive Works, "can be led readily if you have his or her respect and if you show that you respect that person for some kind of ability.”

In short, if you want to improve a person in a certain aspect, act as though that particular trait were already one of his or her outstanding characteristics. Shakespeare said, “Assume a virtue, if you have it not.” And it might be well to assume and state openly that other people have the virtue you want them to develop. Give them a fine reputation to live up to, and they will make prodigious efforts rather than see you disillusioned.

PRINCIPLE 8: Use encouragement. Make the fault seem easy to correct.

PRINCIPLE 9: Make the other person happy about doing the thing you suggest.

The effective leader should keep the following guidelines in mind when it is necessary to change attitudes or behavior:

1. Be sincere. Do not promise anything that you cannot deliver. Forget about the benefits to yourself and concentrate on the benefits to the other person.

2. Know exactly what it is you want the other person to do.

3. Be empathetic. Ask yourself what is it the other person really wants.

4. Consider the benefits that person will receive from doing what you suggest.

5. Match those benefits to the other person’s wants.

6. When you make your request, put it in a form that will convey to the other person the idea that he personally will benefit. 

Happy Heroism

At first, it may seem unintuitive to consider heroic and godlike the Cyrenaic life of leisure, pleasure, ease, and comfort. The doxographical and historical material of Greek hedonism, however, makes a compelling case that the life of a happy and self-sufficient wiseman is most truly deserving of immortal depiction, and considered to be of far higher value than that of an ordinary existence. My touchstone examples are Aristippus the Elder, Hegesias the Death Persuader, Theodorus the Atheist, and Epicurus of Samos, each of which invokes imagery pulled from a shared background of Greek Mythos, Heroic Codes, or comparisons to Divinity, in order to illustrate their ethical achievements. This practice of casting ethical sages in heroic roles offers both a form of aesthetic idealism and provides examples of attitudinal embodiment, each powerful motivational tools for the attainment of successful living. 

By way of further explanation as to the historical importance and relevance of such an investigation, scholar Kurt Lampe points out the importance of the cultural background against which Greek ethicists pushed to restructure fellow citizens and their political organization, which illuminates the context of shared values from which these innovations emerged:

One of the striking features of most Greek philosophy is its aspiration to rebuild its practitioners from the “bare self ” up—to determine what is universally good and desirable, and to reorganize life and society based on this determination. But modern philosophers have rightly argued that the bare self is a fantasy; selfhood is largely constituted by libidinal, evaluative, and narrative orientations, which can only be altered gradually and piecemeal. (2017).

Building from this assumption, we find that the overwhelming proto-ethical influence on Athenian philosophy was handed down by earlier poetical mythology: 

…one complex of values that will prove illuminating in this study revolves around masculine competition and honor. This complex finds its most influential expression in Homer, whose epics The Iliad and The Odyssey precede Cyrenaicism by several hundred years. Homer’s enormous influence on subsequent Greek culture is well indicated by the claim in Plato’s Republic that “this poet educated Greece” (606e). The capacity of so-called “heroic values” to shed light on classical Greek culture has recently been demonstrated in studies of both Socratic philosophy and Athenian legal procedure. Closely related to this are other features of Homeric ethics and its descendants in lyric and tragic poetry, which will help to fill in the background behind otherwise puzzling Cyrenaic beliefs or behavior. (Lampe, 2017).

Aristippus the Elder: 

There are several versions of a common anecdote which demonstrates Aristippus’ valuation of his virtuous character and pleasant life in relation to others, which recalls the self-estimation of Odysseus: 

Once when [Aristippus] was sailing to Corinth and was caught in a storm it happened that he became upset. Someone said, “We common people weren’t afraid, but you philosophers acted like cowards!” “Well,” he answered, “we aren’t contending for the same kind of soul!” (D.L. 2.71).

 “…he replied that of course the other hadn’t been terribly worried about the soul of a totally worthless loser [nequissimi nebulonis], but he was afraid for the soul of Aristippus!” (Aulus Gellius, Noct. Att. 19.1.1 = SSR 4a.49).

According to Aelian, Aristippus’s response to his fellow sailor is, “Naturally [I was afraid]! After all, your concern and risk just now involved an unhappy life, but mine involved a happy one” (VH 9.20).

In his book The Birth of Hedonism, Kurt Lampe suggests that the adaptability and sociability of Aristuppus is reminiscent of the “hero’s cunning” familiar from Homeric epics. 

