Dale Carnegie - How To Win Friends and Influence People - NOTES

As part of my pursuit of self-development in the realms of sociability and communication, I recently read Dale Carnegie’s popular handbook How to Win Friends and Influence People. My overall impression is that the consensus opinion of the content here is both overblown and overrated. I failed to find either the manipulation-manual or the people-pleasing pocketbook which reviewers often allude to, no doubt due to the general rule according to which the stronger impression grows in the most genial soil already found there. Instead, this is a fairly basic book of communication skills, especially useful for managing prickly people. The lack of objective backing for any of the claims made by Carnegie renders the information highly dubious, although it appeals to popular anecdotes, business experiences, and common sense for the most part. As far as it goes, there are some interesting, useful principles to keep in mind for smoothing communication in various relationship. These notes distill the essence of the book and serve as a useful reminder of the recommended techniques. I would advise against rigidly adopting any of what follows as a matter of habit or personality, against Carnegie own recommendation in the introduction, and instead, I would treat these observations as a tool-box with potential applicability, to consider in situations where ordinary people-skills fall short. 

Fundamental Techniques in Handling People:

PRINCIPLE 1: Don’t criticize, condemn or complain.

Instead of condemning people, let’s try to understand them. Let’s try to figure out why they do what they do. That’s a lot more profitable and intriguing than criticism, and it breeds sympathy, tolerance and kindness. “To know all is to forgive all.”

As Dr. Johnson said, “God himself, sir, does not propose to judge man until the end of his days.” Why should you and I?

PRINCIPLE 2: Give honest and sincere appreciation.

We nourish the bodies of our children and friends and employees, but how seldom do we nourish their self-esteem? We provide them with roast beef and potatoes to build energy, but we neglect to give them kind words of appreciation that would sing in their memories for years like the music of the morning stars.

Some of the things most people want include:

1. Health and the preservation of life.

2. Food.

3. Sleep.

4. Money and the things money will buy.

5. Life in the hereafter.

6. Sexual gratification.

7. The well-being of our children.

8. A feeling of importance.

Almost all these wants are usually gratified—all except one. But there is one longing—almost as deep, almost as imperious, as the desire for food or sleep—which is seldom gratified. It is what Freud calls “the desire to be great.” It is what Dewey calls the “desire to be important”.

In our interpersonal relations we should never forget that all our associates are human beings and hunger for appreciation. It is the legal tender that all souls enjoy. Try leaving a friendly trail of little sparks of gratitude on your daily trips.

PRINCIPLE 3: Arouse in the other person an eager want.

If out of reading this book you get just one thing—an increased tendency to think always in terms of other people’s point of view, and see things from their angle—if you get that one thing out of this book, it may easily prove to be one of the building blocks of your career.

Six Ways to Make People Like You:

PRINCIPLE 1: Become genuinely interested in other people.

Alfred Adler, the famous Viennese psychologist, wrote a book entitled What Life Should Mean to You. In that book he says, “It is the individual who is not interested in his fellow men who has the greatest difficulties in life and provides the greatest injury to others. It is from among such individuals that all human failures spring.”

PRINCIPLE 2: Smile.

The chairman of the board of directors of one of the largest rubber companies ‘in the United States told me that, according to his observations, people rarely succeed at anything unless they have fun doing it. This industrial leader doesn’t put much faith in the old adage that hard work alone is the magic key that will unlock the door to our desires, “I have known people,” he said, “who succeeded because they had a rip-roaring good time conducting their business. Later, I saw those people change as the fun became work. The business had grown dull, they lost all joy in it, and they failed.”

Act as if you were already happy, and that will tend to make you happy. Here is the way the psychologist and philosopher William James put it:

“Action seems to follow feeling, but really action and feeling go together; and by regulating the action, which is under the more direct control of the will, we can indirectly regulate the feeling, which is not. “Thus the sovereign voluntary path to cheerfulness, if our cheerfulness be lost, is to sit up cheerfully and to act and speak as if cheerfulness were already there...”

Thought is supreme. Preserve a right mental attitude—the attitude of courage, frankness, and good cheer. To think rightly is to create. All things come through desire and every sincere prayer is answered. We become like that on which our hearts are fixed. Carry your chin in and the crown of your head high. We are gods in the chrysalis.

PRINCIPLE 3: Remember that a person’s name is to that person the sweetest and most important sound in any language.

We should be aware of the magic contained in a name and realize that this single item is wholly and completely owned by the person with whom we are dealing and nobody else. The name sets the individual apart; it makes him or her unique among all others. The information we are imparting or the request we are making takes on a special importance when we approach the situation with the name of the individual. From the waitress to the senior executive, the name will work magic as we deal with others.

PRINCIPLE 4: Be a good listener. Encourage others to talk about themselves.

If you aspire to be a good conversationalist, be an attentive listener. To be interesting, be interested. Ask questions that other persons will enjoy answering. Encourage them to talk about themselves and their accomplishments.

PRINCIPLE 5: Talk in terms of the other person’s interests.

PRINCIPLE 6: Make the other person feel important—and do it sincerely.

If we are so contemptibly selfish that we can’t radiate a little happiness and pass on a bit of honest appreciation without trying to get something out of the other person in return—if our souls are no bigger than sour crab apples, we shall meet with the failure we so richly deserve. Oh yes, I did want something out of that chap. I wanted something priceless. And I got it. I got the feeling that I had done something for him without his being able to do anything whatever in return for me. That is a feeling that flows and sings in your memory lung after the incident is past.

There is one all-important law of human conduct. If we obey that law, we shall almost never get into trouble. In fact, that law, if obeyed, will bring us countless friends and constant happiness. But the very instant we break the law, we shall get into endless trouble. The law is this: Always make the other person feel important. John Dewey, as we have already noted, said that the desire to be important is the deepest urge in human nature; and William James said, “The deepest principle in human nature is the craving to be appreciated.” As I have already pointed out, it is this urge that differentiates us from the animals. It is this urge that has been responsible for civilization itself.

You don’t have to wait until you are ambassador to France or chairman of the Clambake Committee of your lodge before you use this philosophy of appreciation. You can work magic with it almost every day.

If, for example, the waitress brings us mashed potatoes when we have ordered French fries, let’s say, “I’m sorry to trouble you, but I prefer French fries.” She’ll probably reply, “No trouble at all” and will be glad to change the potatoes, because we have shown respect for her.

Little phrases such as “I’m sorry to trouble you,” “Would you be so kind as to...?” “Won't you please?” “Would you mind?” “Thank you”—little courtesies like these oil the cogs of the monotonous grind of everyday life—and, incidentally, they are the hallmark of good breeding.

Emerson said, “Every man I meet is my superior in some way. In that, I learn of him.”

How to Win People to Your Way of Thinking:

PRINCIPLE 1: The only way to get the best of an argument is to avoid it.

PRINCIPLE 2: Show respect for the other person’s opinions. Never say, “You're wrong.”

Don’t argue with your customer or your spouse or your adversary. Don’t tell them they are wrong, don’t get them stirred up. Use a little diplomacy.

PRINCIPLE 3: If you are wrong, admit it quickly and emphatically.

When we are right, let’s try to win people gently and tactfully to our way of thinking, and when we are wrong—and that will be surprisingly often, if we are honest with ourselves—let’s admit our mistakes quickly and with enthusiasm. Not only will that technique produce astonishing results; but, believe it or not, it is a lot more fun, under the circumstances, than trying to defend oneself.

PRINCIPLE 4: Begin in a friendly way.

PRINCIPLE 5: Get the other person saying “yes, yes”, immediately.

Socrates, “the gadfly of Athens,” was one of the greatest philosophers the world has ever known. He did something that only a handful of men in all history have been able to do: he sharply changed the whole course of human thought; and now, twenty-four centuries after his death, he is honored as one of the wisest persuaders who ever influenced this wrangling world.

His method? Did he tell people they were wrong? Oh, no, not Socrates. He was far too adroit for that. His whole technique, now called the ‘Socratic method’, was based upon getting a “yes, yes” response. He asked questions with which his opponent would have to agree. He kept on winning one admission after another until he had an armful of yeses. He kept on asking questions until finally, almost without realizing it, his opponents found themselves embracing a conclusion they would have bitterly denied a few minutes previously.

The next time we are tempted to tell someone he or she is wrong, let’s remember old Socrates and ask a gentle question—a question that will get the “yes, yes” response.

PRINCIPLE 6: Let the other person do a great deal of the talking.

PRINCIPLE 7: Let the other person feel that the idea is his or hers.

Ralph Waldo Emerson in his essay “Self-Reliance” stated, “In every work of genius we recognize our own rejected thoughts; they come back to us with a certain alienated majesty.”

PRINCIPLE 8: Try honestly to see things from the other person’s point of view.

If, as a result of reading this book, you get only one thing—an increased tendency to think always in terms of the other person’s point of view, and see things from that person’s angle as well as your own - if you get only that one thing from this book, it may easily prove to be one of the stepping stones of your career.

“Stop a minute,” says Kenneth M. Goode in his book How to Turn People Into Gold, “stop a minute to contrast your keen interest in your own affairs with your mild concern about anything else. Realize then, that everybody else in the world feels exactly the same way! Then, along with Lincoln and Roosevelt, you will have grasped the only solid foundation for interpersonal relationships; namely, that success in dealing with people depends on a sympathetic grasp of the other persons’ viewpoint.”

PRINCIPLE 9: Be sympathetic with the other person’s ideas and desires.

