Skeletal Cyrenaicism

I would like to take a more personal approach, rather than a historical one, and elaborate on the true import of the lessons I have learned from Cyrenaic theory, as one who is also influenced by far later strands of philosophical thought, chief among these being Epicurus’s hedonism, Charles Peirce’s pragmaticism, Ayn Rand’s objectivism, and Walter Pater’s aestheticism. The following basic commitments are, I believe, the fundamental building blocks upon which to erect a full worldview and lifestyle, and agreement on these points constitutes New Cyrenaic alignment.

Skeletal Cyrenaicism:

Cyrenaic epistemology is a commitment to sensational empiricism. Immediate experience is the foundation for all knowledge, providing us with incorrigible awareness of the world around us as it relates to our psycho-physical constitution, within the basic unity of awareness. Our affections are direct, self-evident, personal, and unmistaken. The practical import of limited Cyrenaic skepticism is purgative — eschewing all unfounded abstract speculation or essentialism, and dismissing any alleged alternative sources of information. 

Cyrenaic ethics is a recognition of the feelings as evaluative faculties. Pleasure and pain are automatic motivating reactions to raw sense data, and are the life-guiding origin of all further judgements of value and disvalue. Pleasure is naturally attractive and choice-worthy, pain is naturally repellent and avoidance-worthy, experienced psychosomatically, and teaches that the ultimate goal of life is to live pleasantly and peacefully, an achievement of happiness. To achieve happiness requires cultivating the personal qualities of Satisfaction, Self-Mastery, and Confidence, which describe necessary constituent components of the pleasant life. Perception of the world is made in terms of opportunities for enjoyment, and risks of suffering to the individual — managing these we call hedonic calculus in the economy of pleasure. 

Cyrenaic education and practice holistically transforms belief, attitude, desire, and capacity. This program has the dual benefits of removing impediments to the purest, most immediate reception of pleasurable experiences, while cultivating hedonic appetite and the refinement of its satisfaction. Education consists of philosophical investigation, training self-awareness, exercising presentism, and learning sociability. Respectively, these skills help us control and eliminate excessive desires through temperance, manage current circumstances through adaptability, and succeed in inter-personal relationships with suavity and compassion. Possessing these virtues renders us both competent and comfortable.

Paterian aesthetics applies hedonistic sensationalism to the appreciation of artistic and experiential phenomena, imparting a form of earthly sensitivity, beatific idealism, and connoisseurship. We regard all objects — works of art, the fairer forms of nature and human life, engaging personalities — as powers or forces producing pleasurable sensations, each of a more or less peculiar or unique kind. We shape ourselves in accordance with an aspirational vision of successful living — exemplified by heroic, impassioned, and joyful modes of being and behaving, taking inspiration from living or artistically depicted exemplars. 

New Cyrenaic Virtues

Pleasure (ἡδονή/hedonē): The pursuit of pleasure is the foundational virtue of Cyrenaic philosophy, as pleasant living is our telos. The Cyrenaic ethical project is a life organized around the life-guiding truth of pleasure and pain. Perception of the world is made in terms of opportunities for enjoyment, and risks of suffering distress. This is hedonic calculus in the economy of pleasure. We must investigate the causes and conditions that secure happiness and well-being, which means understanding physiology, psychology, and relevant externalities. We ought pursue sensual pleasures, intellectual excitement, and aesthetic delights. 

Education (παιδεία/paideia): The goals of philosophical education are tranquility, social mastery, and connoisseurship. Transforming “slavish” characters into free ones involves cultivating self-mastery (see: temperance), the capacity to speak with sophistication (see: sociability), and proper philosophical understanding. Education thereby removes impediments to the purest and most immediate reception of pleasurable experiences (see: presentism), including anxiety, regret, and unjustified (merely conventional) compunctions. Training also includes cultivation of appetite and the refinement of its satisfaction, increasing capacity for appreciation (see: sensitivity).