This social cunning blends into temperance as Diogenes’ testimony proceeds, beginning with the statement that Aristippus “always dealt successfully with whatever happened.” The phrase “deal successfully” (eu diatithemenos) implies active manipulation of the situation, which might require charm, quick-wittedness, and courage. But we are also drifting into the domain of temperance, the function of which is to keep before the mind’s eye what really matters and what does not. One reason Aristippus makes such good use of available opportunities, this passage hints, is because he knows that most situations offer some pleasures. This hint is corroborated by the very next clause, which says that Aristippus enjoys what is present and does not worry about what is absent…It is only by understanding emotionally and intellectually what matters and knowing that one has the capacity to secure these goods that anyone can really focus on the present. (Lampe, 2017).

As mentioned in the introductory paragraph, it may appear that the lifestyle advocated by Cyrenaics would be difficult to romanticize as explicitly heroic, however, such comparisons are not unusual for iconoclastic philosophical thinkers of this period: 

It may seem audacious to compare Aristippus with Odysseus, but we will see below that this comparison occurs more than once in our ancient evidence ([Plut.] Vit. Hom. 2.150 = SSR 4a.55, D.L. 2.79–80 [twice]). Moreover, the shipwreck anecdote we have just encountered recalls Odysseus’s shipwreck on Phaeacia, just as the overwhelming impression Aristippus makes on the Rhodians recalls Odysseus’s impression on the Phaeacians (whose young men he defeats in athletic competition, and whose king offers him the princess’s hand in marriage [Od. 7–8]). More generally, heroic posturing is a common element in Greek philosophizing. As [Angela] Hobbs has convincingly shown, Plato’s dialogues contain an extended rumination on the allure and psychology of Homeric heroes and an attempt to represent philosophers like Socrates as alternative role models. Heroic motifs are also scattered throughout many Stoic and Epicurean texts…(2017).

Hegesias the Death Persuader: 

While Hegesias is a pessimist and diverges sharply from the eudaemonic telos of orthodox Cyrenaicism, his allusions to heroism are instructive, particularly for understanding the later comments and actions of someone like Theodorus. Hegesias believes that, 

The wise person will do everything for his own sake, because he considers no one equal to himself in worth. For even if he seems to receive the greatest profit from someone, it isn’t equivalent to what he himself provides. (D.L. 2.95)

The Hegesiac sage also displays powerful levels of magnanimity, due to their ethical superiority:

errors receive forgiveness. For a person does not err voluntarily, but because he is coerced by some passion. And ‹they› won’t hate, but will rather share ‹their› teaching” (D.L. 2.95). 

Theodorus the Atheist:

Theodorus famously displays his courage and superiority in a collection of oft-repeated anecdotes, not to mention his disregard for the danger inherent in impious suggestions, which won him the designation of ho atheos. Cicero’s renditions of Theodorus’ strength in the face of powerful figures will suffice to illustrate his attitude:

[VERSION 1] When Lysimachus was threatening Theodorus with death, he said, “It’s really a mighty thing you’ve accomplished, if you’ve acquired the power of the cantharis beetle! (Cic. Tusc. 5.117 = SSR 4h.7)

[VERSION 2] Shouldn’t we admire Theodorus of Cyrene? When king Lysimachus threatened him with torture, he replied, “Direct your threats to these luxuriously dressed friends of yours; it makes no difference to Theodorus whether he rots under ground or above it!” (Cic. Tusc. 1.102 = SSR 4h.8)

Philo also describes occasions where Theodorus personally compared himself to Homeric heroes in order to explain the true cause of his prior expulsions from Cyrene and Athens: 

The story goes that when Theodorus, nicknamed the Atheist, had been exiled from Athens and came to Lysimachus, an official mocked him for his flight and listed its causes: that he had been exiled on account of con- demnation for atheism and corruption of the youth. “I wasn’t exiled,” he replied. “The same thing happened to me as to Zeus’ son Heracles. He too was offloaded by the Argonauts, not because he did anything wrong, but because all by himself he was a full load and ballast and weighed them down. So he made his fellow sailors afraid the boat would fill with water. I changed residence for the same reason. The citizens of Athens couldn’t keep up with the profundity and magnitude of my thought, and they also envied me.” Then Lysimachus asked, “And were you also exiled from your own country because of envy?” And he answered, “Not because of envy, but because of the excesses of my nature, which my country couldn’t accommodate. Just like when Semele was pregnant with Dionysus, she couldn’t carry him for the defined time until his birth; but Zeus, struck with fear, extracted the fruit of her womb before its time, and made him equal in honor to the gods. In the same way some deity or god raised me up and decided to send me as a colonist to a better place, Athens, because my own country was too narrow to receive such a mass of philosophical wisdom.” (Quod omn. bon. lib. 127–30 = SSR 4h.9)