PRINCIPLE 10: Appeal to the nobler motives.

PRINCIPLE 11: Dramatize your ideas.

PRINCIPLE 12: Throw down a challenge.

I have never found,” said Harvey S. Firestone, founder of the great Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, “that pay and pay alone would either bring together or hold good people. I think it was the game itself.”

Frederic Herzberg, one of the great behavorial scientists, concurred. He studied in depth the work attitudes of thousands of people ranging from factory workers to senior executives. What do you think he found to be the most motivating factor—the one facet of the jobs that was most stimulating? Money? Good working conditions? Fringe benefits? No, not any of those. The one major factor that motivated people was the work itself. If the work was exciting and interesting, the worker looked forward to doing it and was motivated to do a good job.

That is what every successful person loves: the game. The chance for self-expression. The chance to prove his or her worth, to excel, to win. That is what makes foot-races and hog-calling and pie-eating contests. The desire to excel. The desire for a feeling of importance.

How To Change People Without Giving Offence Or Arousing Resentment:

PRINCIPLE 1: Begin with praise and honest appreciation.

PRINCIPLE 2: Call attention to people’s mistakes indirectly.

PRINCIPLE 3: Talk about your own mistakes before criticizing the other person.

PRINCIPLE 4: Ask questions instead of giving direct orders.

PRINCIPLE 5: Let the other person save face.

Even if we are right and the other person is definitely wrong, we only destroy ego by causing someone to lose face. The legendary French aviation pioneer and author Antoine de Saint-Exupéry wrote: "I have no right to say or do anything that diminishes a man in his own eyes. What matters is not what I think of him, but what he thinks of himself. Hurting a man in his dignity is a crime.”

PRINCIPLE 6: Praise the slightest improvement and praise every improvement. Be “hearty in your approbation and lavish in your praise.”

Everybody likes to be praised, but when praise is specific, it comes across as sincere—not something the other person may be saying just to make one feel good.

Remember, we all crave appreciation and recognition, and will do almost anything to get it. But nobody wants insincerity. Nobody wants flattery.

Listen to these sage words from William James, one of the most distinguished psychologists and philosophers America has ever produced: “Compared with what we ought to be, we are only half awake. We are making use of only a small part of our physical and mental resources. Stating the thing broadly, the human individual thus lives far within his limits. He possesses powers of various sorts which he habitually fails to use.”

PRINCIPLE 7: Give the other person a fine reputation to live up to.

“The average person,” said Samuel Vauclain, then president of the Baldwin Locomotive Works, "can be led readily if you have his or her respect and if you show that you respect that person for some kind of ability.”

In short, if you want to improve a person in a certain aspect, act as though that particular trait were already one of his or her outstanding characteristics. Shakespeare said, “Assume a virtue, if you have it not.” And it might be well to assume and state openly that other people have the virtue you want them to develop. Give them a fine reputation to live up to, and they will make prodigious efforts rather than see you disillusioned.

PRINCIPLE 8: Use encouragement. Make the fault seem easy to correct.

PRINCIPLE 9: Make the other person happy about doing the thing you suggest.

The effective leader should keep the following guidelines in mind when it is necessary to change attitudes or behavior:

1. Be sincere. Do not promise anything that you cannot deliver. Forget about the benefits to yourself and concentrate on the benefits to the other person.

2. Know exactly what it is you want the other person to do.

3. Be empathetic. Ask yourself what is it the other person really wants.

4. Consider the benefits that person will receive from doing what you suggest.

5. Match those benefits to the other person’s wants.

6. When you make your request, put it in a form that will convey to the other person the idea that he personally will benefit. 

Happy Heroism

At first, it may seem unintuitive to consider heroic and godlike the Cyrenaic life of leisure, pleasure, ease, and comfort. The doxographical and historical material of Greek hedonism, however, makes a compelling case that the life of a happy and self-sufficient wiseman is most truly deserving of immortal depiction, and considered to be of far higher value than that of an ordinary existence. My touchstone examples are Aristippus the Elder, Hegesias the Death Persuader, Theodorus the Atheist, and Epicurus of Samos, each of which invokes imagery pulled from a shared background of Greek Mythos, Heroic Codes, or comparisons to Divinity, in order to illustrate their ethical achievements. This practice of casting ethical sages in heroic roles offers both a form of aesthetic idealism and provides examples of attitudinal embodiment, each powerful motivational tools for the attainment of successful living. 

By way of further explanation as to the historical importance and relevance of such an investigation, scholar Kurt Lampe points out the importance of the cultural background against which Greek ethicists pushed to restructure fellow citizens and their political organization, which illuminates the context of shared values from which these innovations emerged:

One of the striking features of most Greek philosophy is its aspiration to rebuild its practitioners from the “bare self ” up—to determine what is universally good and desirable, and to reorganize life and society based on this determination. But modern philosophers have rightly argued that the bare self is a fantasy; selfhood is largely constituted by libidinal, evaluative, and narrative orientations, which can only be altered gradually and piecemeal. (2017).

Building from this assumption, we find that the overwhelming proto-ethical influence on Athenian philosophy was handed down by earlier poetical mythology: 

…one complex of values that will prove illuminating in this study revolves around masculine competition and honor. This complex finds its most influential expression in Homer, whose epics The Iliad and The Odyssey precede Cyrenaicism by several hundred years. Homer’s enormous influence on subsequent Greek culture is well indicated by the claim in Plato’s Republic that “this poet educated Greece” (606e). The capacity of so-called “heroic values” to shed light on classical Greek culture has recently been demonstrated in studies of both Socratic philosophy and Athenian legal procedure. Closely related to this are other features of Homeric ethics and its descendants in lyric and tragic poetry, which will help to fill in the background behind otherwise puzzling Cyrenaic beliefs or behavior. (Lampe, 2017).

Aristippus the Elder: 

There are several versions of a common anecdote which demonstrates Aristippus’ valuation of his virtuous character and pleasant life in relation to others, which recalls the self-estimation of Odysseus: 

Once when [Aristippus] was sailing to Corinth and was caught in a storm it happened that he became upset. Someone said, “We common people weren’t afraid, but you philosophers acted like cowards!” “Well,” he answered, “we aren’t contending for the same kind of soul!” (D.L. 2.71).

 “…he replied that of course the other hadn’t been terribly worried about the soul of a totally worthless loser [nequissimi nebulonis], but he was afraid for the soul of Aristippus!” (Aulus Gellius, Noct. Att. 19.1.1 = SSR 4a.49).

According to Aelian, Aristippus’s response to his fellow sailor is, “Naturally [I was afraid]! After all, your concern and risk just now involved an unhappy life, but mine involved a happy one” (VH 9.20).

In his book The Birth of Hedonism, Kurt Lampe suggests that the adaptability and sociability of Aristuppus is reminiscent of the “hero’s cunning” familiar from Homeric epics. 

This social cunning blends into temperance as Diogenes’ testimony proceeds, beginning with the statement that Aristippus “always dealt successfully with whatever happened.” The phrase “deal successfully” (eu diatithemenos) implies active manipulation of the situation, which might require charm, quick-wittedness, and courage. But we are also drifting into the domain of temperance, the function of which is to keep before the mind’s eye what really matters and what does not. One reason Aristippus makes such good use of available opportunities, this passage hints, is because he knows that most situations offer some pleasures. This hint is corroborated by the very next clause, which says that Aristippus enjoys what is present and does not worry about what is absent…It is only by understanding emotionally and intellectually what matters and knowing that one has the capacity to secure these goods that anyone can really focus on the present. (Lampe, 2017).

As mentioned in the introductory paragraph, it may appear that the lifestyle advocated by Cyrenaics would be difficult to romanticize as explicitly heroic, however, such comparisons are not unusual for iconoclastic philosophical thinkers of this period: 

It may seem audacious to compare Aristippus with Odysseus, but we will see below that this comparison occurs more than once in our ancient evidence ([Plut.] Vit. Hom. 2.150 = SSR 4a.55, D.L. 2.79–80 [twice]). Moreover, the shipwreck anecdote we have just encountered recalls Odysseus’s shipwreck on Phaeacia, just as the overwhelming impression Aristippus makes on the Rhodians recalls Odysseus’s impression on the Phaeacians (whose young men he defeats in athletic competition, and whose king offers him the princess’s hand in marriage [Od. 7–8]). More generally, heroic posturing is a common element in Greek philosophizing. As [Angela] Hobbs has convincingly shown, Plato’s dialogues contain an extended rumination on the allure and psychology of Homeric heroes and an attempt to represent philosophers like Socrates as alternative role models. Heroic motifs are also scattered throughout many Stoic and Epicurean texts…(2017).

Hegesias the Death Persuader: 

While Hegesias is a pessimist and diverges sharply from the eudaemonic telos of orthodox Cyrenaicism, his allusions to heroism are instructive, particularly for understanding the later comments and actions of someone like Theodorus. Hegesias believes that, 

The wise person will do everything for his own sake, because he considers no one equal to himself in worth. For even if he seems to receive the greatest profit from someone, it isn’t equivalent to what he himself provides. (D.L. 2.95)

The Hegesiac sage also displays powerful levels of magnanimity, due to their ethical superiority:

errors receive forgiveness. For a person does not err voluntarily, but because he is coerced by some passion. And ‹they› won’t hate, but will rather share ‹their› teaching” (D.L. 2.95). 