Presentism (monokhronos hēdonē): The pleasures we actively experience in the present moment are the true sensations of value. We telescope our concerns to the present moment as a spiritual exercise, prudential rule of thumb, and emotional attitude — not as an ontological straight-jacket. We thereby diminish discomfort and become more receptive to present pleasures. Due to the greater ability to affect the present moment, we put less faith in painstaking long-term planning than in our ability to adapt to circumstances. We must still plan and reflect, but we do so mindfully, always with an eye upon current conditions. 

Adaptability: Ability to harmonize with place, time, and role, and perform harmoniously in any circumstance. Confidence means feeling comfortable rather than anxious or fearful in unknown or threatening situations. Paradoxically, it is only a person of firm character and profound insight who can be so malleable, adapting comfortably to every situation. This requires gaining a range of basic competencies so that we can respond well in any situations, making us self-sufficient.

Temperance (σωφροσύνη/sōphrosūnē): Temperance involves keeping in mind what really matters and what does not. What really matters is simply to avoid pain and distress, and to experience some modicum of pleasure. We achieve the former by disdaining excess, which does not entail embracing austerity. Excess is relative to what is actually good — pleasure. This does not exclude luxury, but we avoid becoming attached to specific sources of pleasure and reduce our desires accordingly. Simple pleasure is enjoyable and sufficient, we ought never covet more than we currently possesses, nor be overcome by sensual enjoyment and lose our contentment.

Sociability (φιλία/philia): Capable of getting along with any sort of person whatsoever, and to do so without anxiety. This social confidence is based on the understanding both cognitively and emotionally that; 1. all one needs is to avoid pain and discover some modicum of pleasure, therefore, one feels more relaxed around other people. He or she does not need to impress anyone, since we are not after anything another can provide which we could not procure ourselves. 2. Just about every situation presents opportunities for enjoyment, which encourages simple accommodation of oneself to one’s company at any given moment. Training responsiveness, versatility, and adroitness. The wise man is comfortable in any situation, and adroit enough to turn it to his advantage. He speaks well, with knowledge and sophistication, possessing charm, humor, and quick-wittedness.

Sensitivity: Explore diverse and evocative sources of pleasure which require increased capacities for appreciation, such as aesthetic discernment, cultural enrichment, physical ability, dexterous skills, and intellectual stimulation. Training sensitivity to aesthetic delights, judged based on the virtuous merits regarding their degree, type, and unique sensory impressions with which they affect the individual’s “imaginative reason”. We refine all instruments of inward and outward intuition and impression, developing our capacities, in order to best receive and interact with the “beatific vision” of our experience in the world. This training involves, not the conveyance of doctrine or principles, but rather, the teaching of an art. Education increases one’s capacity for enjoyment.

Sympathy:  We have an empathetic distaste for causing or witnessing pain and discomfort due to our immediate grasp of the inherently evil nature of pain and suffering. We appeal to the aesthetic revulsion caused by the ugliness of suffering, prompting an amelioration of its causes if reasonable, and an avoidance of behavior which would bring it about. “How tenderly—more tenderly than many stricter souls—we might yield to kindly instinct, what fineness of charity in passing judgment on others, what an exquisite conscience of other men’s susceptibilities. We go beyond most people in our care for all weakly creatures.”

Earthen Character: Development generally of the more human and earthly elements of character. Virile consciousness of the realities of life, poetic apprehension, united with something of personal ambition and self-assertion. The earthly end comes like a final revelation of nothing less than the soul’s extinction. To the sentiment of the body, and the affections it defines — the flesh — one must cling; a materialist with the temper of a devotee. Amid abstract metaphysical doubts, as to what might lie one step only beyond that experience, we reinforce the deep original materialism or eathliness of human nature itself, bound so intimately to the sensuous world — let us at least make the most of what is “here and now”. 

