Aristippean Cyrenaic Philosophy: A Snapshot

This entry will provide the reader with a basic outline of Cyrenaic philosophy, primarily drawn from the example of Aristippus, but supplemented with the orthodox perspective of his grandson of the same name, the so-called Metrodidact, who provides a more robust theoretical foundation. In time, the concepts introduced here will be fleshed out further on their own pages and contrasted with competing ideas. Here we have a centralised summary of the major ideas and concerns of the Cyrenaics, optimised for practical relevance. 


Aristippean Cyrenaicism:


Epistemology:

  • Empiricism + Relativistic Skepticism: Our immediate, subjective, sensory affections (pathē) vouch for themselves, not whatever they appear to represent, and they do so inwardly, unmistakably, truly and incorrigibly. They are our only source of knowledge. Accordingly, we have inferior epistemic access to other alleged sources for guidance of action and care. We therefore become indifferent to speculative metaphysical and theological matters, which are beyond sensory experience, and as such are irrelevant to practical concerns. Skeptical arguments against dogmatism regarding the nature of external causes for experiential impressions are based on “the argument from circumstances/conditions”, and “the arguments depending upon the differences among animals”.
  • Kinetic Theory: Pleasure and pain are affective pathē caused by physical movements of our being, the one smooth and satisfying, the other coarse and repellent. The intermediate states consist of representational information and cannot themselves motivate action as the accompanying pathē are neutral, though they may have relevance for rational decision-making. The removal of pain and fear is but foundational and purifying, not the goal itself (contra Epicureanism). Our constitutions are stirred by innumerable varieties of intermediates, for example, “I am stirred yellowly” or “I am sweetened”. 
  • Motivation: Pleasure is self-evidently choice-worthy, pain is self-evidently avoidance-worthy, and no other experiences possess these monadic characteristics. The Cyrenaic ethical project is a life organized around the life-guiding truth of pleasure and pain. Further evidence for pleasure and pain as our twin telos is found in “the Cradle Argument”. Emotions are the positive and negative responses respectively resulting from these two states, and involve cognitive evaluations. 

Ethics:

“I assign myself to those who want to live as easily and pleasantly as possible.” - Aristippus. 

  • Individual Sensual Hedonism: The highest good is one’s own pleasure, and the end (to telos) is to live pleasantly/pleasurably (to hēdeōs zēn), which is happiness (eudaemonia). All other goods are instrumental to, or components of, securing one’s own pleasant life. Bodily pleasures are superior to mental pleasures, because more direct and intense, and physical sensation is the originating source of all pleasures, though both are choice-worthy. 
  • Peace of Mind: This pursuit of pleasures is balanced with the value of freedom from mental distress (or, possessing peace of mind), and freedom from bodily pain (aponia). Achievement of these require self-control, in order to avoid becoming attached to any particular source of pleasure, and prudence, in order to judge which pleasures one ought pursue, to avoid the unpleasant consequences of certain sources. Perception of the world is made in terms of opportunities for enjoyment, and risks of suffering pain/distress. This is hedonic calculus in the economy of pleasure.
  • Unitemporal Pleasure: The pleasures of the present experience are to be enjoyed fully as our highest goal, without undue concern for what has passed or what is to come, which is self-defeating. Pleasant living is to be accomplished within each individual unit of time (monokhronos), enjoying what is at hand, without excessive toil or yearning for what is not currently available. 

Praxis:

“All styles, states, circumstances suited Aristippus. Aiming higher, but mostly content with what he had”. - Horace.

  • Education: The goals of philosophical education are tranquility, social mastery, and connoisseurship. Maintaining tranquility requires transforming “slavish” characters into free ones, which involves cultivating self-possession/-mastery/-awareness, the capacity to speak with sophistication, and proper philosophical understanding. Education thereby removes impediments to the purest and most immediate reception of pleasurable experiences, including anxiety, regret, and unjustified (merely conventional) compunctions. Training also includes cultivation of appetite and the refinement of its satisfaction, increasing capacity for appreciation.
  • Temperance/Prudence:  Temperance involves keeping in mind what really matters and what does not. What really matters is simply to avoid pain and distress, and to experience some sort of pleasure. We achieve the former by disdaining excess, which does not entail embracing austerity. Excess is relative to what is actually good — pleasure. This does not exclude luxury, but we avoid becoming attached to specific sources of pleasure and reduce our desires accordingly. Those who are always dissatisfied, no matter what they acquire, have an illness (pathos). Aristippean philosophy cures practitioners of their attachment to superfluities, freeing them from stress, insomnia, and the stranglehold of their preoccupations. Temperance also enables enjoyment: those with a sound mind can indulge freely in luxurious pleasures without becoming corrupted — that is, beginning to feel these are necessities.
  • Presentism: Telescoping of concerns to the present moment as a spiritual exercise, prudential rule of thumb, and emotional attitude — not an ontological straight-jacket. We thereby diminish discomfort and become more receptive to present pleasures. Due to the greater ability to affect the present moment, we put less faith in painstaking long-term planning than in our ability to adapt to circumstances.
  • Adaptability and Confidence: Ability to harmonize with place, time, and role, and perform harmoniously in any circumstance. Confidence means feeling comfortable rather than anxious or fearful in unknown or threatening situations. Paradoxically, it is only a person of firm character and profound insight who can be so malleable, adapting comfortably to every situation.
  • Sociability: Capable of getting along with any sort of person whatsoever, and to do so without anxiety. This social confidence is based on the understanding both cognitively and emotionally that; 1. all one needs is to avoid pain and discover some modicum of pleasure, therefore, one feels more relaxed around other people. He or she does not need to impress anyone, since we are not after anything another can provide which we could not procure ourselves. 2. Just about every situation presents opportunities for enjoyment, which encourages simple accommodation of oneself to one’s company at any given moment.

Eristics:

  • Logic: Applying the rational account of what is good and what is bad to particular situations — one manifestation of practical wisdom, and a sounder foundation for rhetoric than dialectic, because rather than the intuitive foundation for ethical truths found in the pursuit of Socrates, we Cyrenaics believe the only foundation for ethical truths is experience. We also remove fear of death and supernatural punishment based on this understanding. Engaging in philosophical dialogue and reflecting on our positions further clarifies our beliefs. 
  • Suavity: Training responsiveness, versatility, and adroitness. The wise man is comfortable in any situation, and adroit enough to turn it to his advantage. He speaks well, with knowledge and sophistication, possessing charm, humor, and quick-wittedness.

Social Implications:

  • Relationships: Friendships, familial relationships, and romantic partnerships are entered into or continued for self-interested motives due to the pleasures they command. Natural affection follows and we become pleased seeing those we care about happy. Magnanimity and concern are important interpersonal qualities. 
  • Justice: Aristippus was a generally fair and meritorious man, and a law-abiding sort of person. These virtuous qualities were valued for the sake of their pleasant consequences. It is prudent to be just, because the just man lives more pleasantly in society. 
  • Polis: Political aloofness, avoiding roles of ruling and being ruled alike, becoming “a foreigner everywhere” in order to maximize personal freedom. 

Sources: 

Lampe, K. (2017). Birth of Hedonism - The Cyrenaic Philosophers and Pleasure As a Way of Life. Princeton University Press.

Redmond, F. (2012). Cyreniacs Handbook. Createspace Independent Publishing Platform.

Tsouna-McKirahan, Voula. (1994). “The Socratic Origins of the Cynics and Cyrenaics”, in Paul A Vander Waerdt (ed.), The Socratic Movement. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 367-91.

Pater, W. (1973). Marius the Epicurean / 1. Blackwell.

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