Theodorus the Atheist:

Theodorus famously displays his courage and superiority in a collection of oft-repeated anecdotes, not to mention his disregard for the danger inherent in impious suggestions, which won him the designation of ho atheos. Cicero’s renditions of Theodorus’ strength in the face of powerful figures will suffice to illustrate his attitude:

[VERSION 1] When Lysimachus was threatening Theodorus with death, he said, “It’s really a mighty thing you’ve accomplished, if you’ve acquired the power of the cantharis beetle! (Cic. Tusc. 5.117 = SSR 4h.7)

[VERSION 2] Shouldn’t we admire Theodorus of Cyrene? When king Lysimachus threatened him with torture, he replied, “Direct your threats to these luxuriously dressed friends of yours; it makes no difference to Theodorus whether he rots under ground or above it!” (Cic. Tusc. 1.102 = SSR 4h.8)

Philo also describes occasions where Theodorus personally compared himself to Homeric heroes in order to explain the true cause of his prior expulsions from Cyrene and Athens: 

The story goes that when Theodorus, nicknamed the Atheist, had been exiled from Athens and came to Lysimachus, an official mocked him for his flight and listed its causes: that he had been exiled on account of con- demnation for atheism and corruption of the youth. “I wasn’t exiled,” he replied. “The same thing happened to me as to Zeus’ son Heracles. He too was offloaded by the Argonauts, not because he did anything wrong, but because all by himself he was a full load and ballast and weighed them down. So he made his fellow sailors afraid the boat would fill with water. I changed residence for the same reason. The citizens of Athens couldn’t keep up with the profundity and magnitude of my thought, and they also envied me.” Then Lysimachus asked, “And were you also exiled from your own country because of envy?” And he answered, “Not because of envy, but because of the excesses of my nature, which my country couldn’t accommodate. Just like when Semele was pregnant with Dionysus, she couldn’t carry him for the defined time until his birth; but Zeus, struck with fear, extracted the fruit of her womb before its time, and made him equal in honor to the gods. In the same way some deity or god raised me up and decided to send me as a colonist to a better place, Athens, because my own country was too narrow to receive such a mass of philosophical wisdom.” (Quod omn. bon. lib. 127–30 = SSR 4h.9)

Diogenes Laertius also relates a dialogue between Theordorus and Stilpo, illustrating Theodorus’ sly wit and an apparent proclamation of self-deification: 

“Are you, Theodorus, what you declare yourself to be?” To this he assented, and Stilpo continued, “And do you say you are god?” To this he agreed. “Then it follows that you are god.” Theodorus accepted this, and Stilpo said with a smile, “But, you rascal, at this rate you would allow yourself to be a jackdaw and ten thousand other things.”

Epicurus of Samos:

There are multiple quotes from Epicurus comparing himself and other members of his school to the Gods and immortals, in order to praise the scope and importance of his teachings. We see an echo of Theodorean influence perhaps, which is all the more plausible considering Diogenes Laertius’ claim that Epicurus’ view on the gods was taken from Thedorus’ book. Some examples of comparisons include:

Vatican Saying 78: "The truly noble man busies himself chiefly with wisdom and friendship, of which the one is an understandable good but the other is immortal."

Go on thy way as immortal, and think of us as immortal too. (Epicurea fragment translated by Bailey).

Meditate then, on all these things, and on those things which are related to them, both day and night, and both alone and with like-minded companions. For if you will do this, you will never be disturbed while asleep or awake by imagined fears, but you will live like a god among men. For a man who lives among immortal blessings is in no respect like a mortal being. (Letter to Menoeceus). 

Norman DeWitt explains that, “Paradoxical as it must seem, Epicurus knows no higher praise than to call a thing immortal; being opposed in this text to understandable, it must mean "passing understanding."” (DeWitt, 1973). Epicurus famously denied the immortality of the soul, and also denied that the Gods interfered with the lives of men. Nevertheless, Epicurus was also somewhat “deified” in his sect, enjoying an immortality of reputation persisting long after his death. 

Sources:

DeWitt, N.W. (1973). Epicurus and His Philosophy. Greenwood Press.

Diogenes Laertius. (1980). Diogenes Laertius : lives of eminent philosophers. Harvard University Press.

Lampe, K. (2017). The Birth of Hedonism - The Cyrenaic Philosophers and Pleasure As a Way of Life. Princeton University Press.

Pillars of Pleasure

Aristippus of Cyrene is famously quoted as stating the following: “The kind of possessions and traveling provisions free men ought to acquire are those which can swim away from a ship-wreck with them.” (Vitruvius, De Arch. 6.1.1). These possessions and provisions are, of course, the values and virtues endowed by proper philosophical education — those characteristics and excellencies of ability which the wise man ought cultivate in order to flourish. Based on my study and understanding of Cyrenaic philosophy, I’d like to offer the following Pillars of Pleasure as best representing the foundational elements which enable, express, and constitute the pleasant life.

Pillar I - Satisfaction (εὐδοκέω/eudokeo): 

The Cyrenaic ethical project is centered around achieving and maintaining satisfaction through the pursuit and enjoyment of pleasures, so emphasis is placed on active appreciation and savouring of pleasant experiences. Peace of mind is essential to maximal enjoyment, and alongside the possession of confidence, involves exercising present-focus in order to make the most of what is at hand. Success according to our hedonistic eudaemonism requires taking satisfaction as both the criteria of action and the purpose of living, rendering this the cardinal value of our school. 

Pillar II - Self-Mastery (ἐνκράτεια/enkráteia): 

Self-mastery or self-control, within Cyrenaic ethics, refers to the ability to maintain purposeful awareness and direction over one’s actions. This value forms the bedrock for wisely exercising choice and avoidance (prudence), informed by the fundamental virtue of temperance (disdaining excess), while also underpinning the importance placed on securing internal and external freedom (autonomy), so that we are able to act according to our own sober judgement. The successful Cyrenaic engages in philosophical education and study in order to properly understand the nature of pleasure, self, and world — cutting through attachment and insatiability, thereby transforming actions and outlook in accordance with the true philosophy.

Pillar III - Confidence (θάρσος/thársos): 

Confidence is a Cyrenaic watchword, appearing multiple times in the doxography, and describes the foundational attitude formed from the reasonable expectation of success, due to an assurance of personal ability and versatility, underpinning the active pursuit of simple pleasures. Confidence is concomitant with the development of the Cyrenaic virtues of adaptability and sociability, dovetailing with the simple accomodation of oneself to the available pleasures most situations easily offer, these being all that is necessary for enjoyment, and the sage masterfully capitalises on any circumstance.

Maximization is Misleading

It’s common to discuss the evaluative metric of hedonic calculus in terms of “maximizing” pleasure and “minimizing” pain, aiming for a situation where, on balance, the agent experiences a greater return in happiness than their investment in effort. While this simplistic picture has its merits, the imprecise language involved could support two erroneous interpretations which, if left unchecked, lead either towards insatiable extravagance, or else, towards reserved timidity, each for the very same reason depending on where the emphasis is placed. 

To tackle the easier error first, the exhortation to “minimize” pain could be, and historically has been, misconstrued as recommending a path of habitual caution and repression, where anything that might cause a measure of discomfort or hurt is routinely avoided, until, at the minimum extreme, it becomes impossible even to survive without enduring some small measure of exertion. This bare minimum, then, is taken to represent absolutely necessary human values, these and these alone are considered sufficient, the resulting state of numb subsistence is slapped with a shiny new name like eudaimonia or tranquility, and anything extra is avoided as deadly poison. “Surely that’s absurd!” you may say, but it is not difficult to find moderate ascetics of widely different stripes who have learned essentially the same clumsy lesson. These men and women rally against striving to achieve any “unnecessary” desires, arguing that, since they cannot mourn the absence, removal, or failure to achieve that which was never prized to begin with, they are also spared the great distress of want, loss, and disappointment. As such, those shrewd individuals systematically trim down their requirements to the bare minimum until what remains is so easily met as to be virtually assured of satisfaction. We may find our examples among the Cynics, Stoics, various mendicant monks, Buddhists, Jainists, Daoists, even some confused Epicureans — history is full of their kind, take your pick. 

Of course, such a program in self-denial is ridiculous and, if anything is unnecessary, certainly we have found it here. In the words of Aristippus, “it is not abstinence from pleasures that is best, but mastery over them without ever being worsted.” These ascetics have simply lost their nerve — they are afraid of the possibility of disappointment; they shy away from comfort, out of fear that it will someday pass and disappoint them with its absence: they abstain from pursuing pleasure, not due to strength of character, but from weakness of spirit. By contrast, Epicurus maintains that just because all pleasures are good in themselves, this does not mean that all pleasures are choice-worthy, and conversely, just because all pains are bad in themselves, this does not mean that all pains are avoidance-worthy. Often, we should choose the painful, difficult, uncomfortable course of action, because it will lead to greater pleasure! But doesn’t this present a problem for an ostensibly hedonistic philosophy? On what basis are we to make our determination in any instance, if the pleasure or pain that it will cause is no longer enough? In fact, hedonic calculus remains the criteria, but as rational beings, we are able to make principled judgements about the expected outcomes of our activity beyond the sliver of a moment, such that we may judge something initially painful as tending to cause more pleasure in the future, and vice-versa for something initially pleasurable. This is the true import of the economy of pleasure, and like good economists, we do not use a single immediate variable as our sole determining factor, we must use general knowledge and principles to predict where the trends are heading in the future, though we can only enjoy them in the present.  