Encyclopedia Britannica, “Cyrenaics”, by Hugh Chrisholm

CYRENAICS, a Greek school of philosophy, so called from Cyrene, the birthplace of the founder, Aristippus (q.v.). It was one of the two earliest Socratic schools, and emphasized one side only of the Socratic teaching (cf. Cynic). Socrates, although he held that virtue was the only human good, admitted to a certain extent the importance of its utilitarian side, making happiness at least a subsidiary end of moral action. Aristippus and his followers seized upon this, and made it the prime factor in existence, denying to virtue any intrinsic value. Logic and physical science they held to be useless, for all knowledge is immediate sensation (see Protagoras). These sensations are motions (κινήσεις) which (1) are purely subjective, and (2) are painful, indifferent or pleasant, according as they are violent, tranquil or gentle. Further they are entirely individual, and can in no way be described as constituting absolute objective knowledge. Feeling, therefore, is the only possible criterion alike of knowledge and of conduct. “Our modes of being affected (πάθη) alone are knowable.” Thus Cyrenaicism goes beyond the critical scepticism of the Sophists and deduces a single, universal aim for all men, namely pleasure. Furthermore, all feeling is momentary and homogeneous. It follows (1) that past and future pleasure have no real existence for us, and (2) that among present pleasures there is no distinction of kind, but only of intensity. Socrates had spoken of the higher pleasures of the intellect; the Cyrenaics denied the validity of this distinction and said that bodily pleasures as being more simple and more intense are to be preferred. Momentary pleasure (μονόχρονος ἡδόνη), preferably of a carnal kind, is the only good for man. Yet Aristippus was compelled to admit that some actions which give immediate pleasure entail more than their equivalent of pain. This fact was to him the basis of the conventional distinction of right and wrong, and in this sense he held that regard should be paid to law and custom. It is of the utmost importance that this development of Cyrenaic hedonism should be fully realized. To overlook the Cyrenaic recognition of social obligation and the hedonistic value of altruistic emotion is a very common expedient of those who are opposed to all hedonistic theories of life. Like many of the leading modern utilitarians, they combined with their psychological distrust of popular judgments of right and wrong, and their firm conviction that all such distinctions are based solely on law and convention, the equally unwavering principle that the wise man who would pursue pleasure logically must abstain from that which is usually denominated “wrong” or “unjust.” This idea, which occupies a prominent position in systems like those of Bentham, Volney, and even Paley, was evidently of prime importance at all events to the later Cyrenaics.

Developing from this is a new point of practical importance to the hedonism of the Cyrenaics. Aristippus, both in theory and in practice, insisted that true pleasure belongs only to him who is self-controlled and master of himself. The truly happy man must have φρόνησις (prudence), which alone can save him from falling a prey to mere passion. Thus, in the end, Aristippus, the founder of the purest hedonism in the history of thought, comes very near not only to the Cynics, but to the more cultured hedonism of Epicurus and modern thinkers. Theodorus, held even more strongly that passing pleasure may be a delusion, and that permanent tranquillity is a truer end of conduct. Hegesias denied the possibility of real pleasure and advocated suicide as ensuring at least the absence of pain. Anniceris, in whose thought the school reached its highest perfection, declared that true pleasure consists sometimes in self-sacrifice and that sympathy in enjoyment is a real source of happiness. Other members of the school were Arete, wife of Aristippus, Aristippus the younger (her son), Bio and Euhemerus.

The Cyrenaic ideal was, of course, utterly alien to Christianity, and, in general, subsequent thinkers found it an ideal of hopeless pessimism. Yet in modern times it has found expression in many ethical and literary works, and it is common also in other ancient non-Hellenic literature. There are quatrains in the Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyám and pessimistic verses in Ecclesiastes which might have been uttered by Aristippus. (“Then I commended mirth, because a man hath no better thing than to eat and to drink and to be merry; for that shall abide with him of his labour the days of his life which God giveth him under the sun”). So in Byron and Heine, and, in a sense, in Walter Pater (Marius the Epicurean), there is the same tendency to seek relief from the intellectual cul-de-sac in frankly aesthetic satisfaction. Thus Cyrenaicism did not entirely vanish with its absorption in Epicureanism.