Diogenes Laertius also relates a dialogue between Theordorus and Stilpo, illustrating Theodorus’ sly wit and an apparent proclamation of self-deification: 

“Are you, Theodorus, what you declare yourself to be?” To this he assented, and Stilpo continued, “And do you say you are god?” To this he agreed. “Then it follows that you are god.” Theodorus accepted this, and Stilpo said with a smile, “But, you rascal, at this rate you would allow yourself to be a jackdaw and ten thousand other things.”

Epicurus of Samos:

There are multiple quotes from Epicurus comparing himself and other members of his school to the Gods and immortals, in order to praise the scope and importance of his teachings. We see an echo of Theodorean influence perhaps, which is all the more plausible considering Diogenes Laertius’ claim that Epicurus’ view on the gods was taken from Thedorus’ book. Some examples of comparisons include:

Vatican Saying 78: "The truly noble man busies himself chiefly with wisdom and friendship, of which the one is an understandable good but the other is immortal."

Go on thy way as immortal, and think of us as immortal too. (Epicurea fragment translated by Bailey).

Meditate then, on all these things, and on those things which are related to them, both day and night, and both alone and with like-minded companions. For if you will do this, you will never be disturbed while asleep or awake by imagined fears, but you will live like a god among men. For a man who lives among immortal blessings is in no respect like a mortal being. (Letter to Menoeceus). 

Norman DeWitt explains that, “Paradoxical as it must seem, Epicurus knows no higher praise than to call a thing immortal; being opposed in this text to understandable, it must mean "passing understanding."” (DeWitt, 1973). Epicurus famously denied the immortality of the soul, and also denied that the Gods interfered with the lives of men. Nevertheless, Epicurus was also somewhat “deified” in his sect, enjoying an immortality of reputation persisting long after his death. 

Sources:

DeWitt, N.W. (1973). Epicurus and His Philosophy. Greenwood Press.

Diogenes Laertius. (1980). Diogenes Laertius : lives of eminent philosophers. Harvard University Press.

Lampe, K. (2017). The Birth of Hedonism - The Cyrenaic Philosophers and Pleasure As a Way of Life. Princeton University Press.

Pillars of Pleasure

Aristippus of Cyrene is famously quoted as stating the following: “The kind of possessions and traveling provisions free men ought to acquire are those which can swim away from a ship-wreck with them.” (Vitruvius, De Arch. 6.1.1). These possessions and provisions are, of course, the values and virtues endowed by proper philosophical education — those characteristics and excellencies of ability which the wise man ought cultivate in order to flourish. Based on my study and understanding of Cyrenaic philosophy, I’d like to offer the following Pillars of Pleasure as best representing the foundational elements which enable, express, and help constitute the pleasant life.

Pillar I - Satisfaction (εὐδοκέω/eudokeo): 

The Cyrenaic ethical project is centered around achieving and maintaining satisfaction through the pursuit and enjoyment of pleasures, so emphasis is placed on savouring pleasant experiences and active appreciation. Peace of mind is essential to maximal enjoyment, and alongside confidence, involves exercising present-focus in order to make the most of what is at hand. Success according to our hedonistic eudaemonism requires taking satisfaction as both the criteria of action and the purpose of living, rendering it the cardinal value of our school. 

Pillar II - Self-Mastery (ἐνκράτεια/enkráteia): 

Self-mastery or self-control, within Cyrenaic ethics, refers to the ability to maintain purposeful awareness and direction over one’s actions. This value forms the bedrock for wisely exercising choice and avoidance (prudence), informed by the fundamental virtue of temperance (disdaining excess), while also underpinning the importance placed on securing internal and external freedom (autonomy), so that we are able to act according to our own sober judgement. The Cyrenaic sage engages in philosophical education and study in order to properly understand the nature of pleasure, self, and world — cutting through attachment and insatiability, thereby transforming actions and outlook in accordance with the correct account while keeping a clear-head.