This same argument can be applied to correcting the opposite error, which is to take “maximization” as some cosmic proclamation that only the highest peak-experiences ultimately count, and we should toil to procure greater and greater degrees of excitation. Sure, you may be content relaxing by the beach-side, but could you be doing cocaine instead? Well, consistent hedonism suggests you should! Oh, you are happily married, but wouldn’t a one-night stand or an affair offer extra pleasure? Hey, hedonism says it would! Similar examples are readily deployed as lazy reductio ad absurdum arguments against hedonistic philosophies. On the surface, they have the appearance of compulsion, or at least, they’re often compelling enough for most people to reject hedonism out-of-hand — to laugh it away, or to condemn it as dangerous degeneracy. 

There are two main reasons why these arguments fail to hold up to the least scrutiny. The first is the inverse of the pain-avoidance argument: just because something is pleasurable, or even “more pleasurable”, in the immediate context, does not mean that it ought to be chosen if it will lead to greater pain in the long-run. This is the obvious flaw of the more absurd “maximization” arguments, and even those who proffer them will soon admit the illusion of legitimacy hinges on making an arbitrary insistence of short-sightedness, since the would-be hedonist will clearly be ruined sooner or later if they were to take this code of conduct seriously. How can any so-called “consistent hedonism” recommend a principle of action that will, even at a glance, cause the agent far greater pains than any pleasures gained? Obviously it cannot. The other argument runs in the opposite direction, and involves a misunderstanding regarding what it means to “maximize” one’s pleasure. It is not at all obvious that the cocaine-induced party-lover is actually experiencing “more” pleasure, in the relevant sense, than the leisurely beach-goer, or the studious chemistry student, even setting aside future consequences. What does “in the relevant sense” mean here? It means that the only course rational hedonism actually recommends is the one where, on balance, we experience a greater extent of joy than sorrow over a lifetime. The greater the extent of pleasure experienced, you see —not primarily the “degree” or “amount” — the better. Hence Epicurus summons us to continuous pleasure, not intense pleasure. Any modest level of pleasantness we actively enjoy, and can confidently expect to sustain, while maintaining peace of mind and avoiding bodily stress, is meeting the criteria of our hedonistic program, as guided by the faculties of nature. Within reason, we must add variety and spice, because monotony yields diminishing returns and stagnant habituation, and, as we covered earlier, one ought to take calculated risks or expend their efforts where these will generally add to our enjoyment. But where on earth does this additional duty to endlessly pursue “increase” for its own sake come from? God only knows. 

The surest course for extending pleasurable experience over a lifetime actually recommends exercising temperance, and instructs us to greedily defend certain necessary preconditions for happiness, such as maintaining our self-control, confidence, and satisfaction. By contrast, far from achieving the pleasure he so desires, the insatiable “hedonist” who endlessly seeks after higher thrills, or who feeds a bottomless appetite, is suffering a mental illness which will assure he is never content no matter what he obtains. We can only enjoy pleasantness in the moment, it is not the kind of good that can be stored up, accumulated, saved for later — miss what is present, and it is gone forever. Our avaricious seeker will never stop to enjoy what he so desperately chases. Quite the counter-productive course. Hence, Aristippus teaches us to disdain excess, to dispense with the tiresome business of chasing after empty figments, and instead, to focus our energy on adapting and enjoying present circumstances in the most advantageous manner. 

We Cyrenaics wish only to live as easily and pleasantly as possible, not to ceaselessly crank the dopamine dial to 11 in slavish service to Dionysius, nor again to shrink from any possibility that events may temporarily turn against us, committed to diminishing ourselves first lest the universe do it for us. We deserve better, and can readily achieve it.

Originations and Evolutions: A New Cyrenaic Project

The aim of this post is to situate New Cyrenaicism within its historical context, to highlight the basic influences and convictions which shape our project, and to indicate areas that modern Cyrenaic philosophy ought investigate and perhaps incorporate in order to forge ahead as a considerable life-path worthy of adoption. I want to stress that although Ancient Cyrenaicism and the aestheticism of Walter Pater are primary points of reference for New Cyrenaicism, our defining commitments protest against confinement to rigid dogma and mutual conformity. Exploring an eclectic pastiche which better expresses or elucidates some element of our experience, rendering the practical pursuit of pleasure more effective, is both beneficial and necessary. Philosophical inquiry, scientific investigation, political association, economic prosperity, and countless other factors have dramatically shifted the context within which a New Cyrenaic operates daily, compared to our intellectual ancestors. We live in an atmosphere different indeed from the Victorian era of Pater, how much more so from Ancient Greece? The genealogical probing and expansions which I indicate here do not profess to be definitive nor chronologically accurate. When I note, for example, an affinity between Heraclitean metaphysics and the epistemology of orthodox Cyrenaicism, or suggest that American Pragmatism is especially useful for understanding how conceptions of objects relate to the affections, this should not be read as a conclusive judgement on direct influence, nor as a necessary endorsement for sympathetic Cyrenaics. Rather, these are comments on the silken web of influences that were active at the time of Cyrenaicism’s development, and which have continued spinning to the present day in various forms, with excellent work being done in the meantime, all of which builds upon the meager extant information available. The views expressed here are therefore formed from my own associations, and should be differentiated from those attributable to the Ancient Cyrenaics and to Walter Pater, which I have dealt with elsewhere. Consider these expansions more amenable to the spirit of Cyrenaicism, than to the letter, though my opinion is that there is plenty of consonance to be found. Without further ado…

Basic Commitments:

In a separate post, I have highlighted the distinguishing philosophical commitments of what I call Skeletal Cyrenaicism, by which I mean, the basic foundational beliefs, motivations, and areas of concern for Cyrenaic practitioners. Without reproducing that material here, these can be summarized in more technical terminology as a commitment to the following:

Individual Axiological Eduaimonic Hedonism; Agent-relative Sensual Empiricism; Moderate Purgative Skepticism; Philosophical Education; Confident Adaptability; Tempered Presentism; Social-Mastery; Aesthetic Idealism.

It is from this general perspective that I seek to find both the origination and continuation of Cyrenaic philosophical themes.

Historical Influences:

The following influences are here considered only insofar as the threads of their thought have had a notable influence on the formation or elaboration of the Ancient Cyrenaic position.

Heraclitus of Ephesus: This Ionian pre-Socratic philosopher is responsible for originating evaluative relativity, or perspectivism, which was further explored by the Sophists and thereby transmitted to the Cyrenaics. His emphasis on attending to the waking evidence of a shared reality rather than turning aside into myopic imaginings, and his theory of the Unity of Opposites in terms of brute bi-modal qualities, also suggests proto-empiricism in an adolescent form. 

Protagoras: This famous Sophist’s doctrine that “man is the measure of all things”, his interpretation of sensations in terms of violent or gentle physical motions, and the quasi-skeptical relativity implied by these theories, were hugely influential on Cyrenaic epistemology and found their way, with vital modifications, into the mature scheme of the Metrodidact.

Socrates: The Athenian gadfly was the direct teacher of Aristippus the Elder, founder of the Cyrenaic movement, who learned from his instructive master the value of pleasures, the importance of virtue, formulation of the ethical telos, and the need for greater philosophical rigor.

Epicurus of Samos: Epicurus’s hedonistic philosophy is a later development influenced primarily by Democritean atomism and the philosophy of Cyrenaicism. Although his more sophisticated approach soon supplanted his predecessors almost completely, Epicurus’ explication of certain doctrines, some clearly taken from the school of Aristippus, is enormously helpful for the modern Cyrenaic looking to gain greater understanding than is possible from the meager extant material of his own school. In addition, the criticisms leveled at the early Epicureans by those few orthodox figures who remained loyal to Aristippean beliefs provides an instructive contrast of emphasis.

Pyrrho of Elis: Though the skepticism of the Phyrronists is far more radical than that of the Cyrenaics, some of their arguments are helpful for understanding what threads of thought the orthodox school may have used to defend similar positions. In addition, the formulation of the end as “ataraxia”, though conceived differently than the peace of mind of Aristippus and the limit of pleasure for Epicurus, was nevertheless an influential eudaemonic concept with clear ties to the earlier schools.

Promising Leads:

Aristotelian Virtue Ethics: Aristotle offers an unparalleled survey of fundamental Greek virtues, useful for the modern Cyrenaic who wishes to gain deeper insight into the concept of arete and how best to achieve these, without the post-Christian connotations commonly associated with colloquial usage of the term “virtue”. 

Millsian phenomenalism: J.S. Mill offers an interesting presentation of impressionistic epistemology, including ways to account for matter and objects from a phenomenalist foundation. 

Peircean Pragmatism: C.S. Peirce’s pragmatic maxim offers the most concise method for understanding the content of our conceptions. Peirce’s idiosyncratic objective idealism and philosophical architectonic also provide interesting leads for extending Cyrenaic empiricism.

Ayn Rand’s Objectivism: Ayn Rand’s philosophy offers useful insights across the board for modern Cyrenaics, albeit with fundamentally different underpinnings. Objectivism’s normative ethics and rational approach are particularly instructive.

Friedrich Nietzsche: Nietzsche’s rousing spirit and cutting polemics are perhaps the most important qualities to mine from his corpus, and though he is not a hedonist, the focus on individual efficacy is applicable to our project.

Other Fields:

Biology: Understanding basic biological requirements, surveying human physiological needs, engaging in nutritional analysis, exploring mental health, and generally grasping the naturalistic causes behinds our desires and feelings, all guide the modern hedonist in best supplying himself with those values that are necessary and sufficient for living healthily. 