The New Cyrenaic System

With this entry I present a condensed vision of the entire New Cyrenaic system. All credit for philosophical originality properly belongs to the individual figures named and tagged - these are, in chronological order, Heraclitus of Ephesus, Aristippus of Cyrene, Epicurus of Samos, and Walter Pater. Additional credit is due to Charles Sanders Peirce, who, though I do not reproduce his doctrine in depth, broadly influenced the interpretation and perspective provided. My contribution is entirely dependent on underlying primary material provided by the aforementioned persons, and consists solely of trans-historical creative reinterpretation, aiming at a functional pastiche of cohesive elements. The unitive principle which informs this ethical project is total commitment to our immediate affectations as the sole criteria of truth and value. It is for the reader to test the following for themselves. 

Metaphysics and Epistemology: 

Empirical Idealism: Complete fidelity to immediate experience, consisting of sensory affections, as the sole source and criteria of knowledge. These subjective impressions vouch for themselves, and they do so inwardly, unmistakably, truly, and incorrigibly. Affections are elements of sensational awareness generated by movements of our physical being due to relational contact with external stimuli, and they fall into three categories: pleasurable, painful, or neutral. These latter, intermediate states provide representational information, of which there are innumerable varieties, and may also be accompanied by/provoke pleasurable or painful sensations. 

Hedonic Motivation: Among the affections we have the feelings called pleasure and pain. Pleasure is self-evidently choice-worthy, pain is self-evidently avoidance-worthy, and no other sensations possess these monadic qualities as a matter of brute experience. Consequently, these feelings alone are directly capable of motivating or guiding choice and avoidance. Emotions are the positive and negative responses respectively resulting from cognitive judgements, evaluative or prospective, according to the criteria of these two states. As further evidence of nature supplying the norm, we have the Cradle Argument, according to which we judge the evidence provided by uncorrupted beings, such as animals and young children, who, from birth, automatically pursue pleasure and shun pain without moralistic confusion.

Purgative Skepticism: Withdrawal of interest from all other alleged sources of knowledge beyond what can be accessed and verified through direct sense-perception, or can be inferred therefrom, eliminating concerns with speculative metaphysics and intrinsic axiological dogma, narrowing the field of legitimate concern and circumscribing the scope of epistemic ability. 

Impressionistic Flux: The impressions of experience are constantly undergoing changes, at different rates and in varying respects, with underlying continuity and fixed relationships among them. We observe that change is oppositional and bi-polar, operating according to an interplay of centrifugal and centripetal tendencies. Human beings, like all phenomena, are a developmental result of this self-same process, and within the nexus of experience, the mode of organic sense-perception operates along multiple qualitative continuums, the extremes of which we declare opposites. The mind is sensitive to patterns of behavior resulting from the interactivity of balanced forces because it is of the same nature, these habitual relationships being deemed “lawful” when applied to the predictable motions of external objects, and “logical” when considered cognitively. The universe is therefore comprehensible, directly as a matter of immediate experience, and inferentially as the approximate value of statistical ratios. 

Pragmatic Theory of Objects: Our conception of an object’s identity consists entirely in that confluence of present and expected relational effects, on other objects and on oneself directly, according to which we group and categorize entities in terms of their general characteristics and principles of action, within ranges of practical significance. 

Presentism: The present moment alone is truly ours, a bubble wherein experience unfolds and phenomena are open to purposeful interactivity. We yield to the improvement of the present, excluding all embarrassment alike of regret for the past and calculation for the future, as far as possible, in order to maximize attentive receptivity. (See “Present Focus” below for the practical application of this insight).

Ethics:

Individual Sensual Hedonism: The highest good (summum bonum) is one’s own pleasurable existence as a living organism. The end (to telos) is to live pleasantly/pleasurably, which is called happiness. All other goods are instrumental to securing and adorning one’s own pleasant living. Human happiness is psychosomatic, requiring physical health and mental well-being as both foundational states for seeking greater pleasure, and for maintaining the sensitivity of our apparatus for enjoyment.

Peace of Mind and Homeostasis of Body: The active pursuit of pleasures is balanced with the value of freedom from mental distress (or, possessing peace of mind), and freedom from bodily pain (or, preserving physical well-being). It is by pursuing, attaining, and maintaining this dual-aspect of healthiness, we may say biological hygiene, which provides pleasure in itself, and establishes the necessary pre-conditions for pursuing and appreciating higher pleasures.