Pillar III - Confidence (θάρσος/thársos): 

Confidence is a Cyrenaic watchword, appearing multiple times in the doxography, and describes the foundational attitude formed from the reasonable expectation of success, due to an assurance of personal ability and versatility, underpinning the active pursuit of simple pleasures. Confidence is concomitant with the development of the Cyrenaic virtues of adaptability and sociability, dovetailing with the simple accomodation of oneself to the available pleasures most situations easily offer, these being all that is necessary for enjoyment, and the sage masterfully capitalises on any circumstance.

Maximization is Misleading

It’s common to discuss the evaluative metric of hedonic calculus in terms of “maximizing” pleasure and “minimizing” pain, aiming for a situation where, on balance, the agent experiences a greater return in happiness than their investment in effort. While this simplistic picture has its merits, the imprecise language involved could support two erroneous interpretations which, if left unchecked, lead either towards insatiable extravagance, or else, towards reserved timidity, each for the very same reason depending on where the emphasis is placed. 

To tackle the easier error first, the exhortation to “minimize” pain could be, and historically has been, misconstrued as recommending a path of habitual caution and repression, where anything that might cause a measure of discomfort or hurt is routinely avoided, until, at the minimum extreme, it becomes impossible even to survive without enduring some small measure of exertion. This bare minimum, then, is taken to represent absolutely necessary human values, these and these alone are considered sufficient, the resulting state of numb subsistence is slapped with a shiny new name like eudaimonia or tranquility, and anything extra is avoided as deadly poison. “Surely that’s absurd!” you may say, but it is not difficult to find moderate ascetics of widely different stripes who have learned essentially the same clumsy lesson. These men and women rally against striving to achieve any “unnecessary” desires, arguing that, since they cannot mourn the absence, removal, or failure to achieve that which was never prized to begin with, they are also spared the great distress of want, loss, and disappointment. As such, those shrewd individuals systematically trim down their requirements to the bare minimum until what remains is so easily met as to be virtually assured of satisfaction. We may find our examples among the Cynics, Stoics, various mendicant monks, Buddhists, Jainists, Daoists, even some confused Epicureans — history is full of their kind, take your pick. 

Of course, such a program in self-denial is ridiculous and, if anything is unnecessary, certainly we have found it here. In the words of Aristippus, “it is not abstinence from pleasures that is best, but mastery over them without ever being worsted.” These ascetics have simply lost their nerve — they are afraid of the possibility of disappointment; they shy away from comfort, out of fear that it will someday pass and disappoint them with its absence: they abstain from pursuing pleasure, not due to strength of character, but from weakness of spirit. By contrast, Epicurus maintains that just because all pleasures are good in themselves, this does not mean that all pleasures are choice-worthy, and conversely, just because all pains are bad in themselves, this does not mean that all pains are avoidance-worthy. Often, we should choose the painful, difficult, uncomfortable course of action, because it will lead to greater pleasure! But doesn’t this present a problem for an ostensibly hedonistic philosophy? On what basis are we to make our determination in any instance, if the pleasure or pain that it will cause is no longer enough? In fact, hedonic calculus remains the criteria, but as rational beings, we are able to make principled judgements about the expected outcomes of our activity beyond the sliver of a moment, such that we may judge something initially painful as tending to cause more pleasure in the future, and vice-versa for something initially pleasurable. This is the true import of the economy of pleasure, and like good economists, we do not use a single immediate variable as our sole determining factor, we must use general knowledge and principles to predict where the trends are heading in the future, though we can only enjoy them in the present.  

This same argument can be applied to correcting the opposite error, which is to take “maximization” as some cosmic proclamation that only the highest peak-experiences ultimately count, and we should toil to procure greater and greater degrees of excitation. Sure, you may be content relaxing by the beach-side, but could you be doing cocaine instead? Well, consistent hedonism suggests you should! Oh, you are happily married, but wouldn’t a one-night stand or an affair offer extra pleasure? Hey, hedonism says it would! Similar examples are readily deployed as lazy reductio ad absurdum arguments against hedonistic philosophies. On the surface, they have the appearance of compulsion, or at least, they’re often compelling enough for most people to reject hedonism out-of-hand — to laugh it away, or to condemn it as dangerous degeneracy. 