Psychology: Possessing a basic understanding of psychology aids in self-awareness, self-regulation, and navigating interpersonal relationships. It is advisable to research material on conditions conducive to promoting mental health, civic engagement, and healthy communication. 

Politics: Living in a society with other human beings requires some awareness of the optimal means for regulating our encounters in order to maximise the benefits while mitigating the risks. It is preferable to command a fundamental understanding of the political, economic, and social systems within which your community operates. 

Life Skills: Possessing basic practical knowledge will allow the individual to maintain independence and self-sufficiency, the surest foundation for remaining adaptable and confident. 

Horace on Aristippus

Epistles 1.1:

Original Latin:

Ac ne forte roges quo me duce, quo Lare tuter;
nullius addictus iurare in uerba magistri,
quo me cumque rapit tempestas, deferor hospes.               
Nunc agilis fio et mersor ciuilibus undis,
uirtutis uerae custos rigidusque satelles;
nunc in Aristippi furtim praecepta relabor
et mihi res, non me rebus subiungere conor.

Translation into English by C. Smart:

And lest you should perchance ask under what leader, in what house [of philosophy], I enter myself a pupil: addicted to swear implicitly to the ipse-dixits of no particular master, wherever the weather drives me, I am carried a guest. One while I become active, and am plunged in the waves of state affairs, a maintainer and a rigid partisan of strict virtue; then again I relapse insensibly into Aristippus' maxims, and endeavor to adapt circumstances to myself, not myself to circumstances. 

Epistles 1.17:

Original Latin:

si te grata quies et primam somnus in horam

delectat, si te pulvis strepitusque rotarum,    
si laedit caupona, Ferentinum ire iubebo;     
nam neque divitibus contingunt gaudia solis
nec vixit male, qui natus moriensque fefellit: 
si prodesse tuis pauloque benignius ipsum    
te tractare voles, accedes siccus ad unctum.  
‘si pranderet holus patienter, regibus uti        
nollet Aristippus.’ ‘si sciret regibus uti,         
fastidiret holus, qui me notat.’ utrius horum   
verba probes et facta, doce, vel iunior audi,  
cur sit Aristippi potior sententia. namque     
mordacem Cynicum sic eludebat, ut aiunt:   
‘scurror ego ipse mihi, populo tu: rectius hoc et        
splendidius multo est. equus ut me portet, alat rex,   
officium facio: tu poscis vilia—verum          
dante minor, quamvis fers te nullius egentem.’         
omnis Aristippum decuit color et status et res,         
temptantem maiora, fere praesentibus aequum.        
contra, quem duplici panno patientia velat,    
mirabor, vitae via si conversa decebit.          
alter purpureum non exspectabit amictum,   
quidlibet indutus celeberrima per loca vadet 
personamque feret non inconcinnus utramque;         
alter Mileti textam cane peius et angui           
vitabit chlanidem, morietur frigore, si non    
rettuleris pannum. refer et sine vivat ineptus.

Translation into English by C. Smart:

If pleasant rest, and sleep till seven o'clock, delight you; if dust and the rumbling of wheels, if the tavern offend you, I shall order you off for Ferentinum. For joys are not the property of the rich alone: nor has he lived ill, who at his birth and at his death has passed unnoticed. If you are disposed to be of service to your friends, and to treat yourself with somewhat more indulgence, you, being poor, must pay your respects to the great. Aristippus, if he could dine to his satisfaction on herbs, would never frequent [the tables] of the great. If he who blames me, [replies Aristippus,] knew how to live with the great, he would scorn his vegetables. Tell me, which maxim and conduct of the two you approve; or, since you are my junior, hear the reason why Aristippus' opinion is preferable; for thus, as they report, he baffled the snarling cynic: "I play the buffoon for my own advantage, you [to please] the populace. This [conduct of mine] is better and far more honorable; that a horse may carry and a great man feed me, pay court to the great: you beg for refuse, an inferior to the [poor] giver; though you pretend you are in want of nothing." As for Aristippus, every complexion of life, every station and circumstance sat gracefully upon him, aspiring in general to greater things, yet equal to the present: on the other hand, I shall be much surprised, if a contrary way of life should become [this cynic], whom obstinacy clothes with a double rag. The one will not wait for his purple robe; but dressed in any thing, will go through the most frequented places, and without awkwardness support either character: the other will shun the cloak wrought at Miletus with greater aversion than [the bite of] dog or viper; he will die with cold, unless you restore him his ragged garment; restore it, and let him live like a fool as he is.

Satires 2.3:

Original Latin:

danda est ellebori multo pars maxima avaris:
nescio an Anticyram ratio illis destinet omnem.
heredes Staberi summam incidere sepulcro,
ni sic fecissent, gladiatorum dare centum              
damnati populo paria atque epulum arbitrio Arri,
frumenti quantum metit Africa. 'sive ego prave
seu recte hoc volui, ne sis patruus mihi': credo,
hoc Staberi prudentem animum vidisse. quid ergo
sensit, cum summam patrimoni insculpere saxo              
heredes voluit? quoad vixit, credidit ingens
pauperiem vitium et cavit nihil acrius, ut, si
forte minus locuples uno quadrante perisset,
ipse videretur sibi nequior. 'omnis enim res,
virtus, fama, decus, divina humanaque pulchris              
divitiis parent; quas qui construxerit, ille
clarus erit, fortis, iustus.' 'sapiensne?' 'etiam, et rex
et quidquid volet.' hoc veluti virtute paratum
speravit magnae laudi fore. quid simile isti
Graecus Aristippus? qui servos proicere aurum              
in media iussit Libya, quia tardius irent
propter onus segnes. uter est insanior horum?
nil agit exemplum, litem quod lite resolvit.
siquis emat citharas, emptas conportet in unum,
nec studio citharae nec Musae deditus ulli,               
si scalpra et formas non sutor, nautica vela
aversus mercaturis: delirus et amens
undique dicatur merito. qui discrepat istis,
qui nummos aurumque recondit, nescius uti
conpositis metuensque velut contingere sacrum?               
siquis ad ingentem frumenti semper acervum
porrectus vigilet cum longo fuste neque illinc
audeat esuriens dominus contingere granum
ac potius foliis parcus vescatur amaris;
si positis intus Chii veterisque Falerni               
mille cadis—nihil est: tercentum milibus, acre
potet acetum; age si et stramentis incubet unde-
octoginta annos natus, cui stragula vestis,
blattarum ac tinearum epulae, putrescat in arca:
nimirum insanus paucis videatur, eo quod                
maxima pars hominum morbo iactatur eodem

Translation into English by C. Smart:

By far the largest portion of hellebore is to be administered to the covetous: I know not, whether reason does not consign all Anticyra to their use. The heirs of Staberius engraved the sum [which he left them] upon his tomb: unless they had acted in this manner, they were under an obligation to exhibit a hundred pair of gladiators to the people, beside an entertainment according to the direction of Arrius; and as much corn as is cut in Africa. Whether I have willed this rightly or wrongly, it was my will; be not severe against me, [cries the testator]. I imagine the provident mind of Staberius foresaw this. What then did he moan, when he appointed by will that his heirs should engrave the sum of their patrimony upon his tomb-stone? As long as he lived, he deemed poverty a great vice, and nothing did he more industriously avoid: insomuch that, had he died less rich by one farthing, the more Iniquitous would he have appeared to himself. For every thing, virtue, fame, glory, divine and human affairs, are subservient to the attraction of riches; which whoever shall have accumulated, shall be illustrious, brave, just—What, wise too? Ay, and a king, and whatever else he pleases. This he was in hopes would greatly redound to his praise, as if it had been an acquisition of his virtue. In what respect did the Grecian Aristippus act like this; who ordered his slaves to throw away his gold in the midst of Libya; because, encumbered with the burden, they traveled too slowly? Which is the greater madman of these two? An example is nothing to the purpose, that decides one controversy by creating another. If any person were to buy lyres, and [when he had bought them] to stow them in one place; though neither addicted to the lyre nor to any one muse whatsoever: if a man were [to buy] paring-knives and lasts, and were no shoemaker; sails fit for navigation, and were averse to merchandizing; he every where deservedly be styled delirious, and out of his senses. How does he differ from these, who boards up cash and gold [and] knows not how to use them when accumulated, and is afraid to touch them as if they were consecrated? If any person before a great heap of corn should keep perpetual watch with a long club, and, though the owner of it, and hungry, should not dare to take a single grain from it; and should rather feed upon bitter leaves: if while a thousand hogsheads of Chian, or old Falernian, is stored up within (nay, that is nothing—three hundred thousand), he drink nothing, but what is mere sharp vinegars again—if, wanting but one year of eighty, he should lie upon straw, who has bed-clothes rotting in his chest, the food of worms and moths; he would seem mad, belike, but to few persons: because the greatest part of mankind labors, under the same malady.

Sources:

Horace & Smart, C. (ed.) (2004) The Works of Horace: Translated Literally into English Prose. Cambridge. 

Latin text reproduced according to: http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/hor.html 

Hedonic Eudaemonism - Achieving The Pleasant Life

In this post, I’d like to thread the needle on a topic of importance for promoting and following Cyrenaicism as a way of life: what, properly considered, is our purpose, end, or telos? I’ll offer the label “hedonic eudaemonism” as best encapsulating the telos of our New Cyrenaicism, because it emphasises the long-range, totalising focus on the happiness of our life as a whole, while also describing the pleasurable quality and content in present-experiential terms. By describing our goal in these terms, we leave no room for Stoicising interpretations of apathetic calm as commanding the character of “eudaimonia”, for example, and we also head-off any lingering misunderstanding that the tantalising fancy of the moment ought enslave our attention. We are concerned with achieving happiness in a robust and lasting manner, and the nature of that happiness is found in living “as easily and pleasantly as possible”. 