Unitemporal Pleasure: The pleasures of the present experience are to be enjoyed fully as our highest goal, without undue concern for what has passed or what is to come, which is self-defeating. Pleasant living is to be accomplished within each individual unit of time, enjoying what is at hand, without excessive toil or yearning for what is not currently available.

Hierarchy of Desires: In order to prioritise our desires, we categorize them according to their level of necessity for the pleasant life, and their origin in natural or unnatural conditions, creating three distinct categories. Of the desires that are both natural and necessary, there are those which are required for our survival, those required for removing bodily pain, and those required for achieving happiness. Unnecessary desires ought to be pursued as augmenting necessary desires and contributing to happiness, but should not be chased at the expense of more basic requirements. 

Aesthetic Exemplarism: Projecting a vision of the successful life, informed by other persons and artistic representations, as tangible exemplars for our own aspirations. Additionally, 

“We may well adorn and beautify, in scrupulous self-respect, our souls, and whatever our souls touch upon — these wonderful bodies, these material dwelling-places through which the shadows pass together for a while, the very raiments we wear, our very pastimes and the inter course of society.” - Walter Pater. 

True aesthetic culture is realizable as a new form of the contemplative life, founded on the vision of perfect men, objects, and environments. Whatever form of human life which may be heroic, impassioned, ideal: these are the criterion of inspirational values.

Character and Attitude:

Education: The goals of philosophical education are tranquility, social mastery, and connoisseurship. Transforming “slavish” characters into free ones involves cultivating self-possession/-mastery, the capacity to speak with sophistication, and proper philosophical understanding. Education thereby removes impediments to the purest and most immediate reception of pleasurable experiences, including anxiety, regret, and unjustified (that is, merely conventional) compunctions. Training also includes cultivation of appetite and the refinement of its satisfaction, increasing capacity for appreciation.

Temperance: We strive to keep in mind what really matters and what does not. What really matters is simply to avoid pain and distress, and to experience some sort of pleasure. We achieve the former by disdaining excess, which does not entail embracing austerity, and not becoming attached/dependent to any particular source of pleasure. Excess is relative to what is actually good, which is pleasure, and this does not exclude luxury, but we avoid upsetting the hierarchy by chasing corrosive desires which cannot be satisfied. Those who are always dissatisfied, no matter what they acquire, have an illness. New Cyrenaic philosophy cures practitioners of their attachment to superfluities, freeing them from stress, insomnia, and the stranglehold of their preoccupations. Temperance also enables enjoyment: those with a sound mind can indulge in luxurious pleasures without becoming corrupted — that is, beginning to feel these are necessities.

Present Focus: Telescoping of concerns to the present moment as a spiritual exercise, prudential rule of thumb, and emotional attitude - not an ontological straight-jacket. We thereby diminish discomfort and become more receptive to present pleasures. Due to the greater ability to affect the present moment, we put less faith in painstaking long-term planning than in our ability to adapt to circumstances.

Adaptability and Confidence: Able to harmonize with place, time, and role, and perform harmoniously in any circumstance. Confidence means feeling comfortable rather than anxious or fearful in unknown or threatening situations. Paradoxically, it is only a person of firm character and profound insight who can be so malleable, adapting comfortably to every situation.

Sociability: Capable of getting along with any sort of person whatsoever, and do so without anxiety. This confidence is based on the understanding both cognitively and emotionally that; 1. all one needs is to avoid pain and discover some modicum of pleasure, therefore, the sage feels more relaxed around people. He or she does not need to impress anyone, since we are not after anything another can provide which we could not procure ourselves. 2. Just about every situation presents opportunities for enjoyment, which encourages simple accommodation of oneself to one’s company at any given moment.

Suavity: Training responsiveness, versatility, and adroitness. The wise man is comfortable in any situation, and adroit enough to turn it to his advantage. He speaks well, with knowledge and sophistication, possessing charm, humor, and quick-wittedness.