There are two main reasons why these arguments fail to hold up to the least scrutiny. The first is the inverse of the pain-avoidance argument: just because something is pleasurable, or even “more pleasurable”, in the immediate context, does not mean that it ought to be chosen if it will lead to greater pain in the long-run. This is the obvious flaw of the more absurd “maximization” arguments, and even those who proffer them will soon admit the illusion of legitimacy hinges on making an arbitrary insistence of short-sightedness, since the would-be hedonist will clearly be ruined sooner or later if they were to take this code of conduct seriously. How can any so-called “consistent hedonism” recommend a principle of action that will, even at a glance, cause the agent far greater pains than any pleasures gained? Obviously it cannot. The other argument runs in the opposite direction, and involves a misunderstanding regarding what it means to “maximize” one’s pleasure. It is not at all obvious that the cocaine-induced party-lover is actually experiencing “more” pleasure, in the relevant sense, than the leisurely beach-goer, or the studious chemistry student, even setting aside future consequences. What does “in the relevant sense” mean here? It means that the only course rational hedonism actually recommends is the one where, on balance, we experience a greater extent of joy than sorrow over a lifetime. The greater the extent of pleasure experienced, you see —not primarily the “degree” or “amount” — the better. Hence Epicurus summons us to continuous pleasure, not intense pleasure. Any modest level of pleasantness we actively enjoy, and can confidently expect to sustain, while maintaining peace of mind and avoiding bodily stress, is meeting the criteria of our hedonistic program, as guided by the faculties of nature. Within reason, we must add variety and spice, because monotony yields diminishing returns and stagnant habituation, and, as we covered earlier, one ought to take calculated risks or expend their efforts where these will generally add to our enjoyment. But where on earth does this additional duty to endlessly pursue “increase” for its own sake come from? God only knows. 

The surest course for extending pleasurable experience over a lifetime actually recommends exercising temperance, and instructs us to greedily defend certain necessary preconditions for happiness, such as maintaining our self-control, confidence, and satisfaction. By contrast, far from achieving the pleasure he so desires, the insatiable “hedonist” who endlessly seeks after higher thrills, or who feeds a bottomless appetite, is suffering a mental illness which will assure he is never content no matter what he obtains. We can only enjoy pleasantness in the moment, it is not the kind of good that can be stored up, accumulated, saved for later — miss what is present, and it is gone forever. Our avaricious seeker will never stop to enjoy what he so desperately chases. Quite the counter-productive course. Hence, Aristippus teaches us to disdain excess, to dispense with the tiresome business of chasing after empty figments, and instead, to focus our energy on adapting and enjoying present circumstances in the most advantageous manner. 

We Cyrenaics wish only to live as easily and pleasantly as possible, not to ceaselessly crank the dopamine dial to 11 in slavish service to Dionysius, nor again to shrink from any possibility that events may temporarily turn against us, committed to diminishing ourselves first lest the universe do it for us. We deserve better, and can readily achieve it.

Originations and Evolutions: A New Cyrenaic Project

The aim of this post is to situate New Cyrenaicism within its historical context, to highlight the basic influences and convictions which shape our project, and to indicate areas that modern Cyrenaic philosophy ought investigate and perhaps incorporate in order to forge ahead as a considerable life-path worthy of adoption. I want to stress that although Ancient Cyrenaicism and the aestheticism of Walter Pater are primary points of reference for New Cyrenaicism, our defining commitments protest against confinement to rigid dogma and mutual conformity. Exploring an eclectic pastiche which better expresses or elucidates some element of our experience, rendering the practical pursuit of pleasure more effective, is both beneficial and necessary. Philosophical inquiry, scientific investigation, political association, economic prosperity, and countless other factors have dramatically shifted the context within which a New Cyrenaic operates daily, compared to our intellectual ancestors. We live in an atmosphere different indeed from the Victorian era of Pater, how much more so from Ancient Greece? The genealogical probing and expansions which I indicate here do not profess to be definitive nor chronologically accurate. When I note, for example, an affinity between Heraclitean metaphysics and the epistemology of orthodox Cyrenaicism, or suggest that American Pragmatism is especially useful for understanding how conceptions of objects relate to the affections, this should not be read as a conclusive judgement on direct influence, nor as a necessary endorsement for sympathetic Cyrenaics. Rather, these are comments on the silken web of influences that were active at the time of Cyrenaicism’s development, and which have continued spinning to the present day in various forms, with excellent work being done in the meantime, all of which builds upon the meager extant information available. The views expressed here are therefore formed from my own associations, and should be differentiated from those attributable to the Ancient Cyrenaics and to Walter Pater, which I have dealt with elsewhere. Consider these expansions more amenable to the spirit of Cyrenaicism, than to the letter, though my opinion is that there is plenty of consonance to be found. Without further ado…

Basic Commitments:

In a separate post, I have highlighted the distinguishing philosophical commitments of what I call Skeletal Cyrenaicism, by which I mean, the basic foundational beliefs, motivations, and areas of concern for Cyrenaic practitioners. Without reproducing that material here, these can be summarized in more technical terminology as a commitment to the following:

Individual Axiological Eduaimonic Hedonism; Agent-relative Sensual Empiricism; Moderate Purgative Skepticism; Philosophical Education; Confident Adaptability; Tempered Presentism; Social-Mastery; Aesthetic Idealism.

