Objectivism’s Entity Ontology

Ontology is defined as the study of existence as such, of being qua being. This branch of inquiry includes claims about what kinds of things exist. The philosophy of objectivism asserts that the primary existents are entities, describing the nature of these objects in some detail, and therefore introduces certain limited ontological commitments, ostensibly remaining neutral regarding the ultimate constituent substance(s) of which they are composed. Accordingly, objectivism forwards an entity ontology. Here is some supporting evidence:

To exist is to be something, as distinguished from the nothing of non-existence, it is to be an entity of a specific nature made of specific attributes. [GS, FNI, 125]. 

The first concepts man forms are concepts of entities — since entities are the only primary existents. [ITOE, 18]. 

On the basis of the foregoing, the claim that objectivism posits an entity-ontology can be readily established. 

Entities are not the only existents according to objectivism. The foundation of objectivist metaphysics also affirms the existence of attributes, motions, and relationships, all of which properly belong to entities, and, as one among these dependent existents, objectivism affirms the attribute of consciousness. These derivatives, however, are not considered primary on an ontological level, although consciousness is considered an epistemological axiom. 

I flag these points to illustrate objectivism’s underlying rejection of idealism or panpsychism on a priori logical grounds. When objectivists refrain from naming the substance(s) which compose entities, they do so while ruling out the possibility of anything “mind-like”, essentially affirming some quasi-physicalism*. Rand maintains that attributes “…cannot exist by themselves, they are merely the characteristics of entities…” [ITOE, 18]. Consciousness, “the faculty of perceiving that which exists” [ITOE, 37], is only an emergent attribute of conscious entities, and cannot therefore be ontologically primary or necessary. Here “perceiving” is to be taken in a wider sense than the more particular usage elsewhere in Rand’s corpus, meaning simply “to be aware of” rather than something like “a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism…” [VOS, 19]. Objectivism also maintains that an entity is identical to its attributes, however, attributes can only be isolated through selective focus, and in reality are simply aspects of unitary objects. On this account, Rand holds that consciousness is not an integral ingredient of existence. It is conceivable in the objectivist universe for there to be in the future, and to have been in the past, no consciousness in the universe. 

This material should suffice to illustrate objectivism’s commitment to an entity ontology. In future treatments, I will have recourse to this point due to its downstream implications for two different interpretations of the form-object distinction, paying particular attention to that forward by Peikoff in Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, which entails an untenable dichotomy between objects of sense-perception, and the entities which cause their appearance. 

Notes:

*Objectivism claims that consciousness, though emergent from ostensibly physical bodies, is itself immaterial - however, this should not be understood as an alternative substance. Ayn Rand also explicitly suggest that we cannot know that the ultimate constituents of the physical universe are even “extended in space”, and we should not preemptively judge their nature according to our current understanding of macro-level phenomena. For more information on this point, see the Q&A appendix in ITOE.