Aristippus as Exemplar

We, the New Cyrenaics, ought take our founding inspiration from Aristippus seriously — not primarily as regards an implicit abstract doctrine, later systematized and explicated by his grandson, but as an idealized man amongst men. What recommends itself to the receptive temperament is both more and less than a doctrine — we meet with arresting attitude, disposition, conduct: in a word, bold and blithe character. Through the intriguing series of anecdotes related us by Laërtius, from the antinomian portrayals in choice Socratic dialogues, for the very fact that he so irritated Plato that our man of easy living is scarcely eluded to (and then, with thinly-veiled derision) by the prolific and contemporaneous courter of Dionysius, or his choice pupil — we receive an impression of concentrated Socratic sunniness, amplified by the open elevation of pleasure to the level of a daring ideal, skillfully pursued. Humanity finds, at long last, the modest possibility of quiet repose and easy enjoyment, modeled by one who considers that life needn’t consist of slithering in the mud or floating through the clouds — one who prefers to stride along the earth with dignified bearing, capable of more than the pained fate rejected even by beasts, finding no solace in sacrificing self-interest for honeyed fabrications of the over-active intellect. This purgative skepticism — the dismissal in a single sweep of all seductive idealisms and useless sciences — is the true function of reductive Cyrenaic impressionism. Error arises in supposing epistemological theory to constitute an independent branch of interest. To reveal the correct status of all such proposals, we need but recognize that, for our hedonic ancestor, all philosophical inquiry finds itself occupying a sub-set of ethical investigation — naught but further support for the central thesis that all is vanity. 

The selfsame concretizing tendency justifies specifying the content of happiness, not in reference to some grand abstraction, but as consisting of living pleasurably, that is, exercising choice and avoidance according to the life-guiding truth of pleasant and painful sensations. Not by boring into other men’s minds, not by rationalistic contemplation, nor even by surveying culturally elevated nobility, but by paying attention to what is present in our own immediate experience do we find some natural referent for The Good. Though nothing intrinsically limits this pursuit of pleasure, neither convention nor prejudice, its realizable achievement and selection, in terms of quality and degree, as well as the limitation of its painful opposite, requires wise regulation. The action which yields greater unpleasantness than its currency in pleasant feelings is reprehensible. Consequently, Aristippus, man of the world, exemplified and exhorted lordship over his desires. It is not he who avoids and renounces pleasures, but he who wisely indulges, with full self-control, that commands true mastery over his passions. In this we find the perfect expression of Socratic temperance, its moderating influence in the economy of pleasure, combined with the prudent use of men, surroundings, objects — unified to exact personal enjoyment, as far as possible. Aristuppus thrives in company, a master of socialization, ever adapting to circumstances with the confident assurance bestowed upon one with heroic self-respect and joyful sense. He understands well that what is required for happiness is little: some modicum of pleasure serenely enjoyed, disturbance skillfully avoided, and the capacity to appreciate it. Let us learn from his philosophy, share in a life of pleasant living, and make the most of our time here!

A Charitable Portrayal of Aristippus

When Cyrenaicism is mentioned in historical accounts, it is often referenced in order to provide an unfavorable contrast with the more sophisticated philosophical developments of the Epicureans. Whilst I have immense respect for Epicurus and his philosophy, these two schools actually have far more in common than the conveniently exaggerated juxtapositions would lead us to believe. It is no secret that Epicurus borrowed from his predecessors, which is easily conceded in regards to Democritus and Leucippus, but what is less commonly recognized is that Epicureanism is similarly situated in regards to Cyrenaicism, representing an innovative evolution rather than a sharp departure. In order to dramatize Epicurus’ unique elements, Aristippus and the Cyrenaics are often caricatured as empty-headed goldfish flitting from one source or momentary pleasure to another, while the level-headed Epicureans plan for the future, exercise moderation, and make calculated decisions. Let us interrogate this simplified picture, explore the Cyrenaic theory in greater depth, and analyze the clear parallels with much-needed charity. 

Physics:

Epicurus famously defended an atomistic materialism in the vein of Democritus, albeit with idiosyncratic updates (and we may say, improvements), such as breaking from the latter’s strict determinism by introducing the “swerve” to account for human volition, or treating phenomenal qualities as faithfully representing an underlying structural reality rather asserting that they exist by mere “convention”. 