It is from this general perspective that I seek to find both the origination and continuation of Cyrenaic philosophical themes.

Historical Influences:

The following influences are here considered only insofar as the threads of their thought have had a notable influence on the formation or elaboration of the Ancient Cyrenaic position.

Heraclitus of Ephesus: This Ionian pre-Socratic philosopher is responsible for originating evaluative relativity, or perspectivism, which was further explored by the Sophists and thereby transmitted to the Cyrenaics. His emphasis on attending to the waking evidence of a shared reality rather than turning aside into myopic imaginings, and his theory of the Unity of Opposites in terms of brute bi-modal qualities, also suggests proto-empiricism in an adolescent form. 

Protagoras: This famous Sophist’s doctrine that “man is the measure of all things”, his interpretation of sensations in terms of violent or gentle physical motions, and the quasi-skeptical relativity implied by these theories, were hugely influential on Cyrenaic epistemology and found their way, with vital modifications, into the mature scheme of the Metrodidact.

Socrates: The Athenian gadfly was the direct teacher of Aristippus the Elder, founder of the Cyrenaic movement, who learned from his instructive master the value of pleasures, the importance of virtue, formulation of the ethical telos, and the need for greater philosophical rigor.

Epicurus of Samos: Epicurus’s hedonistic philosophy is a later development influenced primarily by Democritean atomism and the philosophy of Cyrenaicism. Although his more sophisticated approach soon supplanted his predecessors almost completely, Epicurus’ explication of certain doctrines, some clearly taken from the school of Aristippus, is enormously helpful for the modern Cyrenaic looking to gain greater understanding than is possible from the meager extant material of his own school. In addition, the criticisms leveled at the early Epicureans by those few orthodox figures who remained loyal to Aristippean beliefs provides an instructive contrast of emphasis.

Pyrrho of Elis: Though the skepticism of the Phyrronists is far more radical than that of the Cyrenaics, some of their arguments are helpful for understanding what threads of thought the orthodox school may have used to defend similar positions. In addition, the formulation of the end as “ataraxia”, though conceived differently than the peace of mind of Aristippus and the limit of pleasure for Epicurus, was nevertheless an influential eudaemonic concept with clear ties to the earlier schools.

Promising Leads:

Aristotelian Virtue Ethics: Aristotle offers an unparalleled survey of fundamental Greek virtues, useful for the modern Cyrenaic who wishes to gain deeper insight into the concept of arete and how best to achieve these, without the post-Christian connotations commonly associated with colloquial usage of the term “virtue”. 

Millsian phenomenalism: J.S. Mill offers an interesting presentation of impressionistic epistemology, including ways to account for matter and objects from a phenomenalist foundation. 

Peircean Pragmatism: C.S. Peirce’s pragmatic maxim offers the most concise method for understanding the content of our conceptions. Peirce’s idiosyncratic objective idealism and philosophical architectonic also provide interesting leads for extending Cyrenaic empiricism.

Ayn Rand’s Objectivism: Ayn Rand’s philosophy offers useful insights across the board for modern Cyrenaics, albeit with fundamentally different underpinnings. Objectivism’s normative ethics and rational approach are particularly instructive.

Friedrich Nietzsche: Nietzsche’s rousing spirit and cutting polemics are perhaps the most important qualities to mine from his corpus, and though he is not a hedonist, the focus on individual efficacy is applicable to our project.

Other Fields:

Biology: Understanding basic biological requirements, surveying human physiological needs, engaging in nutritional analysis, exploring mental health, and generally grasping the naturalistic causes behinds our desires and feelings, all guide the modern hedonist in best supplying himself with those values that are necessary and sufficient for living healthily. 

Psychology: Possessing a basic understanding of psychology aids in self-awareness, self-regulation, and navigating interpersonal relationships. It is advisable to research material on conditions conducive to promoting mental health, civic engagement, and healthy communication. 