Other questions follow: what is our ultimate good? What is the status of other goods in relation to our end and our ultimate good? How do we go about achieving our end?

I propose the following: 

1. Our ultimate good, or summum bonum, is this life itself. The purpose or end of this life is to live pleasantly/pleasurably.

2. Other goods are either instrumental to, or essential components of, the pleasant life.

3. Achieving and enjoying the pleasant life requires exercising practical reason in the realm of choice and avoidance, in order to secure and maintain those aforementioned goods. It is the role of philosophical education to identify, enumerate, and categorise those goods, while also providing us the tools and techniques required to achieve them.

I believe this presentation of Aristippean Cyrenaicism is historically defensible, philosophically preferable, and practically beneficial. The doxographical material we have regarding Aristippus himself suggests a figure who is undeniably concerned with the quality of his life as a whole — it shows us someone who engages in training and study with clear future-concern, someone who values personal character and virtues not merely as means to the end of gaining particular pleasures, but as inseparable elements of The Good Life itself. 

Such an understanding not only brings early Cyrenaicism into clearer alignment with the Greek ethical tradition in which Aristippus was embedded at Athens, it also better accounts for the Socratic flavour of his associations, and more easily accommodates the extant anecdotes, as against any awkward attempts to read later Cyrenaic developments back onto the founder of the school. With this in mind, we come to understand Aristippus as a radical innovator more so in terms of his attitude towards pleasure, his manner of achieving it, and his confident expression — though these are erected upon familiar intellectual soil — rather than as someone promoting a rather complex foundationalist theory, completely divergent from any of his contemporaries, in a manner starkly at odds with the anti-dogmatic, moderate-skepticism he expressed elsewhere. 

The next step is of course to proceed with a breakdown of those component qualities which one ought to cultivate in order to achieve and enjoy the pleasant life. That subject will be covered in a future post, where I will enumerate the “Pillars of Pleasure” which support successful, happy living. 

Aristippus As A Socratic

Voula Tsouna McKirahan - The Socratic Origins of the Cynics and Cyrenaics

- There are two categories of testimony on Aristippean ethics, one that attributes to him a straightforward hedonism and one that does not consider him a hedonist at all. According to the former, Aristippus was the first Cyrenaic to define the moral end as a smooth movement that results in a pleasure of the body, is confined strictly to the present, and is very short-lived. Pleasure must be distinguished from happiness (eudaemonia), which is the sum of particular pleasures, present as well as past and future ones, extended over one’s lifetime. It is pleasure and not happiness that is pursued for its own sake. 

- On the other hand, Aristocles denies that Aristippus defined pleasure as the only thing that is intrinsically good, and there is further information that he never lectured defending a particular moral end, whether pleasure of anything else — a piece of evidence that fits perfectly with Aristippus’ distaste for a didactic tone in teaching or speaking (Arist. Rh. 2.23). 

- Instead, Aristippus believes that pleasure is to be sought and enjoyed not unconditionally but only if it does not endanger our self-control. The latter is the result of philosophical education, together with the acquisition of internal freedom, self-awareness, and the promotion of the well-being of the soul by means of study and endurance. These goods are not instrumental to the enjoyment of pleasure but valuable in themselves. If one obtains them, one may securely savour bodily pleasures; if one does not obtain them, one presumably should not pursue bodily pleasures, for they would hinder promotion of virtue in the soul. 

- It is undoubtedly true that the Cyrenaics who came after Aristippus developed a hedonistic theory in which the moral end was the momentary present pleasure. Their ethics was backed by their epistemology that claims that the only knowledge accessible to us is the knowledge of our undergoings (pathē). The ethical claim that momentary pleasure is the good has an irrefutable character precisely in virtue of the fact that pleasure is an undergoing and therefore self-evident. 

- In the non-hedonistic tradition Aristippus’ ethical theory is firmly based on the beliefs common to the members of the Socratic circle, is coherent and intuitively persuasive. 

- …we infer that Aristippus and Socrates differ on the subject of pleasure with respect to its practical implications, not in their respective definitions of the moral end. For Socrates, control over bodily pleasure dictates a life of moderation, while for Aristippus it does not. 

- …regarding the passage from Xenophon. First, it provides direct evidence for the claim that Aristippus was a eudaemonist and not a hedonist. Second, Socrates’ argument leaves unscathed Aristippus’ belief that it is morally right for one to enjoy various pleasures. 

- …part of Aristippus’ answer [to Socrates] is that he aims at the easiest and pleasantest life and that he wishes to live a life of freeedom that leads to happiness. But this indicates that Aristippus does not seek pleasure for their own sake but presumably views them as a means to or a component of happiness. Also, he does not look at momentary pleasures of the present but at his life as a whole. 

- Independent evidence tells us that Aristippus indulged in pleasure but at the same time made sure that he was in control of his experiences and that pleasure did not master him instead. 

- We are left to wonder whether Aristippus is right: although pleasure is not the moral end, it is an important constituent of happiness. And one can be self-disciplined without abstaining from pleasure either partially or totally. 

- His [Aristippus’] primary interest was in ethical questions. It may be that he mostly dealt with practical ethics, but we are also allowed to glimpse a theoretical argument to the effect that every object is associated with a moral end, and therefore objects that are morally neutral do not exist. On account of this argument he dismissed the study of mathematics and perhaps also of natural science. On the other hand, some titles of his books indicate an interest in rhetoric. History and perhaps literature complete the list of his interests. 

- Nor can his knowledge… of[familiar topics of Greek intellectual tradition] have been complete superficial, for he taught in the competitive environment of Athenian culture for a substantial fee and fairly successfully. 

- Aristippus’ apolitical stance, “that leads neither through ruling nor through slavery but through freedom” to happiness. Aristippus’ disavowal of civic bonds appears like a means to the end of enjoying an easy and pleasant life. 

Source: 

Tsouna-McKirahan, Voula. (1994). “The Socratic Origins of the Cynics and Cyrenaics”, in Paul A Vander Waerdt (ed.), The Socratic Movement. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 367-91.

Diogenes Läertius - The Lives of Eminent Philosophers - Chapter 8: Aristippus (R.D. Hicks Edition)

Chapter 8. ARISTIPPUS (c. 435-350 B.C.)

Aristippus was by birth a citizen of Cyrene and, as Aeschines informs us, was drawn to Athens by the fame of Socrates. Having come forward as a lecturer or sophist, as Phanias of Eresus, the Peripatetic, informs us, he was the first of the followers of Socrates to charge fees and to send money to his master. And on one occasion the sum of twenty minae which he had sent was returned to him, Socrates declaring that the supernatural sign would not let him take it; the very offer, in fact, annoyed him. Xenophon was no friend to Aristippus; and for this reason he has made Socrates direct against Aristippus the discourse in which he denounces pleasure. Not but what Theodorus in his work On Sects abuses him, and so does Plato in the dialogue On the Soul, as has been shown elsewhere.

He was capable of adapting himself to place, time and person, and of playing his part appropriately under whatever circumstances. Hence he found more favour than anybody else with Dionysius, because he could always turn the situation to good account. He derived pleasure from what was present, and did not toil to procure the enjoyment of something not present Hence Diogenes called him the king's poodle Timon, too, sneered at him for luxury in these words:

Such was the delicate nature of Aristippus, who groped after error by touch.

He is said to have ordered a partridge to be bought at a cost of fifty drachmae, and, when someone censured him, he inquired, "Would not you have given an obol for it?" and, being answered in the affirmative, rejoined, "Fifty drachmae are no more to me." And when Dionysius gave him his choice of three courtesans, he carried off all three, saying, "Paris paid dearly for giving the preference to one out of three." And when he had brought them as far as the porch, he let them go. To such lengths did he go both in choosing and in disdaining. Hence the remark of Strato, or by some accounts of Plato, "You alone are endowed with the gift to flaunt in robes or go in rags." He bore with Dionysius when he spat on him, and to one who took him to task he replied, "If the fishermen let themselves be drenched with sea-water in order to catch a gudgeon, ought I not to endure to be wetted with negus in order to take a blenny?"

Diogenes, washing the dirt from his vegetables, saw him passing and jeered at him in these terms, "If you had learnt to make these your diet, you would not have paid court to kings," to which his rejoinder was, "And if you knew how to associate with men, you would not be washing vegetables." Being asked what he had gained from philosophy, he replied, "The ability to feel at ease in any society." Being reproached for his extravagance, he said, "If it were wrong to be extravagant, it would not be in vogue at the festivals of the gods."

Being once asked what advantage philosophers have, he replied, "Should all laws be repealed, we shall go on living as we do now." When Dionysius inquired what was the reason that philosophers go to rich men's houses, while rich men no longer visit philosophers, his reply was that "the one know what they need while the other do not." When he was reproached by Plato for his extravagance, he inquired, "Do you think Dionysius a good man?" and the reply being in the affirmative, "And yet," said he, "he lives more extravagantly than I do. So that there is nothing to hinder a man living extravagantly and well." To the question how the educated differ from the uneducated, he replied, "Exactly as horses that have been trained differ from untrained horses." One day, as he entered the house of a courtesan, one of the lads with him blushed, whereupon he remarked, "It is not going in that is dangerous, but being unable to go out."