Aristippus and the Cyrenaics are also essentially common-sense physicalists (though not properly materialists), arguing that all sensation consists of varieties of motions in our bodies caused by relational interactions with external objects, producing either gentle, violent, or calm vibrations, corresponding to pleasurable, painful, or indifferent sensational feelings in our awareness. This theory was clearly borrowed from Protagoras, and is not greatly elaborated upon in the extant remains of the Cyrenaics, who did not much care for natural investigation, but note there is no fundamental disagreement between the two hedonistic schools on this point. 

It is ultimately unclear that the sensory impressionism of Cyrenaics epistemology could support a more robust theory of matter, particularly dubious would be an atomistic theory, but something like Mill’s phenomenalism seems compatible. Nevertheless, Epicurus’ developments are far superior in specification, explanation, and argumentation, but he is not essentially at odds with his hedonistic predecessors. 

Epistemology:

Epicurus is, for all intents and purposes, a straightforward empiricist who additionally acknowledges that human beings have innate predispositions and pattern-recognition abilities. The Canon is a triadic account of the faculties for gaining knowledge, and includes the Senses (our six classical organs of awareness), the Feelings (pleasure and pain), and the Anticipations (variously interpreted as pre-conceptual patterning, socio-political navigation, conceptual categorization based on repetitive experiences, etc.). 

The Cyrenaics begin from a somewhat skeptical framework, wherein we can only be completely sure of our directly experienced affections, rather than the intrinsic nature of that which causes them. Another clear outgrowth of Protagorean relativism, we are nevertheless in a similar epistemic situation to the Epicureans, in which empirical evidence is incorrigible and certain, while all other alleged sources of information are considered dubious or non-existent, unless they can be established to originate from what is immediately sensible. 

The Epicureans reason from what is evident to what is not, in the case of both their atomic theory and their various accounts of remote meteorological phenomena, using analogy. The Cyrenaics refrain from engaging in abstract ontology and focus their attention on what is practical, based on that which we do know for sure. They sweep aside with indifference the unfounded supernatural speculations of the masses — those concerns which motivate Epicurean efforts to debunk cosmic sources of mortal fears — because, according to their epistemic theory, there is no corresponding experience which makes this a plausible area for concern to begin with. While there are important differences in these approaches, note again the essential agreements.

Pleasure:

For Epicurus, it is the faculty of the Feelings wherein our natural end is to be understood, since we are supplied by nature with a built-in mechanism for automatic evaluation, judging what phenomena are for or against us according to how they please or disturb us. Epicureans find the limit of pleasure in the elimination of pain in the body and disturbances in the mind, and accordingly they urge us to satisfy our natural and necessary desires through fulfillment, while eliminating corrosive desires, and prudently moderating our merely unnecessary desires. What evidence is brought to support this identification of human nature supplying the norm? The Epicureans place great weight on the example of uncorrupted and unconfused beings, such as young infants or animals, and they ask us to consult our own internal experiences. 

It is with the Cyrenaics that both of these naturalistic arguments originate. Similar to the empiricist Epicureans, the Cyrenaics who admit only direct knowledge of our sensations can find no possible competing criteria by which to judge the good or the bad, except for these selfsame sensations, all of which are either pleasant, painful, or neutral. We naturally gravitate towards the former, shrink away from the next, and are neither compelled nor repelled by the latter. Nevertheless, through corruption we can become confused and work against these innate feelings. The Cyrenaics also greatly value peace of mind, but there is no question of this tranquility supplanting the pleasurable end we seek, it is merely the healthy foundation from which we work to maximize positive experiences. By carefully managing the economy of pleasures and pains, we maintain our constitution while making calculated risks for greater rewards, forgoing superfluous excesses, and making the most of every situation. 

Presentism: 

The Epicureans no doubt have a far-ranging theory of pleasure, taking great delight in reminiscence on pleasurable experiences gone by, and finding solace in the well-founded expectation of future pleasures to come. Due to this temporal extension, Epicureans place greater emphasis on mental pleasures and pains, because while titillations and afflictions of the body only occur during the moment of physical excitement, those of the mind stretch across time, as yesterday’s regrets become today’s anguish, while tomorrow’s rewards induce present excitement.