Politics: Living in a society with other human beings requires some awareness of the optimal means for regulating our encounters in order to maximise the benefits while mitigating the risks. It is preferable to command a fundamental understanding of the political, economic, and social systems within which your community operates. 

Life Skills: Possessing basic practical knowledge will allow the individual to maintain independence and self-sufficiency, the surest foundation for remaining adaptable and confident. 

Horace on Aristippus

Epistles 1.1:

Original Latin:

Ac ne forte roges quo me duce, quo Lare tuter;
nullius addictus iurare in uerba magistri,
quo me cumque rapit tempestas, deferor hospes.               
Nunc agilis fio et mersor ciuilibus undis,
uirtutis uerae custos rigidusque satelles;
nunc in Aristippi furtim praecepta relabor
et mihi res, non me rebus subiungere conor.

Translation into English by C. Smart:

And lest you should perchance ask under what leader, in what house [of philosophy], I enter myself a pupil: addicted to swear implicitly to the ipse-dixits of no particular master, wherever the weather drives me, I am carried a guest. One while I become active, and am plunged in the waves of state affairs, a maintainer and a rigid partisan of strict virtue; then again I relapse insensibly into Aristippus' maxims, and endeavor to adapt circumstances to myself, not myself to circumstances. 

Epistles 1.17:

Original Latin:

si te grata quies et primam somnus in horam

delectat, si te pulvis strepitusque rotarum,    
si laedit caupona, Ferentinum ire iubebo;     
nam neque divitibus contingunt gaudia solis
nec vixit male, qui natus moriensque fefellit: 
si prodesse tuis pauloque benignius ipsum    
te tractare voles, accedes siccus ad unctum.  
‘si pranderet holus patienter, regibus uti        
nollet Aristippus.’ ‘si sciret regibus uti,         
fastidiret holus, qui me notat.’ utrius horum   
verba probes et facta, doce, vel iunior audi,  
cur sit Aristippi potior sententia. namque     
mordacem Cynicum sic eludebat, ut aiunt:   
‘scurror ego ipse mihi, populo tu: rectius hoc et        
splendidius multo est. equus ut me portet, alat rex,   
officium facio: tu poscis vilia—verum          
dante minor, quamvis fers te nullius egentem.’         
omnis Aristippum decuit color et status et res,         
temptantem maiora, fere praesentibus aequum.        
contra, quem duplici panno patientia velat,    
mirabor, vitae via si conversa decebit.          
alter purpureum non exspectabit amictum,   
quidlibet indutus celeberrima per loca vadet 
personamque feret non inconcinnus utramque;         
alter Mileti textam cane peius et angui           
vitabit chlanidem, morietur frigore, si non    
rettuleris pannum. refer et sine vivat ineptus.

Translation into English by C. Smart:

If pleasant rest, and sleep till seven o'clock, delight you; if dust and the rumbling of wheels, if the tavern offend you, I shall order you off for Ferentinum. For joys are not the property of the rich alone: nor has he lived ill, who at his birth and at his death has passed unnoticed. If you are disposed to be of service to your friends, and to treat yourself with somewhat more indulgence, you, being poor, must pay your respects to the great. Aristippus, if he could dine to his satisfaction on herbs, would never frequent [the tables] of the great. If he who blames me, [replies Aristippus,] knew how to live with the great, he would scorn his vegetables. Tell me, which maxim and conduct of the two you approve; or, since you are my junior, hear the reason why Aristippus' opinion is preferable; for thus, as they report, he baffled the snarling cynic: "I play the buffoon for my own advantage, you [to please] the populace. This [conduct of mine] is better and far more honorable; that a horse may carry and a great man feed me, pay court to the great: you beg for refuse, an inferior to the [poor] giver; though you pretend you are in want of nothing." As for Aristippus, every complexion of life, every station and circumstance sat gracefully upon him, aspiring in general to greater things, yet equal to the present: on the other hand, I shall be much surprised, if a contrary way of life should become [this cynic], whom obstinacy clothes with a double rag. The one will not wait for his purple robe; but dressed in any thing, will go through the most frequented places, and without awkwardness support either character: the other will shun the cloak wrought at Miletus with greater aversion than [the bite of] dog or viper; he will die with cold, unless you restore him his ragged garment; restore it, and let him live like a fool as he is.