Some one brought him a knotty problem with the request that he would untie the knot. "Why, you simpleton," said he, "do you want it untied, seeing that it causes trouble enough as it is?" "It is better," he said, "to be a beggar than to be uneducated; the one needs money, the others need to be humanized." One day that he was reviled, he tried to slip away; the other pursued him, asking, "Why do you run away?" "Because," said he, "as it is your privilege to use foul language, so it is my privilege not to listen." In answer to one who remarked that he always saw philosophers at rich men's doors, he said, "So, too, physicians are in attendance on those who are sick, but no one for that reason would prefer being sick to being a physician."

It happened once that he set sail for Corinth and, being overtaken by a storm, he was in great consternation. Some one said, "We plain men are not alarmed, and are you philosophers turned cowards?" To this he replied, "The lives at stake in the two cases are not comparable." When some one gave himself airs for his wide learning, this is what he said: "As those who eat most and take the most exercise are not better in health than those who restrict themselves to what they require, so too it is not wide reading but useful reading that tends to excellence." An advocate, having pleaded for him and won the case, thereupon put the question, "What good did Socrates do you?" "Thus much," was the reply, "that what you said of me in your speech was true."

He gave his daughter Arete the very best advice, training her up to despise excess. He was asked by some one in what way his son would be the better for being educated. He replied, "If nothing more than this, at all events, when in the theatre he will not sit down like a stone upon stone." When some one brought his son as a pupil, he asked a fee of 500 drachmae. The father objected, "For that sum I can buy a slave." "Then do so," was the reply, "and you will have two." He said that he did not take money from his friends for his own use, but to teach them upon what objects their money should be spent. When he was reproached for employing a rhetorician to conduct his case, he made reply, "Well, if I give a dinner, I hire a cook."

Being once compelled by Dionysius to enunciate some doctrine of philosophy, "It would be ludicrous," he said, "that you should learn from me what to say, and yet instruct me when to say it." At this, they say, Dionysius was offended and made him recline at the end of the table. And Aristippus said, "You must have wished to confer distinction on the last place." To some one who boasted of his diving, "Are you not ashamed," said he, "to brag of that which a dolphin can do?" Being asked on one occasion what is the difference between the wise man and the unwise, "Strip them both," said he, "and send them among strangers and you will know." To one who boasted that he could drink a great deal without getting drunk, his rejoinder was, "And so can a mule."

To one who accused him of living with a courtesan, he put the question, "Why, is there any difference between taking a house in which many people have lived before and taking one in which nobody has ever lived?" The answer being "No," he continued, "Or again, between sailing in a ship in which ten thousand persons have sailed before and in one in which nobody has ever sailed?" "There is no difference." "Then it makes no difference," said he, "whether the woman you live with has lived with many or with nobody." To the accusation that, although he was a pupil of Socrates, he took fees, his rejoinder was, "Most certainly I do, for Socrates, too, when certain people sent him corn and wine, used to take a little and return all the rest; and he had the foremost men in Athens for his stewards, whereas mine is my slave Eutychides." He enjoyed the favours of Laïs, as Sotion states in the second book of his Successions of Philosophers. To those who censured him his defence was, "I have Lais, not she me; and it is not abstinence from pleasures that is best, but mastery over them without ever being worsted." to one who reproached him with extravagance in catering, he replied, "Wouldn't you have bought this if you could have got it for three obols?" The answer being in the affirmative, "Very well, then," said Aristippus, "I am no longer a lover of pleasure, it is you who are a lover of money." One day Simus, the steward of Dionysius, a Phrygian by birth and a rascally fellow, was showing him costly houses with tesselated pavements, when Aristippus coughed up phlegm and spat in his face. And on his resenting this he replied, "I could not find any place more suitable."

When Charondas (or, as others say, Phaedo) inquired, "Who is this who reeks with unguents?" he replied, "It is I, unlucky wight, and the still more unlucky Persian king. But, as none of the other animals are at any disadvantage on that account, consider whether it be not the same with man. Confound the effeminates who spoil for us the use of good perfume." Being asked how Socrates died, he answered, "As I would wish to die myself." Polyxenus the sophist once paid him a visit and, after having seen ladies present and expensive entertainment, reproached him with it later. After an interval Aristippus asked him, "Can you join us today?" On the other accepting the invitation, Aristippus inquired, "Why, then, did you find fault? For you appear to blame the cost and not the entertainment." When his servant was carrying money and found the load too heavy--the story is told by Bion in his Lectures--Aristippus cried, "Pour away the greater part, and carry no more than you can manage." Being once on a voyage, as soon as he discovered the vessel to be manned by pirates, he took out his money and began to count it, and then, as if by inadvertence, he let the money fall into the sea, and naturally broke out into lamentation. Another version of the story attributes to him the further remark that it was better for the money to perish on account of Aristippus than for Aristippus to perish on account of the money. Dionysius once asked him what he was come for, and he said it was to impart what he had and obtain what he had not. But some make his answer to have been, "When I needed wisdom, I went to Socrates; now that I am in need of money, I come to you." He used to complain of mankind that in purchasing earthenware they made trial whether it rang true, but had no regular standard by which to judge life. Others attribute this remark to Diogenes. One day Dionysius over the wine commanded everybody to put on purple and dance. Plato declined, quoting the line:

I could not stoop to put on women's robes.

Aristippus, however, put on the dress and, as he was about to dance, was ready with the repartee:

Even amid the Bacchic revelry

True modesty will not be put to shame.

He made a request to Dionysius on behalf of a friend and, failing to obtain it, fell down at his feet. And when some one jeered at him, he made reply, "It is not I who am to blame, but Dionysius who has his ears in his feet." He was once staying in Asia and was taken prisoner by Artaphernes, the satrap. "Can you be cheerful under these circumstances?" some one asked. "Yes, you simpleton," was the reply, "for when should I be more cheerful than now that I am about to converse with Artaphernes?" Those who went through the ordinary curriculum, but in their studies stopped short at philosophy, he used to compare to the suitors of Penelope. For the suitors won Melantho, Polydora and the rest of the handmaidens, but were anything but successful in their wooing of the mistress. A similar remark is ascribed to Ariston. For, he said, when Odysseus went down into the under-world, he saw nearly all the dead and made their acquaintance, but he never set eyes upon their queen herself.

Again, when Aristippus was asked what are the subjects which handsome boys ought to learn, his reply was, "Those which will be useful to them when they are grown up." To the critic who censured him for leaving Socrates to go to Dionysius, his rejoinder was, "Yes, but I came to Socrates for education and to Dionysius for recreation." When he had made some money by teaching, Socrates asked him, "Where did you get so much?" to which he replied, "Where you got so little."

A courtesan having told him that she was with child by him, he replied, "You are no more sure of this than if, after running through coarse rushes, you were to say you had been pricked by one in particular." Someone accused him of exposing his son as if it was not his offspring Whereupon he replied, "Phlegm, too, and vermin we know to be of our own begetting, but for all that, because they are useless, we cast them as far from us as possible." He received a sum of money from Dionysius at the same time that Plato carried off a book and, when he was twitted with this, his reply was,, "Well, I want money, Plato wants books." Some one asked him why he let himself be refuted by Dionysius. "For the same reason," said he, "as the others refute him."

Dionysius met a request of his for money with the words, "Nay, but you told me that the wise man would never be in want." To which he retorted, "Pay! Pay! and then let us discuss the question;" and when he was paid, "Now you see, do you not," said he, "that I was not found wanting?" Dionysius having repeated to him the lines:

Whoso betakes him to a prince's court

Becomes his slave, albeit of free birth,

he retorted:

If a free man he come, no slave is he.From a lost play of Sophocles: Plutarch, De audiendis poetis, 12, p. 33 d, Vita Pomp. 78, p. 661 s.f.

This is stated by Diocles in his work On the Lives of Philosophers; other writers refer the anecdotes to Plato. After getting in a rage with Aeschines, he presently addressed him thus: "Are we not to make it up and desist from vapouring, or will you wait for some one to reconcile us over the wine-bowl?" To which he replied, "Agreed." "Then remember," Aristippus went on, "that, though I am your senior, I made the first approaches." Thereupon Aeschines said, "Well done, by Hera, you are quite right; you are a much better man than I am. For the quarrel was of my beginning, you make the first move to friendship." Such are the repartees which are attributed to him.

[…]

He laid down as the end the smooth motion resulting in sensation.

Having written his life, let me now proceed to pass in review the philosophers of the Cyrenaic school which sprang from him, although some call themselves followers of Hegesias, others followers of Anniceris, others again of Theodorus. Not but what we shall notice further the pupils of Phaedo, the chief of whom were called the school of Eretria. [86] The case stands thus. The disciples of Aristippus were his daughter Arete, Aethiops of Ptolemais, and Antipater of Cyrene. The pupil of Arete was Aristippus, who went by the name of mother-taught, and his pupil was Theodorus, known as the atheist, subsequently as "god." Antipater's pupil was Epitimides of Cyrene, his was Paraebates, and he had as pupils Hegesias, the advocate of suicide, and Anniceris, who ransomed Plato.

Those then who adhered to the teaching of Aristippus and were known as Cyrenaics held the following opinions. They laid down that there are two states, pleasure and pain, the former a smooth, the latter a rough motion, and that pleasure does not differ from pleasure nor is one pleasure more pleasant than another. The one state is agreeable and the other repellent to all living things. However, the bodily pleasure which is the end is, according to Panaetius in his work On the Sects, not the settled pleasure following the removal of pains, or the sort of freedom from discomfort which Epicurus accepts and maintains to be the end. They also hold that there is a difference between "end" and "happiness." Our end is particular pleasure, whereas happiness is the sum total of all particular pleasures, in which are included both past and future pleasures.