The Cyrenaics, on the other hand, are unfairly portrayed as radical ontological presentists, occupying a minuscule sliver of time, paying no heed to future consequences, lacking reflection on the past, and busying themselves with any potential source of elation their eyes may fix upon. In reality, Aristippus and his followers are really more concerned with pointing out a pair of fairly intuitive observations: that present pleasures and pains are of higher degree, intensity, and reality than their copies in recollection or anticipation, and; that people often spend too much time brooding over the past or worrying about the future, while losing focus on the present situation and missing their chance to act here and now, to enjoy what is at hand. 

A cursory reading of Cyrenaic material reveals an emphasis on education, the development of skills and character, a knack for controlling our desires and forgoing those which promise greater troubles than they are worth. None of these concerns make any sense for a movement which is confined to the ever-vanishing moment. Cyrenaic presentism is nothing more than the reasonable exercise of attending to the real world right in front of us, rather than wandering around in one’s imagination — not exclusively, not at the expense of planning and executing long-range goals, but as a prudential rule-of-thumb. 

Friendship and Society:

Epicurus placed great emphasis on the value of living among a community of close friends, a situation which provides greater assurance of security, continuous opportunities for socializing, and a network of mutual support. Epicurus also cautions against risky political engagement, not necessarily advocating complete withdrawal of the kind usually attributed to him, but nevertheless acknowledging the danger to health and serenity that accompanies such public forays, and certainly suspiciously interrogating the corrosive motivations that tend to spur such activity in the first place.

Aristippus tended to pursue pleasures that involved cheerful association with others, adapting to new circumstances and making the most of available opportunities. If the anecdotes recorded by Diogenes Laërtius show us anything, it’s that Aristippus was incredibly quick-witted, jovial, and humorous. Politically, the Socratic dialogue of Xenophon reveals a character prizing personal freedom, rejecting the roles of ruler or ruled, and preferring instead to travel as a stranger everywhere in order to maintain his independence. Though there is apparently greater self-sufficiency and individualism present here than in the Epicurean communities, it is clear nevertheless that Aristippus highly values social relationships, and the genealogy of his school, as well as a collection of spurious letters, suggests that he cared deeply for his daughter Arete, teaching her in his ways and advising her not to worry about inessential losses.

Virtue:

It is impossible, says Epicurus, to live pleasantly without living honorably, wisely, and justly. The virtues are instrumental means to securing the good life, and are inseparable necessities for navigating the world successfully. One must abide by the niceties regulating social conduct, one must exercise prudent judgement in practical matters, and one must abide by the laws and regulations designed to maintain cohesion and protect men from one another. Conversely, nobody who does so fails to live happily, either. Epicurean prudence generally consists of rationally pursuing the necessary and natural desires, taking care to moderate unnecessary desires so as to guard against inviting additional pains in their wake, or in the effort to obtain them, lest we counterproductively disturb our tranquility. 

Breaking from the usual portrayal, and though the Cyrenaics are rather more indulgent, Aristippus  actually emphasizes a perfected version of Socratic temperance, urging the disdain for excess, understanding that all we require is to experience some level of comfortable pleasure while avoiding disturbances, and arguing that those who are dissatisfied no matter what are undergoing a mental illness. We find in Aristuppus the embryonic form of Epicurus’ threefold division of desires, though in a simplified form which highlights the Cyrenaic belief that it is he who wisely indulges in a controlled fashion, not he who cautiously abstains, that exhibits the greatest self-mastery. 

Conclusion:

My hope with this rough overview is merely to provide the beginning of a counter narrative against the popular view that the Cyrenaics were a mere infantile anomaly, whose only continuing interest, if any, is as a historical curiosity portraying misguided Socratics stretching the limits of sophistic excesses. In reality, there is much greater insight available here, later expanded by orthodox and heterodox Cyrenaics over time, and of course, extended by the Epicurean school, albeit with new foundations and greater coherence.