Satires 2.3:

Original Latin:

danda est ellebori multo pars maxima avaris:
nescio an Anticyram ratio illis destinet omnem.
heredes Staberi summam incidere sepulcro,
ni sic fecissent, gladiatorum dare centum              
damnati populo paria atque epulum arbitrio Arri,
frumenti quantum metit Africa. 'sive ego prave
seu recte hoc volui, ne sis patruus mihi': credo,
hoc Staberi prudentem animum vidisse. quid ergo
sensit, cum summam patrimoni insculpere saxo              
heredes voluit? quoad vixit, credidit ingens
pauperiem vitium et cavit nihil acrius, ut, si
forte minus locuples uno quadrante perisset,
ipse videretur sibi nequior. 'omnis enim res,
virtus, fama, decus, divina humanaque pulchris              
divitiis parent; quas qui construxerit, ille
clarus erit, fortis, iustus.' 'sapiensne?' 'etiam, et rex
et quidquid volet.' hoc veluti virtute paratum
speravit magnae laudi fore. quid simile isti
Graecus Aristippus? qui servos proicere aurum              
in media iussit Libya, quia tardius irent
propter onus segnes. uter est insanior horum?
nil agit exemplum, litem quod lite resolvit.
siquis emat citharas, emptas conportet in unum,
nec studio citharae nec Musae deditus ulli,               
si scalpra et formas non sutor, nautica vela
aversus mercaturis: delirus et amens
undique dicatur merito. qui discrepat istis,
qui nummos aurumque recondit, nescius uti
conpositis metuensque velut contingere sacrum?               
siquis ad ingentem frumenti semper acervum
porrectus vigilet cum longo fuste neque illinc
audeat esuriens dominus contingere granum
ac potius foliis parcus vescatur amaris;
si positis intus Chii veterisque Falerni               
mille cadis—nihil est: tercentum milibus, acre
potet acetum; age si et stramentis incubet unde-
octoginta annos natus, cui stragula vestis,
blattarum ac tinearum epulae, putrescat in arca:
nimirum insanus paucis videatur, eo quod                
maxima pars hominum morbo iactatur eodem

Translation into English by C. Smart:

By far the largest portion of hellebore is to be administered to the covetous: I know not, whether reason does not consign all Anticyra to their use. The heirs of Staberius engraved the sum [which he left them] upon his tomb: unless they had acted in this manner, they were under an obligation to exhibit a hundred pair of gladiators to the people, beside an entertainment according to the direction of Arrius; and as much corn as is cut in Africa. Whether I have willed this rightly or wrongly, it was my will; be not severe against me, [cries the testator]. I imagine the provident mind of Staberius foresaw this. What then did he moan, when he appointed by will that his heirs should engrave the sum of their patrimony upon his tomb-stone? As long as he lived, he deemed poverty a great vice, and nothing did he more industriously avoid: insomuch that, had he died less rich by one farthing, the more Iniquitous would he have appeared to himself. For every thing, virtue, fame, glory, divine and human affairs, are subservient to the attraction of riches; which whoever shall have accumulated, shall be illustrious, brave, just—What, wise too? Ay, and a king, and whatever else he pleases. This he was in hopes would greatly redound to his praise, as if it had been an acquisition of his virtue. In what respect did the Grecian Aristippus act like this; who ordered his slaves to throw away his gold in the midst of Libya; because, encumbered with the burden, they traveled too slowly? Which is the greater madman of these two? An example is nothing to the purpose, that decides one controversy by creating another. If any person were to buy lyres, and [when he had bought them] to stow them in one place; though neither addicted to the lyre nor to any one muse whatsoever: if a man were [to buy] paring-knives and lasts, and were no shoemaker; sails fit for navigation, and were averse to merchandizing; he every where deservedly be styled delirious, and out of his senses. How does he differ from these, who boards up cash and gold [and] knows not how to use them when accumulated, and is afraid to touch them as if they were consecrated? If any person before a great heap of corn should keep perpetual watch with a long club, and, though the owner of it, and hungry, should not dare to take a single grain from it; and should rather feed upon bitter leaves: if while a thousand hogsheads of Chian, or old Falernian, is stored up within (nay, that is nothing—three hundred thousand), he drink nothing, but what is mere sharp vinegars again—if, wanting but one year of eighty, he should lie upon straw, who has bed-clothes rotting in his chest, the food of worms and moths; he would seem mad, belike, but to few persons: because the greatest part of mankind labors, under the same malady.

Sources:

Horace & Smart, C. (ed.) (2004) The Works of Horace: Translated Literally into English Prose. Cambridge. 

Latin text reproduced according to: http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/hor.html