Particular pleasure is desirable for its own sake, whereas happiness is desirable not for its own sake but for the sake of particular pleasures. That pleasure is the end is proved by the fact that from our youth up we are instinctively attracted to it, and, when we obtain it, seek for nothing more, and shun nothing so much as its opposite, pain. Pleasure is good even if it proceed from the most unseemly conduct, as Hippobotus says in his work On the Sects. For even if the action be irregular, still, at any rate, the resultant pleasure is desirable for its own sake and is good. The removal of pain, however, which is put forward in Epicurus, seems to them not to be pleasure at all, any more than the absence of pleasure is pain. For both pleasure and pain they hold to consist in motion, whereas absence of pleasure like absence of pain is not motion, since painlessness is the condition of one who is, as it were, asleep. They assert that some people may fail to choose pleasure because their minds are perverted; not all mental pleasures and pains, however, are derived from bodily counterparts. For instance, we take disinterested delight in the prosperity of our country which is as real as our delight in our own prosperity. Nor again do they admit that pleasure is derived from the memory or expectation of good, which was a doctrine of Epicurus. For they assert that the movement affecting the mind is exhausted in course of time. Again they hold that pleasure is not derived from sight or from hearing alone. At all events, we listen with pleasure to imitation of mourning, while the reality causes pain. They gave the names of absence of pleasure and absence of pain to the intermediate conditions. However, they insist that bodily pleasures are far better than mental pleasures, and bodily pains far worse than mental pains, and that this is the reason why offenders are punished with the former. For they assumed pain to be more repellent, pleasure more congenial. For these reasons they paid more attention to the body than to the mind. Hence, although pleasure is in itself desirable, yet they hold that the things which are productive of certain pleasures are often of a painful nature, the very opposite of pleasure; so that to accumulate the pleasures which are productive of happiness appears to them a most irksome business.

They do not accept the doctrine that every wise man lives pleasantly and every fool painfully, but regard it as true for the most part only. It is sufficient even if we enjoy but each single pleasure as it comes. They say that prudence is a good, though desirable not in itself but on account of its consequences; that we make friends from interested motives, just as we cherish any part of the body so long as we have it; that some of the virtues are found even in the foolish; that bodily training contributes to the acquisition of virtue; that the sage will not give way to envy or love or superstition, since these weaknesses are due to mere empty opinion; he will, however, feel pain and fear, these being natural affections; and that wealth too is productive of pleasure, though not desirable for its own sake.

They affirm that mental affections can be known, but not the objects from which they come; and they abandoned the study of nature because of its apparent uncertainty, but fastened on logical inquiries because of their utility. But Meleager in his second book On Philosophical Opinions, and Clitomachus in his first book On the Sects, affirm that they maintain Dialectic as well as Physics to be useless, since, when one has learnt the theory of good and evil, it is possible to speak with propriety, to be free from superstition, and to escape the fear of death. They also held that nothing is just or honourable or base by nature, but only by convention and custom. Nevertheless the good man will be deterred from wrong-doing by the penalties imposed and the prejudices that it would arouse. Further that the wise man really exists. They allow progress to be attainable in philosophy as well as in other matters. They maintain that the pain of one man exceeds that of another, and that the senses are not always true and trustworthy.

The school of Hegesias, as it is called, adopted the same ends, namely pleasure and pain. In their view there is no such thing as gratitude or friendship or beneficence, because it is not for themselves that we choose to do these things but simply from motives of interest, apart from which such conduct is nowhere found. They denied the possibility of happiness, for the body is infected with much suffering, while the soul shares in the sufferings of the body and is a prey to disturbance, and fortune often disappoints. From all this it follows that happiness cannot be realized. Moreover, life and death are each desirable in turn. But that there is anything naturally pleasant or unpleasant they deny; when some men are pleased and others pained by the same objects, this is owing to the lack or rarity or surfeit of such objects. Poverty and riches have no relevance to pleasure; for neither the rich nor the poor as such have any special share in pleasure. Slavery and freedom, nobility and low birth, honour and dishonour, are alike indifferent in a calculation of pleasure. To the fool life is advantageous, while to the wise it is a matter of indifference. The wise man will be guided in all he does by his own interests, for there is none other whom he regards as equally deserving. For supposing him to reap the greatest advantages from another, they would not be equal to what he contributes himself. They also disallow the claims of the senses, because they do not lead to accurate knowledge. Whatever appears rational should be done. They affirmed that allowance should be made for errors, for no man errs voluntarily, but under constraint of some suffering; that we should not hate men, but rather teach them better. The wise man will not have so much advantage over others in the choice of goods as in the avoidance of evils, making it his end to live without pain of body or mind. [96] This then, they say, is the advantage accruing to those who make no distinction between any of the objects which produce pleasure.

The school of Anniceris in other respects agreed with them, but admitted that friendship and gratitude and respect for parents do exist in real life, and that a good man will sometimes act out of patriotic motives. Hence, if the wise man receive annoyance, he will be none the less happy even if few pleasures accrue to him. The happiness of a friend is not in itself desirable, for it is not felt by his neighbour. Instruction is not sufficient in itself to inspire us with confidence and to make us rise superior to the opinion of the multitude. Habits must be formed because of the bad disposition which has grown up in us from the first. A friend should be cherished not merely for his utility--for, if that fails, we should then no longer associate with him--but for the good feeling for the sake of which we shall even endure hardships. Nay, though we make pleasure the end and are annoyed when deprived of it, we shall nevertheless cheerfully endure this because of our love to our friend.

The Theodoreans derived their name from Theodorus, who has already been mentioned, and adopted his doctrines. Theodorus was a man who utterly rejected the current belief in the gods. And I have come across a book of his entitled Of the Gods which is not contemptible. From that book, they say, Epicurus borrowed most of what he wrote on the subject.

Theodorus was also a pupil of Anniceris and of Dionysius the dialectician, as Antisthenes mentions in his Successions of Philosophers. He considered joy and grief to be the supreme good and evil, the one brought about by wisdom, the other by folly. Wisdom and justice he called goods, and their opposites evils, pleasure and pain being intermediate to good and evil. Friendship he rejected because it did not exist between the unwise nor between the wise; with the former, when the want is removed, the friendship disappears, whereas the wise are selfsufficient and have no need of friends. It was reasonable, as he thought, for the good man not to risk his life in the defence of his country, for he would never throw wisdom away to benefit the unwise.

He said the world was his country. Theft, adultery, and sacrilege would be allowable upon occasion, since none of these acts is by nature base, if once you have removed the prejudice against them, which is kept up in order to hold the foolish multitude together. The wise man would indulge his passions openly without the least regard to circumstances. Hence he would use such arguments as this. "Is a woman who is skilled in grammar useful in so far as she is skilled in grammar?" "Yes." "And is a boy or a youth skilled in grammar useful in so far as he is skilled in grammar?" "Yes." "Again, is a woman who is beautiful useful in so far as she is beautiful? And the use of beauty is to be enjoyed?" "Yes." When this was admitted, he would press the argument to the conclusion, namely, that he who uses anything for the purpose for which it is useful does no wrong. And by some such interrogatories he would carry his point.

He appears to have been called theos (god) in consequence of the following argument addressed to him by Stilpo. "Are you, Theodorus, what you declare yourself to be?" To this he assented, and Stilpo continued, "And do you say you are god?" To this he agreed. "Then it follows that you are god." Theodorus accepted this, and Stilpo said with a smile, "But, you rascal, at this rate you would allow yourself to be a jackdaw and ten thousand other things."

[However, Theodorus, sitting on one occasion beside Euryclides, the hierophant, began, "Tell me, Euryclides, who they are who violate the mysteries?" Euryclides replied, "Those who disclose them to the uninitiated." "Then you violate them," said Theodorus, "when you explain them to the uninitiated." Yet he would hardly have escaped from being brought before the Areopagus if Demetrius of Phalerum had not rescued him. And Amphicrates in his bookUpon Illustrious Men says he was condemned to drink the hemlock.

For a while he stayed at the court of Ptolemy the son of Lagus, and was once sent by him as ambassador to Lysimachus. And on this occasion his language was so bold that Lysimachus said, "Tell me, are you not the Theodorus who was banished from Athens?" To which he replied, "Your in- formation is correct, for, when Athens could not bear me any more than Semele could Dionysus, she cast me out." And upon Lysimachus adding, "Take care you do not come here again," "I never will," said he, "unless Ptolemy sends me." Mithras, the king's minister, standing by and saying, "It seems that you can ignore not only gods but kings as well," Theodorus replied, "How can you say that I ignore the gods when I regard you as hateful to the gods?" He is said on one occasion in Corinth to have walked abroad with a numerous train of pupils, and Metrocles the Cynic, who was washing chervil, remarked, "You, sophist that you are, would not have wanted all these pupils if you had washed vegetables." Thereupon Theodorus retorted, "And you, if you had known how to associate with men, would have had no use for these vegetables." A similar anecdote is told of Diogenes and Aristippus, as mentioned above.

Such was the character of Theodorus and his surroundings. At last he retired to Cyrene, where he lived with Magas and continued to be held in high honour. The first time that he was expelled from Cyrene he is credited with a witty remark: "Many thanks, men of Cyrene," said he, "for driving me from Libya into Greece."